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Abstract
In a liberal-democracy, the proper role of parents and of the state in forming children’s
beliefs involves several separate but interrelated debates: These concern the conceptual
space that children occupy within liberal theory, the basis of the ‘control rights’ adults are
said to have over children, and the tension between the values of autonomy and diversity,
which are foundational values for a liberal-democracy. To clarify these debates,
competing paradigms are identified in political theories that address them: A dualinterest view and a child-centred view. The former ‘balances’ the interests that parents
and children have in the child-rearing relationship, and the latter takes the interests of
children as paramount when making decisions aimed at ordering children’s moral lives.
Only child-centred views are consistent with the moral equality required by liberalism.
Parental rights should be viewed not as ownership rights or expressive rights but as
instrumental rights that they hold as their children’s primary caretakers. These rights
necessarily include an interpretive role in relation to their children’s best interests, and
hence an entitlement to transmit their beliefs to them. Objections based on children’s
autonomy are largely groundless: They unhelpfully set autonomy and diversity at odds
with one another, they risk undermining the possibility of meaningful lives, and they
demand an “open future” that is impossible. Nevertheless, for democratic reasons the
state properly exercises authority over the content of education for future citizens.

Keywords: Children’s rights, child-centred, children in liberal theory, open future,
diversity, autonomy, civic education, parental rights, belief-formation
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Introduction
This project is about the formation of children’s values in the context of a liberal
democracy. How their values are formed, and so who can properly influence their
formation, are ideas that are important to the overriding goal of making children’s lives
go better, now and into the foreseeable future. And before we can know what legal and
political rights children ought to have – and that parents ought to have vis-à-vis their
children – we must investigate the relational status of parents and children. Such an
examination involves several separate, but interrelated debates: The conceptual space that
children occupy within liberal theory, the basis of the ‘control rights’ adults are said to
have over children, and the tension between two values that are seen as formative for
liberal democracy – diversity and autonomy.
The notion of the best interests of the child is one that is said to guide decisionmaking about children. And on its face, it seems hard to contradict. But beneath the
surface of this seemingly innocuous truism lie several unanswered or contestablyanswered questions. It doesn’t seem true that the interests of children alone should be
taken into account in every instance in which the lives of children are implicated. Other
people, after all, must share both intimate and political space with children and the adults
they will eventually become, and thus the interests of others cannot be safely ignored. We
must figure out how these interests fit into a scheme wherein the interests of children are
said to be paramount. It is also not at all obvious what might inform a child’s best
interest. While it is clear that some things are universally needed (love, acceptance, food
and shelter) from the point of view of a moral education the interests of children are less
easily discerned.
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On one hand it is thought that all people have an interest in making decisions for
themselves in ways that allow them to live lives that they find meaningful. On this view,
autonomy is a universal human good for children – no less than for adults, who jealously
safeguard their ability to live the life that they have freely chosen – because at some point
children transform into adults. However, the qualities that one might normally embrace in
order to live autonomously are seemingly at odds with some ways of life that are, in fact,
meaningful. What gives a way of life meaning is that one embraces it as one’s own,
oftentimes regardless of whether or not one has chosen it in any strong sense. It is
arguable that children have an interest in being a fully participating member in the
cultural life of the family and will, in any case, be exposed to particular ways of life that
may or may not conduce to any particular formulation of autonomy. How are we to
understand the moral right that parents have to induct their children into their value-sets
separately from the practical fact of this exposure and the induction that is likely as a
result? Or are parents required to mitigate such induction by exposing children to
alternative ways-of-life (Clayton 2006)?
Indeed, even the capacity to choose is given from within the different contexts-ofmeaning to which we are exposed early on – hence the communitarian critique of
liberalism (Sandel 1982; MacIntyre 1988). On this view, those things that we cling to as
the most meaningful, such as culture and religious values, are products of early exposure
and consistent upbringing rather than thoughtful, dispassionate reflection. And since there
are many and incompatible such contexts-of-meaning, the diversity found within the
liberal polity is oftentimes at odds with the view that autonomous self-reflection is the
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means through which we come to embrace most wholeheartedly those things that we care
about the most.
The emergence of the family as a focus of sustained study within the discipline of
political philosophy is relatively recent. Prior to the radical questioning that was
emblematic of the general social climate of the 1960s any commitment to a thorough and
deep study of the family was reserved generally for sociologists and anthropologists.1 In
many ways this seems à propos. After all, political philosophy is largely about the
analysis of power and the justification of force. Prior to the 1960s, most thinking about
the family began with a set of fixed assumptions about the ubiquity, instrumentality and
fundamental nature of the institution of the family, complete with gender divisions
ordained by nature (or god) and hierarchies between parents and children as old as
Aristotle’s Politics. Political science as a discipline was interested in investigating the
family in as much as it questioned the best ways to achieve certain unquestioned goals,
namely the socialization of children to the given political order toward the end of
assuring stability and order (Elshtain 1982). But to the extent that the power imbalance
among individuals within the family was a result of proper socialization, there was no
call to justify it.2
Historically, the default position has been that parents are the natural educators of
their children. Generally speaking, observers have chosen to justify this position rather
than to supplant it.3 In rare cases, though, this default position has been challenged by
1

The Index of the 1967 Encyclopedia of Philosophy has no entries for parents, infants or families and only
four for children. By contrast there are hundreds for angels.
2
Elshtain’s point, beyond the need to question the power disparity within the family unit, is that the social
order itself went unquestioned and there was little interest in discussing whether this was the social order
which children then ought to be brought up to embrace.
3
A number of justifications are offered including a Lockean view about ‘owning’ the fruit of one’s
productive labour. For a taxonomy see Austin (2007).
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those who believe that parents ought not or are not required to undertake their children’s
moral education. For instance, ‘child liberation’ theory analogizes the historical
oppression of women, non-whites and the poor with the putative oppression of children
and claims that the time has come to recognize the autonomy-rights of children as
belonging to the same legal and political framework that governs adults (Holt 1974;
Farson 1974). Others wonder whether in order to live up to liberalism’s commitment to
equality, the state ought to rear children. On one hand, this will allow women to realize
their equality aims, by not being tied to motherhood (Firestone 1971), and on the other it
would allow future citizens to realize their equality aims because communal rearing
eliminates the inherent advantage (and disadvantage) that emanates from different
familial contexts (Munoz-Dardé 1999; 2002).4 By and large, however, such objections
and ruminations come from a minority of observers and it is within the framework of the
rights of parents to rear their children (be they biological or adopted) that justifications
about children’s moral education take place.
This project seeks to develop a child-centred justification of the moral education
of children, while acknowledging the interests of others. It does so, generally, by arguing
against the dual-interest view that sees the interests of parents qua parents as deserving
(some) protection over the interests of children. Unlike most child-centred theories,
however, it rejects the particular formulation of children’s autonomy-interest that is
generally annexed to the view that children have a right to what is termed an ‘open
4

We can contrast these views of communal rearing with that of Plato for whom, ideally, children were also
to be reared in common by the state (at least the children of the guardian classes). The difference is that the
rearing in common by the state for Plato had to do with the attempt to equalize not opportunity for women
or for children, but to lessen private interests of those who were to guard and rule in the interests of all
equally. It is only in communalizing the rearing of children for this reason that it became clear that the role
of women, no longer having the responsibility for the children and private household, had also to be rethought, culminating in them joining the ranks of guardians as either warriors or philosopher-queens. See
Okin (1979: chap.2).
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future’. It does so by exposing the necessarily interrelated values of diversity and
autonomy and suggests that autonomy as it is normally formulated by those proffering
appropriately child-centred views, misconceives the inherently dialectical nature of
children’s burgeoning value-sets.
Chapter one introduces the problem of the construction of children in liberal
thought. It does so by reviewing the genesis of the status of individuals as ‘free and
equal’, which is integral to liberalism, through the thought of the prototypical early
liberal John Locke. I investigate the extent to which early liberal thought, being based on
the rational individual, can integrate the special case of children given their arguably
underdeveloped rationality. I go on to briefly examine a few alternative views about
‘rights talk’ and place such views in the context of the family around which most
conceptions of children’s lives revolve. Finally, I assess three contestable views about
how best to conceptualize children in the context of accepted liberal theory, in order to
posit a conception that can act as a referent as I proceed.
Chapter two reviews the main arguments forwarded in defense of what is called
the ‘dual-interest’ view, wherein parents can advance some of their parental interests at
the cost of an acceptable loss to their children’s interests. I compare this to a ‘childcentred’ view in order to see which is consistent with liberal theory. Along the way, I
employ a distinction regarding the different types of rights parents might be said to have
that is advanced by Brighouse and Swift (2006). This distinction is central to this project
because how we understand parental rights will determine what answer we get to the
question of what kinds of considerations may be taken into account when parents object
to state-imposed exposure to certain values, particularly in the context of public
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education. Moreover, I offer a crucial distinction between parental and non-parental
interests in order to clear up confusion that is often encountered when discussing parents
and children. This distinction allows us to examine with greater specificity the different
kinds of considerations parents may permissibly take into account when making
decisions that inevitably affect their children.
Chapter three, entitled ‘Liberal-in-Waiting (1): Autonomy v. Diversity?’ in
many ways addresses the crux of our problem. Autonomy and diversity are contending
values within a liberal-democracy and each is seen to imply a different answer regarding
what and whose values are appropriately passed on to children.5 It has become somewhat
fashionable to trace each value to different organizing moments in the trajectory of liberal
thought, such that ‘Lockean liberalism’, with its concern for religious tolerance and
peaceful co-existence is associated with diversity, and ‘Millian liberalism’, with its
explicit concern for individuality is associated with autonomy; but such categorizations
are simplistic. Autonomy itself is given a variety of treatments within liberal theory such
that it isn’t clear that putative adherence to this value would yield a singular outcome.
The point of this chapter is, first, to review Locke and Mill in order to assess the extent to
which it can be said that each thinker unproblematically embodies each value,
respectively. Second, I attempt to unpack the problem that is at the root of the
diversity/autonomy dichotomy – that options can only be chosen within contexts that may
have already pre-empted the choice.

5

Amy Gutmann has made the point that it is not a question of whose values, but what values in the sense
that as separate persons children are owed certain things regardless of the wish of others, including parents.
Therefore the issue is only ever that of discerning what they are owed, and thus what values they ought to
have, without reference to whose they are, which on her view is not relevant (1980). For our purposes, the
question as to whether or not the provenance of values (i.e., whose they are) carries any freight remains to
be determined.
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Chapter four, entitled ‘Liberal-in-Waiting (2): A Right to an Open Future?’
continues the discussion from the previous chapter with the point of canvassing the
general argument that in the name of their autonomy-interest children have a right to
what is termed an ‘open future’. The concept of an open future is generally characterized
as the right to have options kept maximally open as a derivative of the right of children to
choose autonomously, in the future, what values they will embrace and endeavours they
will pursue. I unpack this proposition and assess the two main arguments that are said to
legitimize it, namely the desirability of making choices that are authentic to us and the
desire to pursue better rather than worse options. I do so in order to determine whether
the conception of autonomy inherent in the ‘open future’ model is well-equipped to
deliver either or both of these things.
Chapter five addresses the appropriateness of a broadly construed civic education
in a liberal society and asks whether – and to what extent – it can be imposed even in the
face of parental opposition. This chapter seeks to determine whether parents’ rights may
be adduced in the name of restricting exposure to certain kinds of civic education and on
what basis might we conclude that they may or may not. In so doing, I re-visit a view that
was investigated in chapter 2, that religious freedom protects the parental imposition of
religious views, and I extend it by reviewing the claim that such an imposition might also
amount to a violation of children’s religious liberty. I further look at whether the age of
the respective children is meaningful to the end of discovering whether exposure to
objectionable views is, per se, a violation of children’s religious freedom.
Finally, I offer a concluding chapter and an appendix. In the appendix I offer a
brief analysis of a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision with regard to a

8

controversial civics course that the Government of Québec has made compulsory. I
suggest some ways that the ruling echoes and at least one basic way in which it might
depart from my theory.

9

1. Children as Afterthought: The Construction of Children in Liberal
Theory
1.1 Locke and Early Liberal Thought

Barbara Arneil posits that the problem of the status of children within liberal theory
begins with the very problems for which early liberal theorists were seeking a solution.
She claims that when all were equally subject to the arbitrary will of the king, the
distance between the status of children and adults was not great, but the ends of
citizenship to which early liberal thinkers were committed and the basis upon which these
ends were constructed “shape the way in which children are constructed” (Arneil 2002:
74). The move toward citizenship and away from subjection, and the idea of the rational
self-governing agent that is taken as the model for theories of citizenship, exclude
children from the outset. To explain this judgement let us briefly recall what Locke, the
prototypical early liberal, was trying to do.
The fundamental premise of Lockean liberalism is that all are born free and
equal.6 This is a very different proposition from the one to which Locke was responding
in his Two Treatises of Civil Government (1689). Locke’s First Treatise was a direct
repudiation of Robert Filmer’s thesis in Patriarcha (1680), which attempted to defend an
absolutist monarchy by virtue of the putative grant bestowed upon Adam and his male
progeny by god to be, essentially, king of the world. Filmer draws a parallel between
parental right and monarchical right, both having been divinely instituted and originating

6

While Locke is often thought of as the ‘father of liberalism’ owing to several paradigmatic conceptions
about the limits of state power and the freedom of the individual that have followed self-consciously into
the present age, there has been a relatively longstanding debate as to whether, on careful reconstruction of
Lockean thought, he would actually be considered a liberal today. In large part, the content of this debate
speaks more about our presently disparate notions of what liberalism itself is rather than whether Locke
was or was not a liberal. Regardless, his contribution to liberal thought, of any strain or conception, cannot
be overstated. For analyses of Locke’s thought see Dunn (1982), Grant (1987), and MacPherson (1962).

10

in the person of Adam; the original sovereign. The right that Filmer believes that god
bestowed upon Adam as sovereign over his children “is the fountain of all regal
authority, by the ordination of God himself; it follows that civil power…is by divine
institution” (Filmer 1966: 255).
Locke’s response to Filmer is devastating.7 In his First Treatise, Locke
convincingly demonstrates the incoherence and inconsistency found within Filmer’s
ridiculous premise that one could trace a regal lineage from Adam to all the kings of the
world and thereby justify the ‘divine right of kings’. In Locke’s Second Treatise, he sets
forth a theory of man and his natural right to property for his own comfort and
preservation, as well as the conditions under which civil authorities are legitimately to be
obeyed. The theory establishes certain central features of contemporary liberal thought;
the equal status of persons, the idea that the prior condition of man is not subordination,
but liberty, and that the civil authorities, far from being divinely ordained, exist at the
behest of those they are meant to serve.
At its inception, then, liberal theory’s concern was “to create citizens of a state
rather than subjects of a king” (Arneil 2002: 70).8 The changing status of the individual
from subject of the king to citizen of the state, that is, from an object of some other’s
design to an agent in one’s own right, underlies the limits to state power that is one of the
hallmarks of liberal thought that most self-consciously followed Locke into the present
age. These limits presupposed that individuals were not only born free and equal but were
7

One commonly accepted view for Locke’s decimating attack on Filmer is that it was inexpedient to attack
Hobbes, a fellow rationalist, directly, and therefore Locke chose the ‘easier target’ of Filmer to express his
opposition to monarchical rule. For a challenge to this position, see Thomas I. Cook’s ‘introduction’ to
Locke (1966).
8
Locke was not strictly opposed to monarchy. The preface of the original edition claims that the object of
writing the Two Treatises is “to establish the throne of our great restorer, the present King William” (in
Cook: “Introduction” to Two Treatises of Government 1966), but monarchical government was subject to
all the same constraints of legitimacy as all others forms of government: Ongoing consent and limitation.
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endowed with reason and, thus, were capable of discerning these limits; thus, also
capable of being self-governing. Self-government required “the creation of a free and
tolerant political society conducive to unfettered inquiry, critical self-examination, and
enlightened action” and this could only be guaranteed by a constitutional arrangement
whereby government acted as a “trustee of the citizens for their security and well-being”
(Wood 1984: 99).
According to Locke, this trusteeship was assigned by the citizens themselves by
use of the device of the social contract. Locke rejects Hobbes’ earlier description of man
in the state of nature being perennially engaged in a ‘war of each against all’ as a state not
of equal liberty, but of equal license. By contrast, for Locke the very idea of liberty
implied normative barriers, which made society naturally possible. For Locke, “even in
the state of nature [ ] there is an enforceable and effective moral law…” (Wolff 2006:
21). Human entitlement was not virtually boundless as it was for Hobbes. Rather, man
was entitled to do the least necessary to secure himself and his possessions. The
‘inconvenience’ of the state of nature which led to the founding of civil society, is
precisely that humans err in their determination of what is and is not necessary to secure
a right to dispose of themselves and their possessions a they see fit; they err in their
determination of where these normative barriers lie in particular circumstances. Locke
writes:
I doubt not that it will be objected that it is
unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases,
that self-love will make men partial to themselves and
their friends, and, on the other side, that ill-nature,
passion, and revenge will carry them too far in
punishing others, and hence nothing but confusion
and disorder will follow…I easily grant that civil
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government is the proper remedy for the
inconveniences of the state of nature (1966: 127).
The containment of one’s liberty, for Locke, was found at the point at which one’s liberty
impeded another’s. This idea remains the bedrock position of much contestation over
rights and is repeated by John Rawls in his first basic principle of liberty: “each person is
to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty
for others” (Rawls 1971: 60).9
For Locke, the understanding of such limits as all other things comes from the use
of man’s god-given reason. Reason tells us that we have a natural right to our own
preservation – for god would not have placed us in the middle of such bounty only for us
to starve to death – and thus reason provides the justificatory force for why we may make
use of natural goods that are common to all, without the explicit consent of all others –
for such consent would be impossible to obtain. Reason also tells us what the limits to
such appropriation rightly are (1966: 133-35). Most notably, reason determines why the
state is limited in what it may do. Being based on consent, what it may do is limited by
what consenting parties would permit it to do. Locke argued that people would not have
consented to enter into civil society from the state of nature unless their lot was, on the
whole, improved by the new arrangement “for no rational creature can be supposed to
change his condition with an intention to be worse” (1966:186). The civil authority,
therefore, exists as facilitator of what we cannot otherwise acquire, namely “comfortable,
safe and peaceable living amongst one another, in a secure enjoyment of [our]
properties…” (1966: 169). This consists primarily of a judicial system and the

9

Over time Rawls came to formulate this principle differently, such that its final restatement in the early
90s included that people were to have the “same defensible claim” to “a fully adequate scheme of basic
liberties…” See Freeman (2007) ch.2.
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enforcement of contracts to create the necessary stability to engage in exchange and
transactions with some expectation that the conditions under which promises were made
will be realized. In situations where such conditions are not realized and certain promises
are broken, the civil authority acts as a guarantor by, in some way, coercing the offending
party to live up to their obligations.
The fact of the civil authority acting as guarantor plays a part in Locke’s
impassioned defence of religious toleration as well, and thereby underscores the
appropriate limiting of the state’s mandate to ‘civil concernments’. As Locke comments
in A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), in the last instance the state can always put
things right by compensating someone for a loss suffered as a result of, say, ill success in
trade, but who could ‘put right’ the endangered soul of someone who followed not his
conscience, but the wrongful dictates of the civil magistrate regarding the appropriate
way to worship god? Since with regards to the “life to come” it was not possible for the
magistrate to ease one’s suffering or to restore someone “to a good estate” it was not
reasonable to think that people would consent, beforehand, to being bound by the
religious dictates of another rather than by their own consciences (Locke 1993: 407-08).
For Locke, moreover, the constant negotiation of the appropriate limits of state
intervention is implied. Locke’s final defence of ‘an appeal to heaven’ with regards to
the appropriateness of rebellion brings this point home. Locke proposes that if
government transgresses the limits of its rightful authority, citizens are legitimated in
rebelling against that government. When confronted with the question “who shall be the
judge whether the prince or legislative act contrary to [the public’s] trust?” it is, in the
final analysis, god, and men who rebel against the government in the belief that they are
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legitimated in doing so, will have to make ‘an appeal to heaven’ and answer to god for
their deeds: “in that state the injured party must judge for himself when he will think fit
to make use of that appeal and put himself upon it” (1966: 245-46).
We see, then, that the basis of liberal theory at its inception was the capacity of
free and equal citizens to consent to the social, political and economic arrangements to
which they were then duty-bound to adhere. Moreover, Locke’s paradigmatic elucidation
of the limits to state action; the protection of the ‘private’ sphere within which the state’s
interference is illegitimate, is a pillar of liberal thought that requires the ongoing
negotiation possible only with access to one’s ability to discern ‘natural’ limits in the first
place. From Locke onward, liberal thought has largely consisted of an examination of
these limits: Their exposition and justification even while the question of consent remains
a problem for liberal theory for reasons familiar to political theorists.10 All of this,
however, is predicated on one’s capacity to consent in the first place. If the problem of
people withholding their consent is a difficulty for liberal theory, the fact of the inability
to consent is more difficult still. While all individuals are said to be born free and equal,
the required ability to access one’s reasoning faculty is thought to be in embryo at birth
and not fully developed until one reaches the age of maturity, which is defined, precisely,
by the fact that one now has fully developed access to one’s reasoning capability.

10

David Hume (1748) provides one of the earliest critiques of consent theory. In a telling passage he
writes: “Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he
knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day by the small wages he acquires? We may
as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of his master though he
was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her.”
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1.2 Locke and Children

Locke deploys contrasts between the proper role of the civil authority in matters
of religion and the proper role of coercion to ‘tutor’ and educate young apprentices and
artisans to the full exercise of their talents. These contrasts serve to underwrite the
difference Locke sees between adult citizens, who by definition are not in a state of
tutelage, and those that are, i.e., people who are appropriately admonished and coerced to
develop certain attributes to their full potential. In making his point that the power of the
father to correct his son is distinct from the power of the magistrate to correct citizens,
Locke explicitly notes that a young child requires the care of his parents until such time
as “the child is once come to the state of manhood, and to be the possessor and free
disposer of his goods and estate” (Locke 2010: 137). It is, therefore, the question of
‘manhood’ which determines the controversy and not the efficacy of the civil authority to
bring about a particular state of affairs.11 In a defining quote on the subject, wherein
Locke responds to Jonas Proast, the interlocutor with whom he engaged in a 14-year
debate on the subject of religious toleration, he writes:
But then you will ask, is it not this usefulness and
necessity that gives this power to the father and
mother? I grant it. “I would fain know then,’ say you,
‘why the same usefulness, joined with the like
necessity, will not as well do in the case before us?’
And I, Sir, will as readily tell you: because the
understanding of the parents is to supply the want of it
in minority of their children and therefore they have a
right not only to use force to make their children
apply themselves to the means of acquiring any art or
trade, but to choose also the trade or calling they shall
11

For discussions about the role of rational capacity and the use of force in Locke see Waldron (1988),
Bou-Habib (2003), and Vernon (1996).
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be of. But when being come out of the state of
minority, they are supposed of years of discretion to
choose what they will design themselves to be, they
are also at liberty to judge what application and
industry they will use for the attaining of it (2010:
138).
At one and the same time, we see Locke’s view of children and his view of citizens: His
view of children is used as a foil for his position with respect to the rights of citizens and
it is in contradistinction to his view of citizens that children are to be understood.
Be that as it may, Locke differs from Hobbes who maintained that the power one
had over one’s infant was virtually absolute. In a famous passage, Hobbes concludes that
parents had the right to sell their children as slaves or to sacrifice them for the sake of
peace (1640: II.4.8). Hobbes’ view of children threatens to undermine the consent model
that establishes him as the progenitor of modern political philosophy. Hobbes attempts to
ground children’s obligation to their parents (caregivers) in the ‘hypothetical’ consent of
the children themselves, that is, what we might take to be their consent if they had the
capacity to understand what was in their own interest. While ‘hypothetical consent’
models are themselves questionable12 in this case we have an attempt to justify the
absolute rights of parents over their child. The main problem is that what is found to be in
children’s interest is to be ‘preserved’ rather than killed by those persons (initially
mothers) who have ‘dominion’ over them. On the basis that children would choose
preservation over being killed if they ‘knew what was good for them’, the legitimacy of
their obedience to the one who ‘preserves’ them based upon their ‘consent’ follows. For
this reasoning to be sound, however, Hobbes must assume what he attempts to explain;

12

Dworkin has written that: “A hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of contract; it is no contract
at all” in Reading Rawls (1975), pp. 17-18. CF Stark (2000) and Wolff (2006) 152-57 and 169-71.See
Wolff (2006) 152-57 and 169-71.
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that is, the legitimacy of absolute parental authority is assumed a priori, and this is done
based on the fact of parental power rather than legitimate authority. In other words,
authority presupposes power rather than legitimizing it; thus it threatens to undermine the
very consent model that it seeks to justify.
With regards to Hobbes’ view of children, one observer has asked: “Why should
we be bound by hypothetical connections that purport to outline our best interests, for
example, rather than remaining ourselves the judges of our own best interests? Why defer
to those who claim to be able to derive truths about our best interests?” (King 1998: 18).
In one way or another, this is a central question for liberal thinkers from the postReformation onward (Appiah 2005: ch. 5). An answer to this question with regards to,
specifically, children is possible, but it must begin with a conception of children as
distinct from adults in relevant ways. Hobbes fails precisely because he cannot properly
account for the distinction which he clearly intuits and, instead, his view of filial
obligation threatens to undermine his notion of consent in other areas.
Locke’s views are closest to our contemporary view of children. Archard says of
Locke’s view on parenting that “[t]he condition of children – incapable of supporting
themselves and of acting for their best interests – justifies parents in acting on behalf of
their children…” (Archard 1993: 7). Indeed, Locke comments that the duty parents owe
is restricted to their right to use the care and reason god bestowed upon them for the
child’s good (Locke 1966: 151) and, moreover, is not grounded in any natural right of
parents by virtue of their reproductive role, but is “inseparably annexed” to the provision
of “nourishment and education” such that the right of guardianship “belongs as much to
the foster-father of an exposed child as to the natural father of another” (1966: 152). But
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it is a view not without its difficulties. Locke is silent as to what the duty to care for
one’s children until such time as they reach the age of reason actually entails, beyond the
general directive to provide nourishment and the duty to “inform the mind” of their
progeny (1966: 148-49).13
The idea of ‘reason’ in Lockean thought should not be bound up too readily with
other concepts that are used by critics of liberal thought as indicating liberalism’s
impoverished view of the human as a fundamentally asocial creature or the idea of the
liberal subject as an atomistic individual, more detached from the obligations to tribe and
kin than is realistic, such that our ‘partial’ ties are abstracted out of existence.14 Rather,
reason provides the basis for us to articulate a common understanding necessary if our
partial (and incompatible) ties are not to bind us to a situation whereby we degenerate
into chaos. Partiality is an ‘inconvenience’ to be mitigated if we are to live peaceably
among others, rather than a condition to be overcome altogether. Locke’s theory, far from
being atomistic, amounts to an associational view, which view was more concerned with
the fact of plural viewpoints than it was with their genesis. Much of the ongoing debate
he has with Proast involves the idea that as long as individuals hold their beliefs
sincerely, it does not matter whether their beliefs are a result of deep inner struggle and
rigorous review of all and opposing ideas, or simply having, in the words of Paul BouHabib, “the right intentions” (2003). In his A Second Letter Concerning Toleration
(1690), Locke responds, sarcastically, to Proast’s argument that since men generally
neglect to undertake a thorough examination of the grounds of their religion they need to

13

Elsewhere, Locke provides a fairly stringent regimen regarding what children require, including fresh air,
but the overall tenor of his prescriptions is about raising decent, law-abiding people – boys somewhat
differently from girls. What constitutes a ‘moral education’ to Locke seems to be fairly narrow in scope.
14
See Sandel (1982) and (2006), Vernon (2005: chapters 1-2).
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be coerced in order to ensure that they have ‘considered’ sufficiently (2010: 146-49).
Locke claims that the only conclusion to be drawn from Proast’s argument is that a
countryman should abandon his family, leaving them to starve for he would need to
“leave off plowing and sowing,” sell his farm implements and artisanal tools for books to
learn Greek and Latin, and spend all his time in contemplation of the sacred texts in order
to satisfy Proast that he had ‘sufficiently considered’ the grounds of his belief (2010: 96).
Such a notion, for Locke, (and for most of us) is absurd. On one hand, then, the genesis
of one’s views, for Locke, was irrelevant. For present purposes, however, it is all
important. We would look askance, for instance, at the idea, mentioned above, that
parents had not only the right to use force to help children develop their talents to
“acquire any art or trade” but could also choose by force the particular “art or trade” the
child would acquire; we have learned too much about the lives of ‘child stars’ and worldclass athletes not to be troubled by the notion for two main reasons. First, we are rightly
troubled by how such children fare; for their own sakes. We recognize that the kind of
training, moral or otherwise, that children receive when they are young precludes the
kind of ‘choice’ that Locke seems to refer to when he claims that once the child is of age
she can choose for herself how to make use – or whether or not to make use – of the skills
she has previously developed. It is not so easy to escape the training received in one’s
formative years, and this has a bearing on the kind of lives that children will come to lead
and the relative fulfilment they are likely to experience. Secondly, such training will have
a bearing on the kind of lives that children will come to lead and therefore the relative
contributions they will make to the society in which there are reciprocal duties.
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Of course our thinking about children has evolved considerably since Locke’s
time even despite the relatively modern ideas Locke had about children. This evolution is
tied to the evolution of our thought about individuals and societies generally and not
simply about the place of children within them. It is only in the latter half of the 19th and
in the 20th centuries that the basis for exclusion of the poor, non-whites and women
became increasingly (and demonstrably) out of keeping with the basic liberal premises of
individual equality, liberty and rationality. By now, however, there is little doubt that
political discourse of the late 20th and early 21st centuries has been dominated by the
interrelated ideas of democracy and individual (liberal) rights.15 The idea that individuals
have rights in view of their status as humans is paradigmatic, so too is the idea that these
rights serve to protect, facilitate or enhance individual choice or agency; again, the liberal
as self-governing agent. By the end of the 20th century virtually no one claimed to be
anything other than a democrat, even if they did so begrudgingly as in Churchill’s
(in)famous quote that “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those
other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Just as “[p]olitical regimes of all
kinds throughout the world describe themselves as democracies” (Held 1996:1) often
despite their internal workings rather than because of them, few of us do not, in some
vein or other, couch our demands in the language of rights: “rights are the language of
priority in modern society …” (in Dwyer 2008: 14).

15

The ideas of democracy and liberalism are often said to exist in some considerable tension. At its most
extreme democracy can be viewed as requiring little more than the expression of the unconstrained
preferences of the greatest number and liberalism, at its most extreme entailing nothing more substantial
than ‘allowing subjects a large measure of personal freedom’ (in Vernon 2001: 5).
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The purpose of early liberal theorists was to actively change the status of the
individual from other-directed object to self-directed subject.16 This altered status,
however, was predicated upon capacities which are denied to children, namely reason and
the capacity for self-government. As such, the status of children within liberal theory has
usually been characterized by what it is that they lack in virtue of what it is that adults
possess which make them, but not children, fit for citizenship. Thus, children are thought
of as ‘becomings’ rather than ‘beings’ and, according to Arneil, infants, being completely
devoid of rationality, are literally non-existent within liberal theory (Arneil 2002: 74).
With its focus on the rational, self-governing chooser, liberal theory has always
subsumed children within the authority of some or other entity.
Owing to the disjoint between our general impressions regarding children’s
incapacity and the basic ideas about rational self-sufficiency upon which much liberal
theory is based, it is perhaps unsurprising that so much of what is said about children
imports dubious premises and carries unpleasant implications. As many observers have
noted, it has been difficult to avoid importing property analogies into our thinking about
children, even while all present observers acknowledge that children are not the literal
property of their parents. Jan Narveson, notoriously, denies moral status to very young
children altogether (1988; 2002). By contrast, at least one observer has noted that the
same putative lack of rationality that kept historically marginalized peoples from access
to the equal protection afforded by their status as ‘rights bearers’ now needs to be
examined with respect to the similarly false construction that has been built around the
idea of young people and we need, similarly, to re-examine their rights (Farson 1975).
16

The use of the word ‘subject’ here, as in a subject/agent who acts, should not be confused with the use of
the word ‘subject’ to denote the subjection of one to the will of another, as in the ‘subjects of a kingdom’
etc…
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And yet we resist the idea that children are merely small adults. Instead, they are seen as
sufficiently different from adults, in either kind or degree, to justify a species of
differentiated rights.
In the past thirty years, a growing body of literature has self-consciously extended
‘liberal’ categories to children. This might seem to be a strange enterprise given how
difficult it is to conceptualize children along liberal lines, as espoused above. I have
stated that liberal theory is largely concerned with altering the status of the individual in
the present, from other-directed subject to self-directed agent and that the only power
over the agent that is legitimate is that to which the agent has consented. At the same
time, I have proffered that children require protection and guidance in order to bring them
to such a time as they are able to make decisions for themselves.
Beginning with the revelation of feminists in the mid 20th century that liberal
categories were inadequate to protect the interests of individual members of families,
precisely because ‘the family’ was seen as a single entity that belonged properly within
the private sphere, interference within which was impermissible, some liberal theorists
have sought to reconstruct the public/private dichotomy in order to extend the concepts of
power and rights to individuals within families (Okin 1989; Chambers 2002; 2008). Such
reconstruction, however, has met with resistance on several fronts. In the first place, the
basis for the reciprocal duties which made society, not possible but ameliorable on the
Lockean view, was thought to mitigate partiality; partiality forms the best understanding
and a desirable characteristic of familial association, rendering the extension of ‘liberal
categories’ to the family context potentially inapposite. In the second place, extending to
children the decision-making capacities normally reserved for adults could run counter to
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the overriding goal of improving the lot of children generally. Given all of this, how are
we to understand the power parents have to make decisions on behalf of their children?
1.3 Rights-Talk

Famously, Ronald Dworkin has said that rights act as ‘trumps’, that is, in a contest
between a demand of right and some other demand, ‘rights’ are always the greater and
therefore trump non-rights demands, even those that could be said to be desirable and
serve some common good (1984).17 Of course, this leads to any number of questions:
How do we know what is a right and what is not? What do we do when rights – as they
often do – collide? Can rights be exercised on behalf of others or must they be claimed by
the person whose rights they are? For present purposes I am concerned mainly with the
following question: What purpose does the existence of rights actually serve?18
James Griffin argues that our human rights tradition has protected our standing as
persons, which personhood distinguishes us from non-human animals and is also
distinguishable from basic human capacities that themselves do not distinguish us from
non-human animals i.e., the capacity to feel pain, or the need to eat and drink, and
therefore properly endows agents, rather than simply humans, with rights.19 People
(humans) who are incapable of exercising agency (infants, coma patients) do not,
properly have ‘human rights’ (2002: 28). For Griffin, this position does not eradicate the
idea that non-agents i.e., coma patients and infants, are actually owed something, that is,
17

More recently, Judith Jarvis Thomson has claimed that rights act as high cards rather than trumps (cited
in Brennan 1995).
18
There are two main functions that rights are said to serve and this gives rise to two main categories of
rights – those that protect our agency and those that protect our interests. With regard to children, an
interest-view of rights is apposite since rights give rise to a duty on the part of others and yet do not, on the
interest view, require that the right-holder be the one to press any particular claim. This is consistent with
our general view that we have duties towards others who cannot press claims – children and comatose
patients for instance – and that these are important enough to require duties on the part of others to either
perform or refrain from performing an act. It is this idea of rights that is adopted here.
19
See also Frankfurt (1988).
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that others have moral duties toward them, even if these duties on the part of others do
not amount to corollary rights on the part of coma patients and infants etc...
This ‘choice’ view of rights, that rights are endowed to those who are capable of
exercising agency, implies two other views of rights: First, that rights which cannot be
enforced cannot properly be so-called and that rights can only be so-called if they can be
claimed by the agent/chooser herself. This is because one who lacks the capacity to
choose likely lacks the capacity to make claims. Relatedly, a right that cannot be enforced
cannot be claimed – at least in the more narrow sense meant here by enforced, that is, by
a coercive power that has the means to make it so. We might, colloquially, say, for
instance, that children are owed many things that could not be enforced, for instance, a
mother’s love, but to the extent of its unenforceability, the language of ‘right’ is
inappropriate on this view. A problem arises here: To say that for a right to exist it must
be possible to claim it, that is, to enforce it legally, is to make in the words of one
observer, “moral rights parasitic on the law” (Wringe 1981: 43). Such a view is
incoherent since to have a right that one could legitimately claim is to say that one has a
moral right to the thing in question such that its legal claim is a legitimate one. Moral
rights, then, are necessarily prior to – rather than consequent with or dependent upon –
their enforceability.20
Be that as it may, a narrow conceptualisation of ‘right’ is not self-evidently
inapposite.21 In the first place, we might wonder how rights are to be taken seriously if
they are unenforceable. Rights that are unenforceable might be said to be little more than
paper-tigers and undermine the very purpose of distinguishing between a right and

20
21

For a seminal analysis on conceptualizing rights see Hofheld (1919).
CF Glendon (1991).
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something else, for instance, an act of charity.22 A further and presently compelling
argument is that ‘rights-talk’ generally is so loose that the all-important idea of a right has
been lost to frivolity. At least one observer has claimed that rights-talk has led to ‘rights
inflation’ (Ivison 2008: 19). People claim to have a right to any number of things that
lessens the urgency of rights-claims overall: ‘I have a right to do what I want in my own
home’ or ‘I have a right to drive a car’ are examples of the kind of ‘loose’ talk that seems
to muddy the waters.23 When compared to the urgency of the claim that one has a right
to the religious expression of their choice, say, the right to drive a car seems hardly to
capture the same kind of demand. On the one hand, we might view the former as a moral
right, which gives rise to the (legal) rights that protect it (such as the First Amendment of
the US Constitution or Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms), while the second
demand might be said to find its complete justification in no more than the fact of its not
being legally prohibited. Both are kinds of rights, but each relies upon different kinds of
justification for its existence. And the right to do what one wants in one’s own home is
hardly correct. Few of us would grant that inviting a religious proselytizer for whom one
had opened the door in for a cup of tea, encompassed within it the ludicrous proposition
that one was legitimated in then hacking them to pieces. The real-life examples, of
course, can be multiplied in ways that speak more readily to the issue at hand, namely,
the public/private divide for it is with regards to issues of domestic rape and violence
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CF Fleischacker (2004) for his argument that the idea that everyone ought to be guaranteed a certain
level of subsistence is a relatively modern one which distinguishes between the idea of justice and previous
ages’ views about how to deal with poverty which took the form of emphasizing the beneficence of the
giver thereby prompting their charity.
23
In fact the latter right has been subject to judicial interpretation. See British Columbia (Superintendent of
Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights) [1999].
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against women and children that the absurdity of the ‘private family’ in any strict sense
anyway, is so obvious.
For some observers rights-talk is more than just muddy and unclear, it is harmful. It
emphasizes what one is owed rather than what one owes to others and exacerbates ‘mefirst’ thinking. The general criticism of rights-talk is that with its focus on what one is
owed, it teaches people to concern themselves with themselves, rather than with their
responsibilities to others. It is said that a focus on rights emphasizes selfishness and selfcentredness and negates other values traditionally associated with virtue such as sacrifice,
duty and self-reliance.
Mary Ann Glendon refers to the state of political discourse in the US of the early 90s
as guided by the sound-bite, which, she says, the “intemperate rhetoric of personal
liberty” seems particularly well suited to (1991: x). Her thesis is that rights-talk has
impoverished democratic deliberation to the extent that rather than seeking to find
creative solutions to both garden-variety problems as well as the larger social problems
that plague us we tend to invoke our putative right in something in an effort to ‘trump’
other considerations.24 Judges who deliberate over competing claims are trained “in a
legal system that has difficulty thinking about long term effects and with envisioning
entities other than individuals, corporations and states” (30). As such, criticism of rightstalk becomes self-fulfilling: To have one’s claims taken seriously they must be refashioned as rights, but rights are deliberated upon within a system that must eschew
much harm that cannot be squeezed into the absolutist paradigm that competing rights
claims tend to bring to the fore. Glendon comments that earlier notions of individualism
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It should be noted that Glendon believes the problem of rights-talk is more serious in the US than in
England or Canada where the discourse of rights it less ‘extravagant’ (1991: 20).
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emphasized the individual as a site of virtuous behaviour, but “the current strain is
characterized by self-expression and the pursuit of self-gratification, rather than by selfreliance and the cultivation of self-discipline” (in Glendon 1991: 173). Others agree.
Ronald Beiner opines that the communitarian critique of liberalism identifies
“deficiencies in the character-building capacities of liberal culture” (1992: 36). Allan
Bloom reiterates a similar point when he concludes that, today, young people are told that
their choices are completely theirs to make, and that one’s country expects little of them
(in Beiner, 1992: 36). Today, we are more likely to think that we have a right not to
participate in contributing to the wider society or to vote in civic elections than we think
that it is our responsibility to do so, despite the historic connection between an informed
and active populace and the ongoing protection of rights generally.

1.3.1 Rights and the Family

In the context of the family, things are said to be dire. Some observers claim that
rights in the family negate loving ties of intimacy and “encourage people to think that the
proper relationship between themselves and their children is the abstract one that the
language of rights is forged to suit” (Schoeman 1980: 9). Even the ready
acknowledgement that children are ‘owed’ something and are not mere parental vassals
does not quiet criticism of rights-talk. Sandel’s sophisticated criticism of Rawl’s A
Theory of Justice is one of the best exemplars of this (1982). Sandel takes aim at the very
root of calls for justice by calling into question Rawls’ underlying premise that “[j]ustice
is the first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls 1971: 3).25 Sandel claims Rawlsian justice
25

While Rawls claims that the monogamous family is a social institution, he pulls back from incorporating
it within the constitutional arrangement. Okin’s Justice, Gender and the Family (1989) takes aim at what
she perceives to be Rawls’ failure with regard to his discussion (or lack thereof) of the family. In her view,
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is a remedial virtue, which obtains in the presence of “fallen conditions”. To imply
circumstances whereby justice is necessary is to concede other, competing, virtues
whereby they would be unnecessary, such as the prevalence of benevolence. It might be
appropriate for justice to prevail in conditions where one would be hard-pressed to satisfy
the rival interest of someone who resided within one’s political community, but whom
one had never met and with whom one shared little, but within the family calls for justice
are seen as begetting the “fallen conditions” that might, on proper inspection, be better
served by circumstances of benevolence, from the moral point of view. It seems helpful
to quote Sandel at length. He writes:
When I act out of a sense of justice in inappropriate
circumstances, say, in circumstances, where the
virtues of benevolence and fraternity rather than
justice are relevantly engaged, my act may not be
superfluous, but might contribute to a reorientation of
prevailing understandings and motivations, thereby
transforming the circumstances of justice to some
degree. And this can be true even where the ‘act’ I
perform out of justice is ‘the same act’ as the one I
would have performed out of benevolence or
fraternity, except in a different spirit. As in Rawls’
account of stability, my act and the sense of justice
that informs it have the self-fulfilling effect of
bringing about the conditions under which they would
have been appropriate. But in the case of the
inappropriate act of justice, the result is to render the
circumstances of justice more pressing without
necessarily evoking an increase in the incidence of
justice to a similar degree (1982: 34-5).
The difficulty here is that Sandel’s point does not take proper account of the fact that
benevolence and fraternity, while part and parcel of all ‘well functioning’ familial
relations, simply do not themselves always obtain. It might be one thing to say that Rawls
theories of justice are incomplete to the extent that they don’t tackle the gender inequalities that exist within
families and which are subsequently reproduced generationally.
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overstates the case by saying that justice is the supreme value of all social institutions,
but it is quite another to dismiss the question of justice in the family altogether. One
might note that circumstances of justice can have the equal and opposite consequence
than that identified by Sandel, which is that a concept of justice can bring a change in the
circumstances of benevolence and fraternity. This is true by working on what it is that we
believe others ought, rightly or justly, to have. In relationships marked by power
relations, as is the case with parents vis-à-vis their children, the question of acting upon
what we believe children ought rightly to have might yet remain a question of
benevolence, and can be rendered conceptually distinct from the question of examining
what it is that they ought rightly to have. The desire to act for the good of others is
different from knowing of what that good consists. Largely, questions of justice in the
family have taken aim at the myriad ways in which assumed power relations have
unwittingly reproduced circumstances that have had ill effects upon those who are the
most vulnerable to the decisions made by others and to the extent that seeing others as
rights-bearers increases one’s view of the obligation one has in view of those others,
rights-talk is beneficial even within the family.
A secondary function of rights-talk is noted by Brighouse who claims that “a great
deal of rights-thinking does not involve the assertion of rights. It involves waiving one’s
rights” (2002: 34). According to Brighouse, the gesture of waiving one’s rights within
intimate relationships out of love or respect for the wants and desires of others is a
profoundly powerful gesture. While this gesture is unavailable to children who lack the
emotional resources and the coercive power to give this gesture the meaning with which
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it may be imbued by adults, he concludes that the fact of seeing one’s child as a rightsbearer shapes our actions toward our children (34-5).
Relatedly, Dwyer makes the important observation that criticism of rights-talk with
respect to children always comes from those whose rights vis-à-vis children are presently
established. After all, the opposite view of restricting the rights of children is to increase
the rights parents have in view of them (2006: 12-14). In other words, rights within the
family already exist. By default, these rights extend to parents. The question is not that of
whether rights in the family ought to exist, but who shall have what rights.
Justice, in the first place, gives us the vocabulary to examine how we ought to
conceive of how it is that people, particularly the most vulnerable among us, out to be
treated, in a language that assumes a greater priority than that of ‘should’, precisely
because of the enormous investment liberal theory has made in the idea that justice ought,
normally, to prevail and that the idea of rights is the best means through which to
articulate that idea. In an equal and opposite way, Dwyer opines that talk of fulfilling
responsibilities on the part of the powerful rather than focusing upon the rights of the
powerless, appeals to the power-holders’ desire to ‘be good’ and ‘moral’. This desire,
however, suffers from the same incompleteness that Sandel maintains talk of justice does,
but on the opposite side of the question. Rights-talk in the family is important because it
gives us the language through which we can articulate present inequities and imbue them
with the moral priority they deserve. Dwyer maintains that to the extent that rights-talk
elevates the moral claims of a person and “to the extent that one believes significant
change in treatment of children is morally requisite, one will find rights-talk useful” (14).
In order, however, to determine what the treatment of children in our society ought
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morally to require, it might be beneficial to examine several implicit and explicit
conceptions of children and childhood that are presently observable within liberal society.

1.4 What is a Child?
1.4.1 The Proprietary View

Throughout much of Western history, children were viewed as the property of
their fathers. Under Roman law, a father had the power of life or death over his children.
Hobbes stipulates something very similar. Elements of such proprietary views are evident
even now. For instance, it has been a central tenet for the better part of the 20th century
that parents have the right to ‘pass on’ their religious beliefs to their children. One
statement of this tenet is given by a Justice of the Québec Court of Appeal who, in 1957
wrote that “…the right to give one’s children the religious education of one’s
choice…find[s] [its] existence in the very nature of man” (Chabot v. Comm. De
Lamorandière, 716 and 722).26
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues, convincingly, that at least two of the great
US constitutional challenges of the 20th century with regards to parental choice in
education – Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) – were
underwritten by a view of the child as the property of the parent. In Meyer, a state law
prohibiting the education of children in any ‘modern’ language other than English was
overturned, just as Pierce overturned a state law making illegal non-publicly funded
schooling.

26

Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly narrowed the leeway parents have to oppose
instruction that parents believe interferes with their inherent right to ‘pass on’ religious value. We look at
this in more detail in our appendix.
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These landmark decisions are often touted as articulations of 1st amendment
doctrine, and vindications of religious freedom and toleration of diversity (Woodhouse
1992: 997). Woodhouse reminds us, instead, that the laws that were overturned in both
Meyer and Pierce were as a result of their violation of the 14th amendment of the US
constitution, proscribing the abridgement of life, liberty or property without due process
(1992: 1089-1092). She argues that the issues at stake had less to do with toleration of
diversity and religious freedom, than they did with the restriction that these laws placed
on the rights of parents to dispose of their children as they saw fit. More to the point,
however, is the insight that these decisions could only be seen as articulations of 1st
amendment principles, by importing the very same ‘ownership’ premises inherent in 14th
amendment doctrine; that is, by regarding children’s viewpoints as coterminous with
those of their parents. When, in 1943, the judiciary ruled that under the 1st amendment
children could not be forced to salute the flag if such went against their religious
convictions, the implicit suggestion was that children are naturally the transmitters of
parental viewpoints, since it was the latter’s convictions that were being played out, but
the protection to do so was being allocated as a right properly protecting the religious
interest of the children themselves (Barnette v. West Virginia). Woodhouse claims that,
even though no one views children as literal property – with the accompanying power to,
say, buy, sell and destroy at will – the rhetoric of property relations is retained in many
instances when speaking about children and that “our culture makes assumptions about
children deeply analogous to those it adopts when thinking about property” (1992:
1042).27

27

A similar argument is made by Brennan and Noggle (1997: 20).
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Jan Narveson’s is just such a contemporary proprietary view, exemplifying many
of these assumptions. Narveson employs a ‘labour theory’ to ground the property rights
of parents in their children, arguing that owing to the productive effort exerted to get
them here children are “the ‘property’ of their (biological-AB) parents in so far as they
are anybody’s” (2002: 267). This might be taken to be no more than a claim that, all
things being equal, the biological parents ought to have something like ‘first refusal
rights’ with regards to the upbringing of these children they have exerted effort to bring
into being.28 And this is partly what Narveson means. The other part is that children are
not born moral agents, but are, instead, moral patients. They begin life as the virtual
property of their parents with regards not only to who those rightful parents are (the
biological ones unless they themselves move to sever that relationship), but also to what
parents may do in respect of those children (266).29
Narveson recognizes that the proprietary view does not, in fact, give a
dispensation to parents to do whatever they may please with their children. This, he
notes, would be out of keeping with any theory of property rights since all such rights are
limited (267). Property rights are limited to the extent that they impede the rights of
others: I may not throw a chair I own through a window that I do not own, because of the
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Such views are complicated by the extent to which our technological capacities renders mere ‘biological
substance’ only part of some children’s conception and/or gestational development. Moreover, the ‘effort’
exerted by biological parents is also complicated by such a view, since it is not always clear who exerted
the most effort in cases where the biological material of life does not cohere with the gestational agent. For
a view that it is gestation, which ought to be privileged in allocating parental rights see Hall (1999: 73-82).
Furthermore, ‘labour theories’ would seem to privilege mothers over fathers a good deal of the time and in
some instances a biological father’s ‘effort’ would fall well below that of a nurse, doctor, midwife or any
number of friends and relatives who care for the mother while she is pregnant and through delivery, and yet
these are not thought to have any parental rights vis-à-vis the child in question.
29
It should be noted that most ‘proprietary’ views have as much to do with the idea that biological parents
are the rightful parents of children as they do with the idea that parents (however allocated) may do
virtually what they wish with their children as if they were actually property. These ought, in fact, to be
treated as related but separate issues: One having to do with the relationship/control rights of parents over
children and the other with the allocation of these rights i.e., who will have them.
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violation this presents to the owner of the window. In this way, although Narveson is
correct to note that even property rights are limited, it might be said that proprietary
views do not limit rights in the correct way. On this view, what parents may do to their
children is not based on any consideration as to the effect it will have upon the child, but
is instead limited by the infringement of the rights of third parties (Austin 2007: 12-13,
Narveson 1988: 273-74). It is elementary for Narveson, for instance, that parents have an
obligation to raise their children to be peaceable and not to become murderers, liars, or
rapists, owing to the harm their becoming so will bring to third parties (Narveson 2002:
272; 1988: 274). Beyond this, however, Narveson claims simply that “parents have wide
scope” (2002: 276).
One reason why this is so, and about which he is correct, is that there is no
obviously best path in life that is right for all people; that it is reasonable to think that a
child born to Vietnamese peasants isn’t inherently being done a disservice by being
raised as…well…a Vietnamese peasant (275). His point here is that the way of life a
child eventually embraces is given in large part by that child’s environment and that this
is not morally problematic given that many different environments exist, any number of
which can be plausibly good.30 He writes that: “the child’s family lives in a certain way,
does what it does, and the child naturally falls in with it” (ibid). Narveson’s problem is
that between the extreme of having a child’s life dictated by what he derisively refers to
as the Central Committee for Children, on one hand, and the opposite extreme of the
family simply ‘doing what it does’ on the other hand, there is virtually no account of
30

For similar arguments see William Galston (2002) and Stephen Gilles (1996). For a view that what is
important is a suitable number of different options from which to choose, see Joseph Raz (1988). In order
to take account of the fact of great divergence not only across geographical space, but certainly across
historical space, Amy Gutmann argues that what children are owed is related to the kind of ‘society’ into
which they will most likely find themselves as adults (1980).
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children as separate beings with unique qualities and needs. Narveson has no account of
children only of people, but as was previously identified, that account is modeled after
characteristics peculiar to adult people.
The reason this is so is because Narveson believes that only full-blooded
Hobbesian contract theory can be rationally defended. On this view our general moral
framework results from our contracting not to impede others in exchange for their not
impeding us in the pursuit of self-referential preferences. Thus, our morals are said to be
‘by agreement’.31 Since the resulting moral space is put into place by these contractors,
and contractors contract as a result of the rational desire to ensure peace, those who lack
the requisite rationality cannot be contractors and are, therefore, not proper subjects of
moral concern from the general moral viewpoint. It is for this reason that children are
not born moral agents; being initially incapable of weighing options that conduce to any
course of action which reflects their interests. They are only moral patients and moral
agents are under no moral obligation to consider their interests when interacting with
them (2002: 266). Once they become moral agents, they also cease to be ‘property’, but
not before (1988: 273).
Narveson believes that any obligations parents have are as a result of a particular
duty to particular children owing to a willingness to take on the task of raising and
nurturing them. He does not believe that members of society at large have a general duty
to moral patients (1988: 274; 2002: 266). This presents us with the following logical
conclusion: Infanticide is not morally prohibited since moral patients have no moral
standing other than what moral agents choose to bestow upon them, and, in the case of

31

This comes from the title of David Gauthier’s book Morals by Agreement (1987) which sets out to
defend Hobbesian contractarianism.
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children, the views of their ‘owners’ are decisive (Narveson 2002: 266).32 The
implication of this is that parents who, for one reason or another, feel no sentiment
toward their particular child are under no moral obligation to keep her alive, and society
has no generalizable right or obligation to intervene. There is an obligation not to treat
any child in such a way that she will likely turn out to be a psychopath and harm others,
but, counter-intuitively, nothing to require that a child, prior to its moral agency, be kept
alive.
Narveson recognizes that the libertarian ideal he espouses is “in no other area of
moral philosophy…at quite such discomfort in relation to ordinary opinion” (1988: 274).
This is likely why the language he uses is guarded. He claims that given the number of
people who would happily claim an unwanted child, we would not see many people
choosing to kill their young children rather than turning them over to others who would
care for them (ibid). (Although if you care not at all for your child, such that you are
contemplating killing her, why you would not kill her as soon as turn her over to
someone who would care for her is unclear. The only suggestion Narveson offers is the
willingness to “save us the pain of seeing a child killed” [ibid].) But his answer to the
question “should parents be forced to turn their children over to others rather than kill
them?” is “probably not” (ibid).
Narveson’s formulation, however, is at even greater odds with ‘ordinary opinion’
than he acknowledges. There are two elements necessary for a ‘full blooded’ Hobbesian
view, neither of which, taken alone, is sufficient. Narveson takes account of the fact that

32

We might envision a circumstance of such scarcity that it is morally preferable to kill a child very nearly
after it is born, than to allow it to live, possibly to die of starvation, or to allow it to live and endanger the
provisions of others, but we are not, here, talking about a situation of such dire circumstances, but one of
relative affluence.
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it is only moral agents who are properly contractors, but he does not properly formulate,
leastways along Hobbesian lines, when moral agency begins. He claims that it begins
very early on; that early on children display the possession of a will (2002: 273) and that
“even quite young children exhibit rationality, after all, and perhaps we should say that
even infants do” (271).33 His suggestion is that having a will and rationality equates to
moral agency, but while these are necessary, they are not sufficient conditions for
Hobbesian contract theory. What is also required is “a large repertoire of
powers…includ[ing] the power to make life worse for others” (Narveson 2002: 270;
1988: 270). For Hobbes, man’s equal capacity underwrites the contract. If you have no
capacity to hurt me in any way, then I have no rational reason to make a contract with
you, since such contracts protect mutual advantage (Kymlicka 2002: 132-33). This is
why, for instance, Narveson insists that “[c]atering to the unfortunate is the work of
charity, not justice […]” (2002: 272). On this more thoroughly Hobbesian view, the
rational agency which would see children graduate from moral patients to moral agents,
will not occur nearly as early as Narveson suggests. It certainly will not occur simply
because, as a two year old, say, a child has a will to waddle over to a shiny object she
spies. Thus, Narveson’s account challenges our intuitions to a far greater degree than
even he seems to realize.34
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Since rationality on the Hobbesian view requires the ability to recognize some basic interests and to
contract with others to protect these mutually. Even if rationality here includes a very poor ability to
recognize interests and very low ‘contracting power’, that even infants might possess such rationality seems
quite impossible.
34
Narveson suggests that even if the theory with which he is working is wildly contrary to our most
cherished convictions, things are not as bad as we think. This seems to be, however, because Narveson is
satisfied that in practice people would be ‘helpful’ and ‘charitable’ and so forth. This does not, however,
affect the fact that these things are not given by his theory (which is, after all, a theory of justice or what
people are owed), but is given simply by what he takes most people to be – “namely helpful” (2002: 272)
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We might, of course, turn Narveson’s problem on its head and say that if a given
theory cannot account for generalized moral convictions that are held even against the
well reasoned and articulated views of that theory, than it is the theory that is inadequate
rather than our generalized moral convictions. And to the extent that it cannot account for
how strongly we adhere to the idea that the infirm and vulnerable ought to be protected,
often in proportion to their vulnerability rather than excluded because of it, Hobbesian
contract theory is found wanting.35

1.4.2 The ‘Liberationist’ View

On the opposite extreme to the proprietary view is the children’s rights
movement, which has always stood opposed to the view of children as parental property;
which view had explicitly undergirded the idea that children could be made to work to
‘pay back’ what had been invested in them by way of the provision of food and shelter
etc… (Woodhouse 1992: 1036-38). What ‘rights’ children are thought to have, however,
is itself a site of contention. At one end of the child’s rights movement is the view that
has come to be known as ‘child liberation’, and which is viewed by its proponents as the
movement’s culmination.
Children’s rights can be fruitfully viewed as being of two possible kinds: Those
which protect children’s interests (welfare rights) and those which protect their decisions
(agency rights) (Brennan 2002; Minow 1986: 8). From the mid 19th to the mid 20th
centuries, the children’s rights movement was concerned with the welfare of children
(Woodhouse 1992: 1051-55; Minow 1986: 8-11). By contrast, the views of ‘child
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See Okin (1989) for a view that contract theory obscures the importance of moral and educational
development.
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liberation’, which developed in the latter half of the 20th century, are concerned with the
‘agency’ of children; that the decisions that children make about their own lives should
be decisive. This is the starkest possible position against the notion of children as
property. It also opposes the idea that what constitutes children’s welfare is decisive, the
nature of which is generally determined by adults.36
The arguments of child liberationists stem from the initial proposition that all
people, in virtue of their status as human beings, possess moral rights. Child
liberationists believe that children should have the same rights as adults in virtually every
avenue of life; including the right to vote, work, travel, own property, live with whom
they please (or by themselves if they so choose), and the right to fashion (or reject
altogether) their own education (Holt 1974: chaps.17-21, 24; Farson 1974: chap. 7).
Child liberationists advance arguments similar to those at one time advanced by
the women’s movement. Women had historically been denied the rights bestowed to men
on the basis that they lacked the requisite capacities (reason, rationality) upon which their
extension and their appropriate exercise were based.37 Like feminists who claimed that
women did, in fact, possess these capacities within their status as human beings, child
liberationists claim that children do not differ markedly from adults in the relevant
capacities that endow adults with the rights that they have. This is not to say that child
liberationists do not recognize that children possess characteristics that, generally
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The agency of children is not always easily extricated from their welfare to the extent that we think of
what is good for people, generally, to be in keeping with some view of their opportunity to decide for
themselves what that is. The preoccupation with ‘autonomy’ within political philosophy is largely of this
kind. The ‘child liberationist’s’ view centres around an understanding of children’s capacity as being
largely indistinguishable from that of the average adult, hence their focus on agency over welfare. The
tension between the two kinds of rights is elucidated in Minow (1986: 11-14).
37
We use the past tense not to indicate that women are now unproblematically equal, but rather to indicate
that the most recent ‘wave’ of the women’s movement tends to focus on other arguments, having achieved
the legal and formal rights that the first two waves of the movement were more narrowly focused on.
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speaking, adults do not. Among such characteristics are children’s smallness,
powerlessness, ignorance and anxiety (Holt 1974:124), their clumsiness, inexperience
(113, 119), their inconsiderateness, self-absorption, selfishness and impulsiveness (114),
their hopefulness and trustfulness (118). It is to say, rather, that the characteristics that
are said to render children incapable of utilizing appropriate judgement in regards to
long-term interests (theirs and those of others), do not debar adults from the exercise of
their legal rights even when they display the same poor judgement and similar
characteristics.
Child liberationists paint a compelling picture as to the inconsistency with which
the law is applied, and yet they come at it from a curious angle. They do not, generally,
argue that children are as capable of employing sound judgement as are adults. Rather,
they argue that since adults who display the poor judgement of children are not debarred
from exercising their rights, children should not be debarred from exercising the same
rights, even if we acknowledge that they are almost inevitably going to do so poorly.
It is not literally true that child liberationists do not acknowledge that children
display differences from adults that are relevant to the exercise of rights. Without
question a 5-day old infant is incapable of exercising any rights whatsoever. This is true
of a 9-month old and likely most two-year olds as well.38 In fact, prior to the capacity for
speech, and therefore the ability of children to articulate their wish to exercise whatever
rights they are said to have, it is virtually impossible to comprehend children’s rights in
terms of anything except their welfare. The burgeoning power of speech, however, like
38

Howard Cohen acknowledges that children lack the requisite capacities to make decisions which best
reflect their interests. His solution is that children could employ the services of one whose ‘expertise’ they
would utilize, just as others employ the expertise of lawyers and accountants. This is, of course, circular. If
children had the capacity to recognize ‘good’ advice from ‘bad’ advice in the first place, they would not
need to ‘borrow’ the capacities of others.
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other basic motor skills virtually all children eventually acquire, demonstrates the very
fact of children’s nature, which is that they are not only moral ‘beings’ in and of
themselves, but that they are also in the process of ‘becoming’.39
The focus on agency as the single all-important, ‘stand-alone’ value, which ought
to be privileged in all instances, is impoverished in child liberationist circles because it
neglects the very reason for which agency is deemed valuable. First, agency rights are
said to be appropriate since people are the best judge of their own interests; this is the
consequentialist argument. The second argument for the importance of agency is that it is
intrinsically valuable, since part of what it means to be human is to make choices which,
in our own estimation, reflect values and life-plans that are important to us.

1.4.2.1 The Consequentialist Argument for Agency

The consequentialist argument is an empirical claim and disputable to the extent
that it is demonstrable that people do not always do what is in their best interests, even on
a view that they are the ones to determine what their interests are. For example, a person
who valued health and did not wish to die young of cancer or heart disease, is not serving
the interests she herself recognizes having by smoking a pack of cigarettes a day or
consistently eating fatty foods while getting no exercise. And child-liberationists, by and
large, do not dispute that people make poor choices. The extension of this line of
examination is whether or not it is also an empirical fact that children make even poorer
choices, on average, than adults, in terms of protecting their own interests.
In her book, In their Best Interests? The Case against Equal Rights for Children,
Laura Purdy argues, convincingly, that they do make poorer choices than adults (1992).40
39

For a discussion of how liberal theory negates the first aspect of children’s nature see Arneil (2002).
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She documents two major historical attempts at child-directed education, that is,
education that was completely dependent upon the choices of the children involved. In
both cases even the researchers concluded that the experiments had failed. Children had
been incapable, overall, of making choices leading to productive, co-operative and
meaningful experiences both in the present and as they grew older, against the
predictions of the researchers. Purdy makes two relevant arguments. The first is that if
experience counts towards wisdom, then it seems reasonable to allow people to have a
period wherein they are working with ‘a safety net’. The basic problem for Purdy is that
on the child liberationist account rationality works in a vacuum, as if the capacity to
determine consequences did not increase with age and experience. Experience is subject
to decreasing marginal utility with additional units counting for less than earlier ones
(132-34). While it is not clear when, exactly, such optimality is reached, nor is it the case
that it is the same for every individual, according to Purdy it is clear that it does not
happen early enough to justify the main arguments of the child liberationists. Purdy’s
second argument is that adducing evidence of how badly adults choose does not
undermine the case that children need to learn certain skills and facts about life on the
view that if adults often do choose badly, it is worrying to imagine how badly they would
have chosen as children, absent the opportunity to do so in relative safety and within
bounded guidelines (52).

1.4.2.2 The Instrumentalist Argument for Agency
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Purdy’s further concern is that children must be taught to make choices that are good for others if they
are to live in a political and moral space with others.
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The second argument in defence of agency, the instrumentalist view, claims that
our lives go better when the choices we make cohere with the particular values, ideals
and life-plans that are the most meaningful to us and when we have been able to make
that determination for ourselves, even if it turns out we have made it wrongly. This, of
course, raises the following question, particularly in light of the ‘becoming’ that
characterizes children’s nature: If I, for instance, make choices which lead me to become
a drug addict such that later in life I am so addicted that I cannot envision wanting to live
any other way, does that not constitute as appropriate a use of agency as any other on the
view that my life is well lived in my own estimation? One answer is to acknowledge that
most drug addicts, were it not for the fact of their addiction, would recoil at the idea of a
future like the kind exemplified by a drug addict’s life circumstances. It is something like
this that is meant by the ‘retroactive consent’ model to paternalistic treatment Robert
Noggle and Samantha Brennan forward when they claim that “most of us are glad that
our parents did not hand us a shotgun, a six-pack, and the keys to the car on our sixth
birthday” (1997: 4). A further answer might involve recognizing that since children do
not yet have a coherent set of life-plans or an established value-set, the idea of protecting
their agency, leastways in any strong sense, finds only shallow justification on this view.
There remains an important difference between children and women (or other
right-seeking groups), in terms of the denial of rights, which goes unnoticed by child
liberationists when they attempt to identify childhood ‘oppression’ with the oppression of
other rights-seeking groups, and that is that childhood is not an ascriptive identity as
such. First, while it is beyond one’s control, it is almost always changeable. Moreover, it
is universal. Everyone began life as a child. One outgrows childhood and will, eventually,
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come to have the same rights as all other adults in a way that cannot be said of those who
are denied rights based on other ascriptive identifiers. Even if the claim of child
liberationists is correct that children act ‘childishly’ in part because they are made to act
so by adults, and that they could exercise better judgement if they were allowed to do so
it does not follow that the metaphorical safety net to which Purdy alludes must be
removed in order for them to be allowed to take on more responsibility and exercise more
(and better) judgement than they often do (or are expected to) at present.
Finally, the most telling problem with ‘child liberation’ is exemplified in the
following: Holt imagines that a child should “have the right to travel and to live away
from home without the parents’ permission” (1974: 195). He claims that since adults get
lost on occasion it will not be harmful to the child if he should get lost “as long as the
child knows how to get in touch with his home, or with friends, or as long as he has on or
with him his name and address” (199, emphasis added).41 Holt’s response to the
imagined objection that some children might not know how to get in touch with their
homes or friends is the following absurdity: “We can only say that a child who would
travel so far without that information is so reckless and foolish that even now the law and
his parents can probably not keep him out of trouble” (ibid). If we substitute the words
‘impulsive’, ‘ignorant’, and ‘trustful’, which Holt readily admits children are by nature,
for the words ‘reckless and foolish’ in the previous quote, we have Holt’s completely
incoherent sketch of childhood.42 In the words of Archard and Macleod “the
41

The italics are meant to draw attention to the fact that Holt is conceiving of a child so young that he may
not actually know his name and address by heart, but must at least have it on or with him.
42
A similarly incoherent sketch is provided by Farson (1974). In Birthrights he cites as part of a list of all
the ways children are dominated by adults, the fact that “in stores or restaurants (almost all of which are
designed only for adults) children don’t act like children” (2) and in the following pages claims that child
liberation is about the removal of double standards, not all standards and that “[j]ust as adults must abide by
regulations, standards, and schedules, so children must responsibly abide by these same rules” (5).
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liberationists’ extremely problematic assimilation of adults and children [is] so easily
refuted that they [have] little impact on the research agenda of mainstream political
theory” (2002: 3).
Both the proprietary and the liberationist views gloss over the unique quality of
this phase in a person’s life, making their present condition and their future outcomes
overly dependent upon the whims and inclinations of others. This, of course, includes the
irresponsible decision to treat children’s agency as decisive; turning Holt’s complaint that
welfare rights amount to the rights adults believe children should have on its head, since,
owing to children’s powerlessness, any and all rights children have amount to the rights
adults believe children should have, including agency rights.
This particular quality of ‘becoming’ implicit in childhood is best understood in
the following way: First, as persons of moral worth children are beings worthy of
consideration in the present. This is true if we set aside the Hobbesian view set out by
Narveson that children’s present considerations ought to be informed by little more than
the future consequences their upbringing poses for others and we consider children’s
futures as adults important precisely because of their moral worth as persons, that is, for
their own sakes. Second, that the sort of decisions and opportunities of which persons
will be capable as adults, are given in part by their relationships as children, and that their
relationship with their parents is among the most influential of these. Moreover, children
are worthy of consideration in the present owing to the importance of their quality of life
in the here and now. This is startlingly evident when we recall the sad lot of children with
terminal illnesses. These children will never make it to adulthood and it seems hard to
imagine that any parent whose child had lived a joyless life of little more than preparation
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for adulthood would take any comfort in that fact that the child would have known some
joy and happiness...had she only lived long enough.

1.4.3 Children as ‘Becomings’

A more compelling account of childhood is offered by Tamar Shapiro (1999). On
Shapiro’s account, what separates childhood from adulthood is the solidity of the valuestructure, which gives meaning to agency in the first place. Children have interests in
developing the capacity to pursue a course of action toward the realization of their future
commitments (agency) as well as interests that are separate from the substance of these
burgeoning commitments (welfare). Such interests include things that children may or
may not be aware of needing; such as, say, adequate skills in literacy and numeracy, or
even things children might repudiate; such as eating their vegetables although they
require proper nutrition. In Tamar Shapiro’s words: “We think of children as people who
have to be raised, whether they like it or not.” Such ‘raising’ involves obligations on the
part of the adult world which include “duties to protect, nurture, discipline and educate”
(716). The very issue of what comprehensive commitments and values children will
develop in order to then pursue them is thrown into stark relief. So too, is the basis of the
obligations we have toward children.
Shapiro uses a Kantian analysis in order to determine that there is nothing
fundamentally troublesome with treating children as beings who are incapable of
realizing their own ends. At first glance, this seems problematic owing to the stringency
with which Kantian ethics disallows the bypassing of another’s will. At second glance,
this bypassing of another’s will, largely understandable when it comes to children for
reasons suggested above, is yet problematic on Kantian grounds, because even while we
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might understand that children are not yet capable of making autonomous choices it is
not immediately clear what empowers adults to do so on their behalf. By way of
elaboration, Shapiro acknowledges that adults’ decisions in the world are imperfect
realizations of final ends and yet within a Kantian ethic there is no opportunity for one
adult to bypass the will of another on this basis.43
A similar point is made by Joe Coleman. In “Answering Susan: Liberalism, Civic
Education and the Status of Younger Persons” (2002), Coleman interrogates how liberals
might justify enforcing certain educational requirements with regards to the development
of civic qualities in younger persons that they would find utterly objectionable to enforce
upon voting adults. Unlike the liberationists, Coleman does not argue that since adults
who choose poorly are still legally entitled to vote, children should not be debarred from
it even when they choose poorly. Nor does he argue that there is an unfair disparity
precisely because at the level of the individual some young people possess citizenship
capacities way over and above those displayed by adults. Instead, Coleman provides
empirical evidence that indicates that, on average, there is no difference between the
capacities liberals generally view as necessary to good citizenship between adults and
adolescents (164-70).44 Indeed, Coleman suggests that the kind of abstract reasoning
required to operationalize the moral powers Rawls takes to be necessary for good liberal
citizenship, eludes almost everyone. Why then is a bypassing of the individual’s will an
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The obvious caveat is that for Kant this assumes a certain kind of adult; one who is ‘independent’. A
usual list of those who do not make the cut includes servants, day labourers, children and women. An
important distinction, however, is that it is only women for whom this status of ‘dependent’ is necessary
and unalterable. Kant’s exclusion of them, however, is not relevant for our purposes since we can alter the
substance of ‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ to suit our contemporary conceptions of women’s moral status
and, if warranted, that of children as well.
44
Note that Coleman is speaking about post-pubescent ‘adolescents’ and not pre-pubescent ‘children’.
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obligation with respect to children on the basis that their decisions are, likewise,
imperfection manifestations of final ends?
The very title of Shapiro’s paper ‘What is a Child?’ is meant to get at this
dichotomy by making explicit something which many of us already intuit about
childhood: That it is more than merely a chronological place on a continuum. Shapiro
determines that despite the imperfect realization of adult autonomy, there is yet a
difference between adult imperfection and children’s imperfection such that there is not
simply a difference in degree between adults and children, but there exists a difference in
kind between them. The difference in kind exists because adults have, generally, acquired
the basic structure within which they choose, evenly imperfectly, ends which correspond
to the ordering of values which has created the edifice of this structure: “The adult, qua
adult, is already governed by a constitution, so to speak” (729). Adducing Rawls, she
writes: “it seems reasonable to claim that there is a limited domain of essential questions,
the answers to which determine the agent’s ‘basic structure” (730). It is from within the
‘basic structure’ to which these answers give rise that adults determine action; in
accordance with a particular ordering of essential values already in place,
notwithstanding that these values are alterable and occasionally become subordinated
altogether as the adult continues through her life. The child has yet to order any such
basic values in any consistent or coherent manner (729).45
That there are instances which repudiate this general rule does not make the rule
ungeneralizable nor does the oft observed truism that a person who is 17 years and 364
45

This explains, in part, why it is easy to become fast friends in childhood and early adolescence with
people that we could never imagine developing such close relationships with had we met them when we
were adults. Notwithstanding differences in personality and temperament, worldviews are sufficiently
underdeveloped so as not to play a part in our choice of friends; something which changes, often
considerably after we have reached adulthood.
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days old is not remarkably different from the person she becomes at the stroke of
midnight.46 The fact that there is an obvious tension implicit in determining the
appropriate ‘end date’ of childhood, so often necessary for the purpose of realizing legal
ends, does not, again, tell against the fact that childhood is characterized by a marked
difference in capacity given not only by a lack of experience but by physiological factors
(such as brain development).47 All together, these things direct us to a ‘gradualist’
approach, whereby children and their expressed wills are given gradually more weight as
they mature (Brennan 2002: 63-66) so too they should be expected to take on additional
responsibility. The gradualist approach need not contravene the difference in kind
approach. We can, for instance, recognize that children are gradually moving toward a
kind of threshold at which it becomes reasonable to think of them as adults; the threshold
marking the important difference referred to by Shapiro. This also speaks to Coleman’s
point, since he also seems to implicitly recognize that the fact of legal distinctions, which
may be inaccurate from the point of view of the average capacities of adolescents and
adults respectively, need not detain us from making conceptual distinctions. In the end,
such distinctions might lead us to re-think the age at which we assume adulthood is
achieved, but that is a different question.
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One possible way of meeting this objection is to treat particular children in particular ways. This is the
thinking behind ‘child emancipation’ laws, for instance, which, albeit under rather stringent conditions, can
allow for a minor to eschew parental control over some or all aspects of her life. This is largely no different
in principle from the protection offered ‘adults’ who by din of some (usually mental) ailment are not treated
as other adults would be. See Minow (1986: 3-5) for a discussion on the patchwork nature of line-drawing
relating to children as it presently exists in law, and how the ‘line-drawing’ exercise is a crude substitute for
the variable competencies adults presume are needed for different tasks. Minow’s point is that this is a
misunderstanding of what we are actually engaged in when we line-draw and the real point is to understand
the varying relationships children have to their communities (parents, state) rather than to pinpoint
conceptual differences between childhood and adulthood. In other words, the law treats children
inconsistently because they are not the real focus of most of the legislation that affects them (6-8).
47
Research shows that our prefrontal cortex, that part of our brains responsible for controlling our
impulses, moderating social behavior and engaging in long-term decision-making, is not fully developed
until sometime in our mid 20s.
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For the purposes of this project I take it as uncontroversial that children
demonstrate a marked difference in their capacities with regards to the pursuit of a
rational course of action which reflects their interests and takes appropriate account of the
interests of others, and that that fact is a part of the reason to bestow upon adult others the
right to make decisions on their behalf. Just as children’s independent status as persons
requires us to take seriously their interests in the first place, their lack of decision-making
power with regards to being in the precarious position they are in as children requires that
some adult others take on the responsibility of having control rights over them. In other
words, having been put in the precarious position of childhood by the actions of others,
and lacking the capacity to be completely independent, some other must also bear the
responsibility of caring for them. It is virtually universally accepted within liberal
democratic societies, that children are rightfully cared for by either adults who choose to
parent them or by institutions of the state in instances where no appropriate adults exist.
We have an obligation toward children precisely because we do not generally hold
accountable people who had no ‘say’ over the actions that bring them dire
consequences.48 Children are in such dire straits in that without intervention by some
other they will surely suffer through no act of will of their own. Of course, who that some
other should be is itself a discussion that implicates the very basis of the control rights
adults hold over children as well as what those adult others are permitted, not permitted
or obliged to provide once they have been identified.
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Our obligation to care for children might be a different matter from our willingness to do so as a result of
things quite other than obligation, for instance sheer ‘human feeling’, although we do believe that both play
a large part in our understanding of why children in general ought to be cared for.

51

2. What Rights (if any) do Parents Have?
2.1 Introduction

I have argued that children are generally, and rightfully, viewed as beings who lack the
capacity to contemplate their own interests from the point of view of long-term
consequences. It is quite clear that beings that eat glue with relative gusto, for example,
might lack an informed view of what is best for them. Our understanding of children is
premised, principally, upon the notion that they are vulnerable and require the
intervention of others to meet even their most basic needs: Very young children cannot
take care of themselves and would quite literally die without the intervention of another.
In the general case within liberal democratic societies, it is the biological (and in more
rare cases adoptive) parents who move, with relative ease, to fill this role. The role they
assume is characterized by a variety of general obligations. At the very least, children
may not be harmed; either emotionally or physically. They must have their basic needs
for food and shelter adequately met. There is some minimum requirement of care and
affection given by the legal requirement not to neglect the children in one’s guardianship.
In other words, this relationship is understood as fashioned, in part, by the needs of
children.49
The necessary corollary to this is that parents are in the position of having to
constantly make decisions with regards to the children in their care. These decisions
range in importance from when the child will have dinner, whom she will befriend, what
49

It is here understood that children do not always have these needs met. Rather, the point is we consider
these things to be the very least to which children are entitled. Moreover, these comments are not intended
to advocate the right of the state to apprehend the children of economically poor parents in the absence of
abuse or neglect. It is here understood that there are instances of ‘neglect’ that arise from the fact of poverty
rather than from the lack of parental care and concern. For example, a single mother who must leave her
young children at home alone while she works, unable to afford a babysitter, is not what is envisioned here
and would not constitute neglect in the way that it is here meant. CF Brennan and Noggle (1997) for an
argument that advances the ‘stewardship’ view.
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school she will attend, what kinds of extracurricular activities she will engage in, to what
general values; religious and secular, she will be exposed to, and with what frequency
and how intensely.
The parent-child relationship is characterized by both the strong bonds which
exist between most parents and their children as well as the enormous influence parents
have over their children’s future outcomes. As such, both parent and child have very
strong interests in the relationship being conducted in certain ways. Very generally,
children have a strong interest in having their needs met as completely as possible and
parents have a strong interest in moulding the relationship in ways that best reflect their
particular view of the parenting role.
In general, parents undertake parenting not as a burden to be endured, but as a
meaning-giving activity that is central to their life-plans. Parents, usually, do not view the
children in their care as simply duty-obliging entities, but as imbuing them with a
combination of obligations in regards to what these persons require, now and in
preparation for the future; physically, morally, emotionally and intellectually, and the
right to direct children’s activities within some kind of sphere of sovereignty within
which parents have exclusive title. This exclusivity would disallow the intervention of
both private third parties (one’s next door neighbour, say, or one’s elderly aunt) and also
public third parties (agencies of the state) from having a legitimate right to substitute
their judgement for that of the parents in matters that fall within this sphere.
There are many reasons why this might be seen as desirable. In the first place, it
might be said to lend support to constancy and stability which is thought highly
beneficial to the personal development of children. As well, children are enabled to
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develop a strong interpersonal bond with another, based on the development of patterned
expectations constitutive of, ideally, loving and nurturing guidance. Also, it allows
parents to experience a unique sense of joy and fulfillment as they help mould their
children into particular kinds of adults. There are also many things which are problematic
with it: The intense vulnerability of children means that bad parental decisions can be as
harmful for children as good parental decisions are beneficial. Likely, too, within the
context of a broad sphere of sovereignty, many poor decisions are made with which we
cannot legitimately interfere, without evacuating parental rights of their content.
There are many who believe that evacuating parental rights of much, and in some
cases all, of their content would be perfectly acceptable, even laudable. Feminists have
exposed the largely confining nature of the ‘private family’ (deBeauvoir 1949; Friedan
1963) and have even contemplated its abolition on the basis of the liberation of women
(Firestone 1970). Others have questioned its desirability from the point of view of the
unequal opportunities it invariably fosters for women (Badinter 2010)50 and the children
they raise (Munoz-Dardé 1999; 2002).51 By and large, however, thinking about children
occurs in the context of the ‘private’ family with large discretionary power which must,
nonetheless, be balanced against the requirement that the state may mandate the provision
of certain things, even, occasionally, against the express wishes of parents. Even within
this context, however, it remains unclear what grounds the right to parental decision50

Badinter takes aim, specifically, at what she thinks of as ‘modern’ French motherhood, whereby France’s
generous social programs aimed at aiding women to ‘mother’ their children has created a crop of young
mothers who actually smother them and that it is this that is presently holding women back. This is a
variation on the ‘mommy wars’, referring to the controversy over such things as the length of
breastfeeding, and other aspects of ‘helicopter’ parenting, however, seen from the point-of-view of the
effects it has on women rather than on their children. For an overview of the rise in helicopter parenting see
Acocella (2008).
51
Munoz-Dardé explores a theme introduced by Rawls. Rawls does not ‘question’ the existence of the
family, leastways not in any strong sense, but recognizes the inequality extant from one family to another
and the effect this will have on a society’s provision of equality of opportunity.
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making. In an influential work, Harry Brighouse asked ‘what rights (if any) do children
have?’ (2002). I now pose the question in regards to parents: What rights, (if any), do
parents have?
On the one hand it seems à propos to allow parents some considerable leeway in
order to make decisions on behalf of their children, consistent with what is not harmful to
them and what provides for their present and future needs. Since there is widespread
disagreement about what constitutes these needs, the strictures for parental leeway must
be relatively flexible and quite wide. But what constitutes the scope of such leeway is, in
part, given not only by the discernible interests of children, but by what we conclude is
the basis for parental rights in the first place. If we conclude that parents have rights
which arise from their own interests, then there might be times when we view as
acceptable that certain interests of children may be infringed in order to satisfy the
interests of parents, as in the model for adjudicating between equal and conflicting rights.
If parents have rights which arise only from the provision of their children’s needs, then
our answer to conflicting interests will be different. In either case, the scope of the
legitimate sphere of exclusivity is shaped, in part, by our foundational arguments for
parental rights. On what, then, are parental rights grounded?

We have two main

contenders. The first is a child-centred view. This view claims that only the interests of
children give rise to any parental rights. The second is a dual-interest view. This view
claims that the interests of both children and parents must be taken into account when
speaking about a parental sphere of sovereignty.52
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‘Dual-interest views’ are occasionally referred to as ‘parent-centred’ or ‘adult-centred’. These latter two
terms are misleading because they seem to refer to a view that would privilege the interests of parents
overall, when, normally, these terms actually refer to a model that ‘balances’ the interests of both parents
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The child-centred view seems like a ‘natural’ to ground a right of parental control
since it deems singularly important the fact that all people are endowed with equal moral
worth; an idea that is implicit in the liberal premise of being born free and equal. Childcentred views are thought by their proponents to provide the strongest protection for the
interests of children as persons with a moral status separate from, but equal to, that of
adults. By contrast, the dual-interest view is thought by proponents to ground a parental
right in the strong interests both parties have in the relationship, fearing that child-centred
views are incapable of adequately protecting parents from the intrusions of others, most
notably the state, that we would normally view as intolerable. Principally, ‘dual-interest’
theorists opine that child-centred views would not, for instance, view the transfer of
children to more capable parents as any violation of a parental right, in and of itself.
In this chapter I will argue the following two things: First, parental rights arise
exclusively from the interests of children. Second, the rights parents have as parents are
not the same as those that they retain as people; a distinction which will help us to
address some of the concerns posed by proponents of the dual-interest view.

2.2 The Dual-Interest View

Few (thankfully) argue that children ought to be treated exactly as adults or that parents
rightly ‘own’ their children as they do the furniture.53 When most people think of their
children (or other loved ones) as being ‘theirs’ the presumption is not generally one of

and children, hence the preferable term ‘dual-interest’. Proprietary views of the parent-child relationship
might appropriately be termed ‘parent-centred’ and have been previously addressed.
53
See Woodhouse (1992) for an interesting discussion on the rhetoric of property ownership as it applies to
children. Her point is that no one believes children are actual chattel who can command no commensurate
duty (after all, it isn’t legal to torture animals and yet we certainly have something very akin to a
straightforward property relationship with some of them), but rather the implicit ‘categories’ of classical
ownership inform much of our legal and philosophical thinking about children.
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ownership, but one of primacy; that is, loved ones are those whose interests and wants are
melded with our own such that they are given a status of primacy in our own eyes, over
the interests and wants of others. Stephen Gilles notes, for instance, that it is a rare person
who loves all children as firmly as her own (1996: 958) – although she might recognize
that she does not love her own children any more than other parents love theirs.
Nonetheless, there is a difference between the foundational arguments made by those
who proffer a child-centred approach to child rearing versus those made by observers
proffering a dual-interest view.54
Child-centred views conclude that any rights parents possess exist only because
such rights serve the interests of the child. Dual-interest approaches, by contrast, are
marked by a view toward a kind of reciprocity. While dual-interest approaches do not
view the interests and needs of parents as the only (or even paramount) consideration,
they differ from child-centred approaches in that they lend considerable weight to the
interests and needs of parents, arguing that such interests are weighty enough to ground
certain basic parental rights (Galston 2002: chap. 8; Callan 1997: chapter 6; Schoeman
1980). Helpfully, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift distinguish between these two kinds
of parental rights: Those which inhere in the parents and exist to serve their interests are
fundamental and those which are invested in parents in order to enable them to carry out
the job of parenting in the best interests of their children are instrumental (2006). Both
rights, of course, are conditional and limited (2006: 81, 88-89). Proponents of either
54

Neither the child-centred nor the dual-interest view ought to be taken as a ‘watertight compartment’.
This is because, in the first place, dual-interest approaches are always concerned with the interests of
children even though they pay considerable attention to the interests of parents. Child-centred approaches,
by contrast, are concerned with the interests of children in respect of the child-rearing relationship rather
than parents, but they also display some concern (as do dual-interest approaches) to the needs of the wider
society. In other words, the extent to which the manner in which children are raised affects the wider
society figures in both approaches to more or lesser degrees.
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approach acknowledge that parents have instrumental rights (the right to make some
decisions on behalf of their children for their own good) even if they do not all agree
what these entail and why parents have them. Our concern here is whether or not parents
have any fundamental rights.
According to one prominent view, rights exist when they ground an interest “of
sufficient weight to warrant the imposition of duties on others” (Callan, 1997: 136).
Callan claims that positive and negative rights are important facets of ‘rights talk’
because they enable us to identify the scope of duties to which the right in question
obliges others.55 He claims that negative rights “[form] part of the agreed background to
disputes about parental educational role” (1997: 136). He offers the example of a
totalitarian state that prescribed the education of children in every facet, claiming that
such a state would clearly violate the rights of parents: Whatever else might also be
violated, the negative right of non-interference is clearly violated in this example, and it
is against this background that the discussion about the scope of parental rights takes
place. For Callan, there is no moral interest in arguing that parents do not have a right to
educational choice, but rather what is the scope of the right (ibid). Although it is not hard
to imagine that a totalitarian state violates the rights of people in myriad ways, we must
be able to identify in what sense rights are thereby violated. To say that the right to free
speech, for instance, benefits the listener because it allows her the possibility of hearing
and acknowledging truth, is a very different argument, requiring a very different
response, from the one that claims freedom of speech benefits the speaker by virtue of
being the logical extension of freedom of conscience. What is important here is not the
55

The classic formulation of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ rights is, of course, Isaiah Berlin’s in ‘Two Concepts
of Liberty’.
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right itself, but how the right is tied to the purpose it is meant to serve. This in turn allows
us to determine, in part, the scope of the right in given instances. For Hart this
determination takes the form of the ‘core’ of a given right or law and the ‘penumbra’ of
the same right or law (1958). For instance, the ‘core’ of the right to free speech clearly
includes the protection of political speech – notwithstanding any difficulty around what
might be considered ‘political’ speech. The ‘penumbra’ would require us to determine the
purpose for which free speech is a right, in other words, is it meant to protect just
political speech, which it was clearly intended to include, or other kinds of speech as
well? Once we understand the principle we can determine what level of constitutional
protection non-political speech such as commercial speech and, say, pornography, ought
to receive. Similarly, the distinction between fundamental and instrumental rights helps
us to determine the content of a parental educative right and when the right should be set
aside. In other words, the answer to the question regarding the scope of parental rights is
given, in part, by whether such rights are viewed as fundamental or instrumental.
The two most common grounds for fundamental parental rights are, respectively,
the ‘intimacy argument’ and the ‘expressive liberty’ argument. The former claims that the
parents’ interest in developing a particular kind of intimacy with their children, one made
possible only by sharing certain ‘enthusiasms’, is what grounds a fundamental parental
right while the latter claims that the right to form the values of one’s child stems from the
right of individual adults to order their own lives as they see fit.

2.2.1 The Intimacy Argument

Ferdinand Schoeman (1980) and Brighouse and Swift (2006) argue that the right to
intimacy with one’s children is an interest of a significant enough weight that it can
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ground a moral claim to raise children “in a context of privacy, autonomy and
responsibility”, which can then “morally insulate persons in such relationships from state
obtrusions” (Ferdinand 1980: 6). Brighouse and Swift argue that “what parents
fundamentally have a right to is an intimate relationship of a certain kind with their
children” (2006: 102). While Brighouse and Swift agree on the whole with Schoeman,
they nonetheless seek to distinguish their own views from his. They observe that, while
Schoeman’s conclusions are fundamentally correct, he takes the wrong path to get there,
thereby missing some important points along the way.
Schoeman concludes the following: That intimate relationships, generally, are
conducive to human flourishing and therefore intimate relationships with one’s children,
being one of several kinds of such relationships, are also conducive to human flourishing
(Brighouse and Swift 2006: 89-90). Schoeman argues that intimacy itself requires a stay
on the interference of the state on the basis that such interference renders the relationship
insecure and transacted less on “the parties’ own terms” (1980: 15). There is a sense in
which interference forbids the free, genuine and spontaneous giving of oneself that
occurs within relationships marked by intimacy. Brighouse and Swift attribute, I believe
correctly, to Schoeman the view that “[i]f you think an outside agent is monitoring, or
dictating the terms of, a relationship, you cannot be sure of your own views or motives,
or those of the person the relationship is with” (Brighouse and Swift 2006: 89). To the
extent that Schoeman is correct that intimate relationships, whatever their general shape,
‘give root’ to our lives, then interference in them would constitute an, at least partial,
uprooting of the very thing that grounds a meaningful existence. Indeed, Schoeman notes
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that the reason people most often give for wanting children in the first place is to
experience the intimate nature of this particular relationship (1980: 8).
Brighouse and Swift do not believe, however, that Schoeman goes far enough in
undergirding a fundamental parental right (89-91). They attribute to Schoeman an
argument that provides both parent-centred (they occasionally use the term adult-centred)
and child-centred reasons for preserving relationships that already exist (because intimate
relationships are ipso facto conducive to human well-being), however, they fear that this
does not ground an argument which would protect the development of new parental
relationships (90). Brighouse and Swift’s objection proceeds on the following
assumption: Approaches that are concerned with the best interests of children necessarily
suffer from the fundamental flaw that has come to be labelled the ‘Plato Worry’ (Hannan
and Vernon, 2008)56 on which view there is no violation of any parental right if children
are redistributed from merely adequate parents to empirically better ones. Since, on this
view, redistributive schemes that reflect children’s best interests do not, in and of
themselves, violate any putative parental right to rear, Schoeman does not offer an
argument that protects the right to new relationships, ones prior to the development of the
intimacy which grounds his view.
Brighouse and Swift’s objection proceeds from the basis that most people would
find it intuitively wrong to redistribute children in this way, even if it was the case that
empirically better parents could be found. A fundamental parental right would preclude
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The ‘Plato Worry’ gets its name from Plato’s scheme to redistribute the children of certain classes of
people in The Republic. In that work, Plato’s concern was not for the interests of children but for the polis
as a whole. The goal was to eliminate private interests among the elite classes by disallowing knowledge of
one’s biological child. All children would be reared in common and therefore all children would be thought
of as one’s own child. The ‘Plato Worry’ gets its name from the fact of the scheme to seize children from
the procreative parents rather than the purpose for which this was to be done.
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this kind of redistribution because such a scheme would completely set aside the separate
but integral interests of parents in having the opportunity to be parents (as long as they
were adequately good).57 Brighouse and Swift do not believe that Schoeman can provide
the proper grounding for a fundamental parental right because the reasons he offers for
the rights of parents are overly intertwined with the interests of children. On Schoeman’s
account, the rights parents possess as a result of it being conducive to their well-being are
conducive to children’s well being as well. Schoeman would need a ‘stand alone’
argument nested in the interests of parents in parenting in order to avoid the ‘Plato
Worry’ and Brighouse and Swift do not believe he proffers one (Brighouse and Swift,
2006: 90).
Schoeman would certainly not agree that his view does not protect parents from
the ‘Plato Worry’. He writes: “to set terms for emotional parenting more stringent than
required for the protection of children from abuse and/or neglect constitutes an
interference in a person’s claim to establish intimate relations except on society’s terms”
(1980: 17). While this sounds like a decided rejection of any scheme to redistribute
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Such redistribution could preclude the formation of new relationships with one’s biological children.
However, Brighouse and Swift point out that this is not their concern; that they do not have an argument for
why biological parents should be privileged over adoptive parents. Brighouse and Swift are talking
exclusively about a general interest, among those who have the desire, to rear children as a central
meaning-giving activity in one’s life. They explicitly claim that they do not possess any particular
arguments which would indicate that these persons ought to be, primarily, the biological parents. This view
complicates their overall argument to a rather large extent. Clearly, in the case of those people who
purposely endeavour to have biological children, the purpose is almost always in order to have the
opportunity to rear them, in which case redistribution would be necessarily very traumatic and where it
occurred it could preclude the formation of new relationships. It is a fundamental right not to have this
happen that they are arguing for and the reason they believe it is necessary to do so is because Schoeman’s
view would not protect the formation of these new relationships; it would only protect those relationships
that already exist. In the case of adoptive parents, however, the case is different since they do not have a
default relationship with children. These are people who must wait for the opportunity for others (private or
public agencies) to determine that they are suitable to have children distributed to them in the first place, in
which case they do not seem to possess any fundamental right to the formation of new relationships. As
such, the inability to determine whether biological or adoptive parents ought to be privileged complicates
matters.
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children away from those parents who meet the adequacy threshold, Brighouse and Swift
comment that the problem with the ‘Plato Worry’ is not, as Schoeman suggests, that
redistribution would occur based on ‘society’s terms’ where such terms are understood to
be no more than the fickle will of the majority. Brighouse and Swift point out that such
majoritarianism is presently anathema to any liberal society (2006: 91). Instead, any
redistributive scheme would be constitutive of “firm and binding standards given by
justice” (Ibid). Such standards would be ‘choice-insensitive’58 in that they would not
reflect any particular conception of the good, but would reflect criteria it is felt all people
must meet.59 In this way they would be no different from other standards set within
liberal societies including whatever ‘minimal threshold’, the need for which to protect
children from neglect and abuse Schoeman acknowledges, all parents would be required
to meet whether or not fundamental parental rights could be ascertained. As such,
Schoeman’s wish to avoid the ‘Plato Worry’ falters on his own misunderstanding of what
kind of terms could be adduced in order to determine when redistribution was
appropriate: They would not be ‘society’s terms’ but what ‘justice required’. This being
the case, Schoeman fails to secure the fundamental rights parents would need in order to
reject redistributivist schemes in the absence of abuse or neglect. Brighouse and Swift
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The terminology comes from Ronald Dworkin’s work on distributive justice from Sovereign Virtue
(2000) in which he defends a distributive scheme that is ‘choice-sensitive’ and ‘circumstance-insensitive’.
In other words, the distributive scheme would reward the choices of individuals (to work hard, to not
gamble away their fortunes), but would be insensitive to circumstance, in other words, would redistribute in
such a way as to compensate for the capriciousness of ‘luck’. In a liberal society, however, the state ought
to be neutral with regard to the permissible choices of its citizens and as such any redistribution as given by
the Plato Worry would not use as a criterion the relative merit of permissible choices of citizens and would
therefore be ‘choice-insensitive’.
59
The very question as to whether or not there are such criteria and whether ‘standards of justice’ are not
themselves expressions of the majority is an important one. On one reading, Brighouse and Swift are
merely quibbling with terminology as what Schoeman means by ‘society’s terms’ might very well come to
the same thing as the ‘standards of justice’ given by Brighouse and Swift, since these constitute, in a
manner of speaking ‘society’s terms’. After all, liberal values are justified, by and large, by the fact that
members of liberal societies consent to them, even if only generally and in abstraction.
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believe that on a child-centred approach, merely adequate parents cannot be guaranteed
the opportunity of forming intimate relationships with children whom they could
rightfully ‘parent’. A ‘stand alone’ parent-centred argument, one which recognizes the
weighty interest at stake, is required.60
Brighouse and Swift believe that they have found such a ‘stand-alone’ parentcentred argument and that it is based in the unique moral quality of the parent-child
relationship (98-99). They acknowledge that liberal theory views as anathema control
rights over others that do not inhere in the interests of those others, leastways where those
others have demonstrated the incapacity to choose for themselves. It has been pointed
out, for instance, that while we have a desire to have intimate relations with others
(friends, spouses) and this desire is, likewise, an important interest that is advanced
because central to the meaning of the lives of most people, this interest does not ground a
right of control over these others (Hannan and Vernon 2008); a spouse need not stay with
us if they choose not to, nor must a friend return our phone call if they are inclined not to.
We are neither allowed to insist that these intimate others exhibit particular moral
qualities in a way that can be called a right regardless of how much the continuing
intimacy of our relationship depends upon their doing so. Clearly, of course, children are
in a different position from adults and as such our relationship with them is necessarily
different. This necessity to have at least an initial right of control over them is not here in
dispute for reasons that have already been canvassed. What is in dispute is the
understanding which grounds that right of control.
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It should be noted that Brighouse and Swift do not equate fundamental parental rights with extensive
parental rights arguing that instrumental rights can be quite extensive and fundamental rights can be quite
limited. At issue is the basis of the right and not the extensive array of areas its exercise rightly covers.
Brighouse and Swift are arguing on behalf of a limited, fundamental parental right.
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Brighouse and Swift contend that the parent-child relationship is unique, not
easily substitutable and “contributes to one’s flourishing of a different kind” (2006: 96),
from intimate relationships with adult others. It is the unique moral quality owing to these
things that differentiate it from all other relationships which might normally be adduced
as an objection to the claim Brighouse, Swift and Schoeman forward. While the unique
moral qualities of the parent-child relationship which Brighouse and Swift adduce are
rightly stated, it is not clear that these bestow upon the parent-child relationship a
privileged position with regards to these different, but similar, relationships. It might as
easily be said that an intimate relationship with a spouse to whom one has made
substantial (and lifelong) commitments or the intimate relationship one has with a lover
are unique in their own right, not easily substitutable and contribute to one’s flourishing
in substantive ways; that they are more than “mere desires, however intense” (98). The
fact, then, that the parent-child relationship is unique, does not ipso facto mean it is
weightier and therefore in some important way privileged.
Brighouse and Swift’s very premise is problematic. They readily note that one of
the most compelling reasons parents have for wanting to take on the challenge of this
kind of relationship is precisely because children may not exit these relationships. In
other words, the fact of children’s intense vulnerability is one of the central aspects that
make caring for them so appealing (95-6); a reference to the unique moral quality of the
relationship which grounds their argument. However, this fact would seem to lend
credence, on a liberal view, to strengthening rather than weakening the protection of
children’s interests. Whatever the ‘weight’ of this particular relationship its merits
cannot be ascertained with respect to how much it serves the interests of the power-holder
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(parents). The fact of its ‘uniqueness’ does not provide the justificatory force they need to
claim that the parents’ interests may be indulged with some (acceptable) loss to the
child’s on the view that the power holder has a particularly weighty interest in it being so
(102).
Brighouse and Swift are careful to note that the parent-child relationship, as they
see it, is governed by “stringent and nondiscretionary moral norms” (92) and as such
offers a good deal of protection to the interests of children. Nonetheless, they seem to be
putting the cart before the horse: They object to aspects of Schoeman because his
formulation does not ground fundamental parental rights and therefore does not protect,
in their view, against the ‘Plato Worry’ and such redistribution violates fundamental
parental rights. However, in order for the redistributivist scheme referred to in the ‘Plato
Worry’ to be a violation of fundamental parental rights, such rights must exist. It is clear
from Brighouse and Swift’s objection that they have already constituted that parents have
fundamental rights and that such rights can be invoked as a defence against the ‘Plato
Worry’. In other words, their objection relies upon the a priori existence of a right they
(and Schoeman) fail to establish. The reason they fail is because their defence trades on a
difference in kind that is not meaningful to the conclusion they reach. Brighouse and
Swift determine quite reasonably that, all things aside, weighty interests ground rights.
They further argue that people have a weighty interest in a particular kind of intimate
relationship with their children. The obvious objection is that where the weighty interest
of the parent ought to ground a right the potentially contravening interests of the child
ought to act as a counterweight such as to deprive the parent from holding any such right
all. After all, fundamental parental rights are such that parents may act on these rights to
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satisfy their own desires for a particular kind of relationship with their children even to
the extent of an acceptable loss to the children’s interest, thereby using children as a
means to the parents’ ends.
Callan and Galston also acknowledge the good of parent/child intimacy, although
this does not form the crux of their overarching arguments for fundamental parental
rights. Unlike Brighouse and Swift who specifically disavow that fundamental parental
rights are grounded in any expressive or associative interests parents have (102) both
Callan and Galston tie the good of intimacy to these other interests (Galston 2002: 101108; Callan 1997: 143). While acknowledging that they are linked, I will extricate one
from the other in order to examine them as distinct claims.
Callan claims that “the good of intimacy cannot be divorced from concerns about
the adults that children will become” (1997: 143-4). There is more than one reason why
this might be so; however the reason to which Callan alludes is that the kind of people
children will become will have an impact upon the possibility for the continuing
relationship between the parent and that child (144). This is not, of course, completely
separate from the necessary fact that parents will rear their children in ways they believe
are best for the children themselves and that such ways cannot be divorced from the
values and beliefs that parents embrace. It is clear that, even with regard to instrumental
rights, it is impossible (and undesirable) to avoid forming, leastways in part, children’s
values and that the formation of children’s values will normally stem from parental
actions that are perfectly permissible. This practical fact need not overshadow our
examination of the implications of the intimacy argument taken on its own. I might not
wish for my child to join the military because I disapprove of the ways in which the
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rhetoric of patriotism is employed to suit ends that are disingenuous, or, at least,
ideologically wrong-headed in my view. That I will rear my child to share this view in
the hope that he will never join the military is a safe bet to make. But the issue raised by
Callan takes this view a step further and implies that the underlying issue is that once it is
determined that the child does not share the parental view in question, a link in the chain
of intimacy is likely softened and it is the prevention of this softening to which parents
have a fundamental right. In this sense, the scope of parental rights is not, instrumentally,
to protect the interest of the child (although such an interest may be, inadvertently,
protected by this as well). There is a specific function which is meant to be served and it
is to protect the relationship between parent and child in a way that serves the aspirations
of parents.61
An interesting observation is à propos here. Rarely do children turn out exactly as
one had envisioned. In fact, a large part of the parental role entails the consistent
amelioration of intimacy despite the lack of and not because of shared commitments and
values; that what is unique about the parent-child relationship is that it is largely based on
building a relationship with one’s children “regardless of your differences” (Hannan and
Vernon 2008: 6; Mills 2003: 504-05). As a corollary to this, Callan points out that an
incessant concern for how children will ‘turn out’, precludes the “sheer fulfilment of
sharing a life with my child now” (1997: 143), negating the possibility that the child can
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Of course, it is normally in the interests of children as well that intimate relationships between parent and
child be maintained. That, however, is not the focus here, as that would proffer a child-centred argument
for intimacy. Moreover, the emphasis in Callan, although it is not explicit, seems to be on the withdrawal of
intimacy from the parent’s side rather than from the child’s. Even if this latter assessment is incorrect, it is
still the case that the intimacy argument for fundamental parental rights is exclusively focused upon the
good of intimacy and the damage of its loss in terms of the parent’s feelings, hopes and aspirations and not
the child’s (Callan 1997: 144).
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enjoy the ‘good’ that is that relationship in the present.62 If the above is correct, then
intimacy between parent and child does not require the commitment to similar values as
has been so adamantly advanced by Schoeman and, to a lesser extent, Brighouse and
Swift. This, of course, is not strictly true in the sense that some parents will require a
commitment to certain integral values in order for intimacy to remain unharmed. And, if
it turns out to be the case that parents have a fundamental right to this intimacy then the
fact that shared commitments are not required in general for a successful parent-child
relationship does not tell against the right in specific instances where clearly it is
required.
I can use a starker example than the military for illustrative purposes. Imagine a
gay child who is born into a deeply religious household in which homosexuality is
thought to be a terrible sin. Likely, the gay child has few greater interests than in not
believing in homosexuality’s sinfulness since it is likely that such a view will seriously
disable him from the kind of feelings of self-worth and self-esteem that children require.
Whatever else, self-hatred does not give one a good start in life. By contrast, the strong
interest of these parents, on the intimacy view, is to have a heterosexual child. Clearly
their interests collide. On the ‘intimacy argument’ parents may act “within limits” to
ensure that the realization of their fear of estrangement will not come to fruition (Galston
2002: 102). Limits exist because dual-interest views necessarily take into account the
countervailing interests of children. On no account may parents do whatever they please
in order to ensure intimacy even if it is the case that they have a right to such intimacy;
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In the previous chapter we elaborated on this point by pointing out that a parent of a terminally ill child
would find cold-comfort in the fact that they had hitherto raised that child with an exclusive focus on how
that child would be in the future, since that child will not have one and would have also missed out on the
good of a presently satisfying relationship.
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the dual-interest view is one of ‘balance’ and ‘reciprocity’. What these limits are given
by, however, is unclear. It doesn’t seem right that any theory purporting to be a liberal
one could embrace the clearly deleterious effects that catering to the interests of the
parents in the above example would bring. One would, also, be hard-pressed to liken the
ascriptive identity of homosexuality for which one is, for all intents and purposes, hardwired, to other burgeoning commitments.63 In other words, inducting children into
certain values when they, as of yet, have none cannot be equated with inducting a
homosexual child into a view of life which concluded that his homosexuality was deeply
aberrant. None of this is to defend a view that pits fundamental parental interests against
those of children. To construct the family as a bastion of conflicting interests is not only
largely inaccurate, but it “ful[fills] the worst fears of critics of rights in the family
context” (Hannan and Vernon 2008: 3). In most cases, parents believe that the values
they are passing along are sound and appropriate. In most cases, too, it might be
appropriate to allow parents to pass along these values. It is here suggested, nonetheless,
that most dual-interest proponents would view it as morally impermissible, in the
example of the gay child, to allow parents to pass along the view of the aberrancy of
homosexuality on the basis of the ‘intimacy’ argument because the interests of the child
would be so obviously ill-served.64 This is not an issue of simple line-drawing wherein
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There was a recent controversy when the actor Cynthia Nixon, who is in a relationship with another
woman, claimed that although she knew it was not for all gay people, for her it was a ‘choice’. This
angered many gay-rights activists who have been fighting for the recognition that as an ascriptive identifier
rather than a ‘lifestyle choice’ discriminatory laws and policies are unconstitutional to the extent that
homosexuality falls into the, to use Dworkin’s terminology, ‘circumstance’ rather than ‘choice’ category.
Clearly, for some it is a choice and for others (likely the majority) it is a question of circumstance. More
importantly, is the underlying question as to why the state should take any position whatsoever about whom
you sleep and life-partner with...
64
And since, of course, parents cannot know in advance if their child is ‘hard-wired’ to be gay, this
provides a strong argument against the moral legitimacy of imparting anti-gay values to children
whatsoever, more about which in chapter. 4.
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we might argue that drawing the line in any given place does or does not cohere with
some underlying principle; that issue will always be present. Rather, line drawing
requires a theoretical framework in order to justify why the line ought to be drawn at any
given place. Schoeman, Brighouse and Swift contend that fundamental parental rights to
intimacy allow for the privileging of parents’ interests even at some (acceptable) loss to
the child’s. What such a view would further require is a theoretical basis for deciding
how much of a child’s interest may be subsumed within parents’ before the limits must
be drawn. Nonetheless, I have already demonstrated that the privileging of interests in
the name of the advantage to the one possessing control rights is anathema to liberal
theory and provided reasoning for why the parent-child relationship is not an exception to
this general rule.
There is another purpose which the argument for fundamental parental rights
might be adduced and that is the exclusion of third parties from having legitimate control
rights within the sphere determined to be protected by the right to intimacy with one’s
child. This is one of the ways in which Galston ties intimacy to expressive liberty. When
we are speaking about expressive liberty in the context of child-rearing we are talking
about such norms in the context of exclusivity. In other words, the nature of being able to
rear my child in accordance with my expressive liberty is not simply that I may be
allowed to do so, but that I and not others may be allowed to do so with respect to my
child. The deep connection between expressive liberty and intimacy ties particular
children to particular parents. Galston, for instance, claims that “when I say a child is
‘mine’ I am acknowledging responsibilities and asserting authority beyond what I owe or
claim vis-à-vis children in general” (2002: 103).
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This seems to be the way in which Callan formulates his theory as well. He shifts
the emphasis from whose interests may be privileged in a contest between those of
parents and children to the sovereign sphere within which the decisions of others may not
intrude. He offers at least two salient examples for why we might view this as necessary,
both of which will be taken up below. It is not clear, however, that fundamental rights are
necessary to keep the intrusions of third parties at bay or that the examples he provides
serve the point that they are. As Brighouse and Swift insightfully comment, even though
fundamental rights are generally thought to be expansive, this need not be the case.
Fundamental rights can be construed as rigidly limited, and instrumental rights can be
construed as allowing tremendous leeway (2006: 81, 87-9,105). If, then, we do not
require fundamental rights to protect an appropriate sphere of parental authority and it is
inappropriate for parental intimacy-interests to be privileged over those of children, is
there some other reason we can think of which might yet ground fundamental parental
rights?

2.2.2 The Expressive Liberty Argument

The expressive liberty argument is concerned with the interests of parents that attach to
the expression of particular values that are deemed weighty enough to ground a
fundamental right. Galston is one of the main proponents of this particular view. He
believes that the most basic reason to secure constitutional norms is so that we might live
according to our deepest commitments. Our ability to do so constitutes our ‘expressive
liberty’, the right to which it is the fundamental objective of liberal democratic societies
to secure (2002: 101-08). In turn, our ability to raise our children according to such
commitments constitutes “an essential element of expressive liberty” (102).

72

Galston claims that there are fairly stringent limits to parental authority. These
limits preclude turning our children into ‘automatons’ who at no future time could be
reasonably expected to exercise even the capacity to question the determinative
judgements of their parents (104-05). Children must also learn to respect certain basic
citizenship values such as law abidingness and the willingness to tolerate even the wrong
choices of others (107).65 The very basis of expressive liberty requires us to permit others
to live in ways we would consider ‘unfree’: Others should be allowed to live in ways we
would not wish to on the basis that there are many ways in which one can live that more
than ably meet the bar of what it could mean to live a meaningful life.
This argument for expressive liberty trades on the notion that we have a
particularly weighty interest in raising our children to adhere to the same values we do.
Aside from the parent-child intimacy to which it is linked, and which I have already
discussed, it is not entirely clear what this interest entails. Callan puts it this way: “the
freedom to rear our children according to the dictates of conscience is for most of us as
important as any other expression of conscience [...]” (1997: 143). So, it is clear that our
desire to rear our children with the values that we wish to is important to us, but the
question is why, precisely, is this so? The expressive liberty argument is more
appropriately understood as an amalgam of at least two other (sub) arguments for
parental rights.
The first (sub) argument which makes up the expressive liberty argument is that
of intimacy which I have just canvassed. To recap, this is constitutive of the following
idea: My right to rear my child in accord with my commitments, that is, my expressive
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For a critique of this aspect of Galston see Brighouse (1998: 719-745). See, also Callan (1994) for a
criticism of Galston’s proposals for civic education.
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liberty, not only hinges upon my capacity to exclude others, thereby tying me intimately
to my children and keeping others from having a like relationship with them, but also
allows me to act, ‘within limits’, to steer my children away from ways of life that might
undermine my continuing intimacy with them (Galston 2002: 102). The second (sub)
argument is what I will call the ‘interpretive capacity’ argument; that is, the fact that we
are charged with the task of parenting our children means that we must necessarily have
considerable scope to make decisions on our children’s behalf. Without a wide parameter
of scope to prevent us from perennially and self-consciously assessing even our most
basic decisions, the very term ‘parenting’ is voided: Parenting would entail little more
than being the night manager at an inn wherein a place to rest is provided, a meal or two
thrown in, and advice is dispensed as to the area’s amenities, but guests are more or less
free to do as they please – or as they are told by the local constabulary. It is unlikely that
such a notion of parenting would hold much appeal for most people or that on such a
model children could be assured of getting the nurturing and direction they require.
Interpretive capacity is tied to one’s expressive liberty owing to the necessary connection
between the beliefs parents possess and their ability to make decisions on their children’s
behalf. Even if, as parents, it was appropriate to ask us to perennially assess even our
most basic decisions, this would provide little direction. As has been noted, we cannot
divorce what we believe to be good from what we pass along to our children and it is
only reasonable that we think of as good those values and commitments to which we
adhere: “[W]e cannot but draw upon the comprehensive understanding that gives our
values whatever coherence and grounding they may possess” (Galston 2002: 102).66 Even
if much of what we decided was wrong, this situation likely would not be ameliorated by
66

See also Gilles (1996: 960-61).
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replacing it with a situation wherein parents were in a constant state of anxiety and
uncertainty over being found wanting at every turn, with the possible consequence being
the removal of their child by the state.
Charles Fried refers to the issue of rights with regards to the family as both
‘complex’ and ‘peculiarly elusive’ (1978: 150). Using a framework of ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ rights, Fried concludes that the right to form the values of one’s children as
well as their life-plans can be grounded in the conception that this right is an “extension[]
of the basic right not to be interfered with in doing these things for oneself” (152). For
this reason, Fried is often thought to be evoking a fundamental parental right akin to that
based on the expressive liberty Galston forwards. Fried recognizes that children cannot
be said to accept or refuse such formation. It is at least partially for this reason that he
believes the most appropriate analogy is to regard the child as an extension of oneself
(ibid). Nonetheless, he recognizes that it is a parent’s duty to “care for and educate the
child in the child’s best interests” (ibid, emphasis added) even while he recognizes that a
child’s values must come “from somewhere”. In this case, we seem to have had the
problem re-stated for us. On Fried’s view, the problem seems to be how to disentangle
the necessary fact that parents will make decisions on their child’s behalf, which will
have the effect of forming, at least in part, their values, from the idea that this fact ought
to give rise to a fundamental parental right to do so.
Aside from wanting to secure some sphere of sovereignty as to parental decisionmaking, and bracketing the ‘intimacy’ component for the moment, it isn’t clear that on a
careful examination expressive liberty does not unwittingly turn on a child-centred view
after all. Interpretive capacity, that is, the necessary leeway parents must have to make
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decisions in order for parenting not to be an experience full of anxiety and fear and void
of meaning, subordinates the parental interest in expressive liberty to the question of what
we think of as being in our children’s interest. As Callan expresses it “the reward we seek
from the work (of child rearing) is perhaps opaque in its deepest aspects, but much of it
surely has to do with the gradual realization in the life of the child of those educational
ends that give content to our understanding of success in child-rearing” (1997: 143).
While Callan is correct to refer to the opacity of the interest at stake, I take it to mean that
we have an interest in passing along to our children what we think of as good precisely
because our love for them means that it matters to us that they derive the benefit of our
experience of what that is and that it is the realization of these things in our child that
constitutes our educational ends. Formulated this way, this is more properly a childcentred argument.
Galston, too, elucidates the expressive liberty argument in a way that could
arguably be conducive to the child’s best interest, even though he takes pains to make
clear that he is talking about parental interests and espouses a ‘reciprocity model’ (103).
The reason for his avowal of a reciprocity model is because he believes that without it
parents would not possess any right to introduce their child to their respective values and
commitments. In other words, without the expressive liberty that grounds a fundamental
right to, at the very least, “introduce their children to what they regard as vital sources of
meaning and value, and to hope that their children will come to share this orientation”
(2002: 105) such a right could not be protected. Interestingly, Galston himself
immediately provides a child-centred view for why such an “introduction” to parental
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“values and commitments” might be beneficial. He claims that a coherent framework of
belief might very well promote informed choice in the adult the child will become (ibid).
Many others observe a similar importance in a child’s access to a coherent culture
(Ackerman 1980: 141-42; Callan 1997: 138-39). This point, however, notes the child’s
interest in the parents’ capacity for ‘expressive liberty’ and not the parents’. The capacity
for expressive liberty is a part of the ‘interpretive capacity’ that attaches to parents as a
result of two things: The child’s interest in being a part of a family unit wherein a cultural
framework can be acquired, and, as I will subsequently argue, the parents’ liberal right to
themselves live according to their own norms and values. The important point here is that
this right does not attach to a fundamental right to pass along such norms and values
inhering in the interests of the parents qua parents, but is constitutive of an instrumental
right and, as was previously noted, will have the unalterable consequence of forming the
child’s values as a result of a liberal right the parents themselves have to live by their
own lights.
As a result of the argument that sees a benefit to the child of allowing parents to
introduce their children to their cultural and religious norms and values, as well as the
parental right to live by their own lights, which will necessarily have the effect of
“introducing” a child to values that the parents believe are “vital sources of value and
meaning”, an appropriate sphere of sovereign parental decision-making can be morally
justified via means that do not attach importance to fundamental parental rights, but
achieve the stated purpose of protecting their expression nonetheless.

2.3 Parents qua People/Parents qua Parents
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I have claimed that it is inappropriate, within a liberal framework, to base control rights
over others on the interest of the one who possesses such control. I have done so by
examining the ‘intimacy argument’, which views children, partially, as means to their
parents’ ends. I have also examined the ‘expressive liberty’ argument and demonstrated
that it tends to, either, collapse into the ‘intimacy’ argument, or else it can be
reformulated so that it becomes, properly, a child-centred view. Criticism of childcentred approaches turns on the fact that they pay little or no attention to the interests of
parents and it is from this that we get a view toward a kind of reciprocity that captures the
fact that “parents and children serve, and are served by, one another in complex ways”
(Galston, 2002: 103). There is a fear that, absent a dual-interest view, the despotism that
is patriarchy is reversed and that no justice can be done to the “hopes that parents have
and the sacrifices they make in rearing children” (Callan 1997: 154). This fear of having
the tables reversed overlooks the most important aspect of all parent-child relationships
which is that they are special, in large part, because they are inherently unequal. It is from
the fact of the vulnerability and powerlessness of children that our entire discussion
stems. That being the case, the idea that patriarchal despotism could be reversed in equal
and opposite ways if we do not heed the fundamental rights of parents is wrongheaded; it
negates two things: First, that even on the child-centred view parental educative authority
could be conceived so as to provide adequate scope to parents’ “hopes and sacrifices”
owing to parents’ instrumental rights to order integral aspects of their children’s lives.
Second, on no view being canvassed here could children have equal scope and therefore
the notion of a reversed despotism is an inappropriate way of viewing the parent-child
relationship, regardless of which lens is used through which to view it.
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There is one way in which we can, however, respond to the above concerns of
dual-interest proponents. Proponents of the dual-interest view are concerned that the
interests of parents are always subsumed within those of their children and wonder why it
is that the interests of children should always ‘win out’ (Clayton 2006: 48-54) This is a
trenchant point, given that the liberal defence of child-centred views is that children
ought to have their interests considered equally with those of adults and not that children
deserve greater consideration than do adults. In Prince v. Massachussetts (in Feinberg
1980), for instance, the judge allowed to die a 24-year old Jehovah’s Witness rather than
order a blood transfusion, leaving her three children motherless. Joel Feinberg claims that
in this instance, “both natural parents were determined to decide against the children’s
interests” (1980: 130). I am neither criticizing nor defending either the parents’ decision
or the judge’s ruling here. I adduce it only to say that to view the case as deciding
‘against’ the children’s interests, though it may have been so, reveals the kind of
conflation between parental and non-parental interests that I seek to disentangle.
We can respond to opponents of the child-centred view by distinguishing
between, specifically, parental and non-parental interests. Parental interests refer to the
interests parents have as they relate to their children and their ongoing relationship with
them i.e., interests which stem, specifically, from their role as parent. Non-parental
interests refer to interests parents have that reflect one or other of the many different roles
parents also inhabit as people, such as their role as a friend or spouse, their role as
employee or professional and any attendant career aspirations they may have, their role as
citizen and any important civic duties they may wish to fulfil, their role as a member of a
given religious congregation and so forth.
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As previously stated, individual persons retain the right to live in accordance with
their own norms and values even upon becoming parents. Although adherence to these
will necessarily have some kind of effect upon their children, even if it was not the case
that children benefited from inclusion in said practices parents would, nonetheless, retain
the right to live according to their affirmed values.67 Parental rights, be they instrumental
or fundamental, are best understood as protecting those decisions which are undertaken
with the direct purpose of ordering the life of the child in some way. In this light, parental
rights can be viewed as other-directed, while the liberal rights parents retain by virtue of
their status as persons can be viewed as self-directed: Rights to decision-making that
protect their non-parental interests.
Not all of the decisions that parents make which have an impact upon a child
could be said to be an exercise of a distinctly parental right in the way being established
here. This is because not all decisions parents make are undertaken with the specific
purpose of ordering the lives of their children (although ordering their lives is a likely
consequence of many and perhaps most decisions parents make). We might say, for
example, that it is permissible for parents to pursue certain interests at some cost to their
children’s as when a parent takes a job in a faraway city and uproots her children from
their schools and friends in an effort to advance her own interests in furthering her career,
without necessarily adducing a dual-interest approach. Although it might well be within
a parent’s right to make such a decision, such a decision is not properly an exercise of a
parental right, in the way meant here, for the reason stated above. We need not view the
dual-interest/child-centred paradigms as relevant frameworks within which to evaluate
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If it was deemed, however, that children were harmed by inclusion, the rights parents maintained and the
conditions under which they exercised them would require a different theoretical framework.
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every decision parents undertake which might, nonetheless, affect the family. We might,
instead, view these paradigms as being evocable in the context of parental rights, which
rights are other-directed.
Michael Austin implicitly recognizes the complexity of the parental interests at
stake when he writes that “[...] parents generally prefer sacrificing some of their nonparental interests because they take their parental interests to be stronger and more
significant than whatever sacrifices raising their children involve” (2007: 30, emphasis
added).68 Here Austin uses the language of interests in order to distinguish those that
emanate from one’s role as a parent and those that emanate from one’s myriad other
roles. The difference between the conception of parental rights that I am describing here
and the one that Brighouse and Swift envision is that within their schema other-directed
decisions can be undertaken for the purpose of benefiting the decision maker. Whereas
here, while other-directed decisions can vie for prominence against self-directed ones,
with the case that certain very strong interests of the parents (to find a better job, say, in
another city) can be forwarded against the relatively less important interests of the
children (to stay in the same city and not to be parted from their friends), other-directed
decisions cannot be undertaken to benefit the decision maker. No doubt, of course,
parents retain enormous leeway to interpret which shall be considered the ultimately
important interest; which ones are, in fact, self-directed and other-directed, the difference
between which is rarely clearly delineated. This, however, is the case even when parents
are said to have fundamental rights, and, perhaps it is even more so the case then.
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Nonetheless, Austin, too, opposes child-centred views because he does not believe they take adequate
account of parents’ interests. What is unclear is whether he believes it is parental interests or non-parental
interests that may be privileged when discussing the sphere of sovereignty parents are said to have to order
the lives of their children.
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Callan offers an example, one of parents who, able to choose between paying for
piano lessons for their musically talented child and going to Disneyland, choose the
latter. Callan claims that on a view constrained by “the best interests of their child, a
strong case would exist for saying that the parents had no right to this particular choice”
(Callan, 1997: 145). However, Callan recognizes that most of us would not feel that
parents had no right to this particular choice (even though many of us would strongly
disagree with it) for the following reason: The lack of access to a widely conceived
‘interpretive capacity’ would prove to be invasive to a degree that could not be justified
by what good it might accomplish. About this Callan is correct. However, there are
separate kinds of rights at stake here that need to be unpacked. The first is the moral right
to the choice, and the other is the legal right. On a child-centred view, parents might not
have the moral right to the option they chose, even though they might have the legal
right. Legal right might be here given not because parents had a moral right to the
choice, but because there is no reasonable way to police many of the choices parents
make that are not morally permissible without doing ‘more harm than good’. Therefore,
people might not agree that the parent had the moral right to this choice, even though
they would not want the choice to be restricted legally for other reasons. The fact that we
would not want a choice to be legally restricted, does not lead ineluctably to the idea that
something is morally permissible and vice versa.69
The other issue, however, is that it is not clear that on a child-centred view, the
choice in question is not morally permissible. If we understand the arguments of those
who proffer a dual-interest approach to be based on parental interests in what kind of
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As a further example, one might say that children have a strong moral right to be loved, but love is not
something that they can claim or be guaranteed.
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value structure the child develops, then for the choice to go to Disneyland to be morally
impermissible it must have been undertaken principally with the view to barring the
development of certain kinds of values and life-plans (or to develop certain other ones),
within the child because they did not cohere with the parents’ wishes for the child for
reasons that have to do with the parents’ interests vis-à-vis the child. Moreover, any
decision the parent undertakes is presumably one that allows them to weigh their own
interests as people with wants, needs, and desires of their own that exist outside of their
parental role, that is, their non-parental interests. Of course, parents can choose badly:
They can be selfish and put their minor interests ahead of their children’s relatively major
ones and so forth. But that is neither here nor there for the moment.
Callan further objects that child-centred approaches cannot “adequately protect
(parental) choice in some of the most flagrant cases of repression” (1997: 140). Here
Callan presents the example of the Soviet Union where children whose parents belonged
to certain Christian denominations were consequently taken away from these parents
(ibid).
Callan believes that a view that privileges the weighty interest of parents must be
forthcoming in order to avoid the egregious measures taken by the Soviets. Callan does
not, however, state the issue in the terms necessary to serve the purpose for which he
provides the example. He intimates that on a child-centred view no parental rights would
be violated by the Soviets’ apprehension of Christian children. For this to be a plausible
example, Callan needs to take the next logical step which is to say that on a child-centred
view the children must do better than they would have had they been left with their
original families. He claims that many children were no doubt harmed by this

83

apprehension, but that on other occasions this may not have been so (140). While he is
correct in noting that whether children do better or worse is not relevant from the point of
view of the violation of parental rights, if we are genuinely concerned about what a
child-centred theory could allow we must acknowledge that on the child-centred view
children must be thought to do better by the arrangement, otherwise there is simply no
impetus for what amounts to a lateral move.
This example might, prima facie, seem to bear a striking resemblance to the
‘Plato Worry’. Be that as it may, the important difference between this example and the
‘Plato Worry’ is the following: While a child-centred view might concern itself,
genuinely, with the best interests of the child, such interests must be tied to “what justice
requires” and not merely “society’s terms”. What offends us about this example – or
what ought to offend us about this example – is not the putative violation of fundamental
parental rights but the persecutory nature of the discrimination. The liberal rights of
parents as people are invested in them as individuals. Moreover, they are thought to be
important precisely because the state cannot be the arbiter, in a liberal society, of which
conceptions of the good are valuable and which are not. Of course, this is not literally
true, in that liberal societies privilege the kind of neutral reasoning that is said to allow
for the flourishing of individuals regardless of their conceptions of the good. Like any
other society, therefore, liberal polities cannot help but inculcate certain basic norms and
conceptions. What differentiates liberal societies from other kinds of political
arrangements is the notion that decisions, particularly ones which have as their purpose
the privileging of certain norms over others, must be defended according to fairly
stringent strictures of impartiality rather than on the basis of competing truth-claims. In
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light of these things, the wholesale removal of children from a disparaged religious sect
in the absence of evidence of abuse or neglect constitutes the violation of the liberal
rights of the individual people belonging to this sect rather than the fundamental parental
rights of the parents in question.
That the Soviets might have genuinely believed that the sect(s) in question were
contrary to children’s interests is in no way dispositive – although it nonetheless presents
a practical problem. In order for us to evaluate this situation we would require an
understanding of the reasons for the apprehension. Since the Soviet Union, however,
was not a liberal society we should not expect that any justification they would offer
would be in keeping with liberal norms.
Parents as people have wants, needs and (non-parental) interests of their own,
separate from their hopes and aspirations for their children and their ongoing relationship
with them. How to weigh these interests against those of their children – and how to
weigh the different interests of several children – requires a different calculus than the
one I am attempting to lay bare when I refer to parents, specifically, in regards to their
role as caretakers of their children’s future values and their fundamental right to pass
their own values on to their children (their parental interests). This role refers to their
direct control rights over their children with regards to the values and ideals with which
their children shall be raised; their capacity to ‘form’ their child’s basic value set and lifeplans.
The argument here is that a conceptual separation must be made between those
decisions that, while affecting the children, do so indirectly. I am not opposing childcentred views to parent-centred views. In other words, I am not saying that the interests
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of children are weightier than those of their parents. In fact, my examination is premised
on the idea that children are individual entities with interests as important as (but not
more important than) those of adults. The argument here is that with regards to,
specifically, the rearing of children, a distinction must be made between parents as
parents who must be said to exercise their control rights over children with a view toward
the best interests of the child, and parents as people who have their own interests, the
pursuit of which, while impacting the child, does not constitute an attempt to directly
shape the basic value-set that that child will be expected to embrace. Child-centred views
ought to privilege the interests of the child in relevant circumstances and not under any
and all circumstances. This, however, is not the same thing as a ‘dual-interest’ view
which argues that parental interests in forming their children’s values may ground a
fundamental parental right in the parents’ interests in who that child will become owing
to the right to ‘intimacy’ with one’s child or as an extension of parents’ ‘expressive
liberty’.
In practice, of course, distinguishing between what is in the child’s best interests
separate from the values the parents prioritize is an extremely difficult task. Clearly
parents believe what is in the best interests of the child is, generally, to live by the kind of
values they believe to be the best ones and these will be ones they themselves have
already affirmed. This distinction between the child-centred and the dual-interest
approach, however, is more practically important when we attempt determine under what
conditions others, namely the state, may interfere with decisions that parents undertake.
For instance, when it comes to educational authority the permissibility of resisting state
intrusion in the form of required curriculum in all schools will be framed very differently
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if we assume that parents have an ineluctable right to inculcate within their children their
own comprehensive doctrines as either an extension of the right to live by their own
comprehensive beliefs as Galston claims, or as a right attached to the very decision to
have children, as Shoeman argues. If we take a child-centred approach we may not
assume the ineluctable ties between, either, the right to procreate or the right to exercise
freely with the right to induct one’s children. As such, we have a less sturdy platform
from which to resist certain types of state intervention. Since parents, however, are more
than their children’s ‘innkeepers’, but less than their children’s ‘proprietors’, this is not
inappropriate.
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3. Liberals-in-Waiting (1): Autonomy vs. Diversity?
3.1 Introduction

In considering whether and how liberalism can make a space for children, we need to
confront the quite prevalent current view that there is not one but (at least) two versions
of liberalism, and that the two versions have very different implications for the forming
of children’s beliefs. One version is supposed to tell us that we must maximize children’s
autonomy by inculcating critical capacity; the other is supposed to tell us to safeguard
and secure cultural memberships.70 The tension is obvious. But the ‘two liberalisms’
thesis is schematic and overdrawn, and entirely unhelpful in the case of children. This is
because the protection of cultural membership cannot reasonably come at the expense of
children’s interests; therefore there are limits to the value of cultural membership. But
children’s interests cannot be understood purely as a capacity for critical revision without
potentially undermining cultures that do not seek to maximize autonomy. In the end,
while there might be two foundational values, there can only be one version of liberalism,
leastways where children are concerned. Adults might have the opportunity to privilege
one version over the other because whichever one they choose will be the one which best
70

This is not to say that autonomy and diversity are the only values that are held to be pre-eminent within
liberal theory. Equality has a claim to being foundational. It has been said that no political theory, liberal or
otherwise, that did not have equality as its base could be taken seriously as a political theory, that is, that all
modern theories have the same foundational value, that of equality (Kymlicka 2002: 3-4). What
distinguishes different theories that have this same foundational value depends upon what the particular
theory proposes to equalize, for instance, resources, or opportunities, or liberty. Liberal theory proposes
moral equality that is attractive precisely because we have no “antecedently correct” view of the world
against which we could assess various political arrangements, those, for instance, that did not show equal
concern and respect to all persons. (Lecce 2008: 192). Equality, then, is foundational, but it does not tell
us what is to be equalized or in what way the equal concern and respect that it supposes is to be made
manifest in any given instance. Autonomy and diversity are the values most often invoked with respect to
the rearing of children and both values can be seen as interpretations of what equality demands. On one
hand, equality requires that all children have access to an education that protects their future autonomy, in
part so that they are enabled to make (future) decisions on par with those who would otherwise have access
to such an education. On the other hand, equality demands that all families be shown equal concern and
respect by deeming their particular religious and cultural values as worthy of a certain level of noninterference.
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accommodates their pre-existing views. The same cannot be said for children whose lack
of pre-existing views is the prominent feature about the debate regarding what and whose
views they should adopt.
I will first outline the ‘two liberalisms’ view and turn to an examination of Locke
and Mill to reveal that the ‘two liberalisms’ thesis offers a false dichotomy. As such,
tracing liberal theory back to each thinker as its supposed progenitor is misguided. I
proceed to the views of Kukathas in order to locate some of the problems created for
children when cultural membership is privileged without due regard for children’s
objective interests. Finally, I turn to Kymlicka as a means of clarifying what is important
about cultural membership, but suggest that here too his view is misguided.

3.2 A Tale of Two Liberalisms

Galston claims that “properly understood, liberalism is about the protection of diversity
not the valorization of choice” (1995: 223). Ronald Beiner agrees. He says that “[t]he
official ideology of liberal society, endlessly expounded by liberal theorists, is of course
diversity – the rich multiplicity of different conceptions of the good or of the ends of life”
(1992: 23).71 And Gray contends that “liberalism has always had two faces... [On one]
view, liberal institutions are seen as applications of universal principles. [On another],
they are means to peaceful co-existence” (2000: 2).
For Galston, the problem can be resolved by making compatible the historical
‘moment’ of liberalism with the struggles of the Post-Reformation rather than the later
‘historical impulse’ of the Enlightenment and the attendant privileging of ‘the examined
life’ over “reliance on tradition or faith” (Galston 1995: 525). The reason this is so is that
71

Elsewhere, Beiner says that “liberalism is principally a doctrine of the limitation of state power” (26).
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the arguments proffered for the protection of diversity offer “the best hope of maximizing
opportunities for individuals and groups to lead lives as they see fit” (527). Much is left
unproblematized here. Any life that one ‘sees fit’ to live will depend, largely, upon what
type of life one is exposed to in the first place. Parents, for instance, who kept their child
captive, Rapunzel-like, in a tower her whole life where she was taught to fear everything
and everyone, would not normally be thought to have been within their moral rights to do
so, even if this child looked upon them fondly and wished never to experience anything
beyond her tower walls: The life she sees ‘fit’ to live could hardly have been otherwise,
and she could hardly be expected to endorse anything else.
Liberals who focus upon diversity give greater weight to arguments that the
family should be left alone to reproduce its values as it wishes, in keeping with
liberalism’s protection of belief and (within limits) the practices that follow from these
beliefs. There are liberal and non-liberal arguments for why this is. I canvassed certain
non-liberal arguments in chapter two and concluded that children could not be used as a
means to parents’ ends, and therefore certain arguments for the inculcation of
particularistic values were excluded as anathema to liberal thought. This conclusion,
however, only excludes some reasons for imparting particularistic values, but that can
hardly be the whole story. For instance, the conclusion forwarded in chapter two would
have little to say about the example above, as long as the parents were genuine in their
desire to do what was best for their child as they understood it. Perhaps they really
believe that exposure to the world is a worse option than being trapped in a tower!
On the other hand, the focus upon the individual’s capacity to revise her ends of
life; to live ‘the examined life’ in such a way as to make it clear that the life chosen
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genuinely adheres to the values one embraces as one’s own, carries with it many
implications in large part because exposure to diverse ways of life will have the likely
effect of precluding some perfectly acceptable ways of life.
Each ‘strand’, then, of liberal thought carries with it particular implications for the
rearing and education of children that are ruled out by the opposing view. On one hand,
valuing diversity as the manifestation of respect for the various lives people choose to
lead, suggests that children will be expected to adopt the views to which their parents
expose them. If this is indeed a foundational value, what principles would legitimate the
state to substitute its judgement for that of parents in determining to what values children
should be exposed without undermining that respect? On the other hand, to value
autonomy is also to claim to respect the various lives people choose to lead. This,
however, suggests that children will be expected to adopt views which they have chosen
after a rational deliberation of the merits of various and often countervailing views, which
runs counter to some ways of life people value. The problem we encounter is something
akin to that of the chicken or the egg dilemma: To posit that the value of diversity is the
primary value within liberal society is to presuppose the milieu within which children
could potentially lack the resources to remove themselves from ways of life that are
objectively deleterious. However, to posit that autonomy is the primary value within
liberal society is to presuppose a milieu within which children are likely to renounce
ways of life that conduce to their overall well-being.
There is a way out of this dilemma, however it requires us to jettison the either/or
view of liberalism. It is fundamentally misguided to try to substantiate an argument about
the place of children in liberal theory by referring back to Locke and Mill and their views
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about diversity and autonomy, respectively; because, when unpacked, each thinker’s
views on the subject reveal very little awareness of the unique space that children inhabit.
Locke, for instance, has little to say about the legitimacy of belief-formation, and
therefore, in his view, parental views are reproduced unproblematically. If we take
seriously the ideal that moral concern ought to extend equally to children, the view that
parental norms and values can be unquestioningly reproduced is limited. This realization
brings into sharper focus the requirement of some conception of autonomy as a correlate
to belief-formation. Thus, Locke as the defender of ‘diversity liberalism’ is problematic
in terms of children. Mill, by contrast, demonstrates more concern with how people come
to hold their beliefs. By insisting that individuals consciously choose paths that they think
are best able to lead to outcomes that are important to them, we enable the fundamental
flourishing of the individual, which flourishing is under constant threat of conformity and
inauthenticity. Mill offers a strong view of ‘choice’ in the name of one’s individuality,
but this view is undermined by a second view that Mill also offers, which acknowledges
that one’s ability to choose is informed by circumstances and inherent proclivities that
one cannot choose. Thus, the use of Mill as an example of autonomy is complicated by
his reliance upon the pre-existence of diverse and unchosen options.
Generalizations about the meaning and desirability of diversity and autonomy
conflate how we ought to think about the protection of beliefs that are fully-formed, with
how we ought to think about the formation of these beliefs. They therefore substitute the
one for the other as if they were conceptually interchangeable without taking note of the
important distinction between them, revealing the manner in which children are
metaphorically shoe-horned into conceptual spaces in which they don’t quite fit.
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3.2.1 Locke and the Reproduction of Parental Values

The Lockean focus upon the ends to which civil society is limited (chapter one) and the
large parameters that this implies for the toleration of conflicting religious and moral
commitments, leads to a society in which diverse views will inevitably flourish. This had
little to do with any view on Locke’s part that diversity was inherently good.72 Notably,
in Locke’s earlier work he had concluded that the magistrate had the authority to
pronounce on how people should worship in matters that were ‘indifferent’, that is,
neither explicitly forbidden nor required by scripture. It was by realizing that what
counted as an ‘indifferent’ matter was itself the basis for deep contestation that he
reversed himself and became the exemplar of liberal toleration. This, it has been argued,
had less to do with a re-examination of the relation between belief and knowledge, than
with the question of what motivated people (Vernon 1996: chap. 1). It was, then,
Locke’s realization of the extraordinary lengths to which people would go in order to
publicly affirm the beliefs and practices that their consciences dictated that forced him to
re-examine his earlier thoughts on the distinction between private belief and public
practice.73
In his concern about the individual’s sincerely held belief, Locke rejects the
grounds necessary to use the power of the magistrate to force people to ‘consider’ the
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For Locke, however, the ensuing diversity had its limits. For instance, he claims that non-Christians are
to be tolerated in order to provide a better opportunity to eventually convert them. See Locke (2010: 68).
73
In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke opines that it is not religion or the diversity of opinions that it
spawns which has produced “all the bustles and wars…upon account of religion”, but the “refusal of
toleration to those who are of different opinions” (1993: 431). The communitarian critique contorts this
aspect of liberal thought by suggesting that the revisability criterion that is prominent among some liberals
reveals an erroneous liberal belief regarding the ease with which people relinquish and take-up attachments.
By contrast, liberal thought emanates from the realization of how jealously people guard their present
attachments.
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nature of the true religion. The intensity of coercive power needed in order to turn one
away from a sincerely held belief into believing something else was potentially endless,
and would lead to all manner of torments as ‘recalcitrants’ stubbornly held fast to their
present beliefs and required greater and greater incentives to demonstrate that they had, in
fact, thoroughly considered the nature of the ‘true’ faith that they presently rejected
(Locke 2010: 96). Locke agrees with Proast that it is desirable that people should
examine the grounds of their views. However, his challenge to Proast is that this
“business of search” is outside the domain of political control. Locke writes: “it is
beyond the power or judgement of man…to determine what is everyone’s duty in this
great business of search, enquiry, examination or to know when anyone has done it” (97).
This is a slight, but importantly different point from that made in the argument
forwarded by Waldron – that Locke’s arguments for toleration were owing to the
incapacity of the state apparatus to alter people’s beliefs (Waldron 1988). Locke
concedes in A Second Letter Concerning Toleration that persecution might work to alter
some people’s beliefs in some circumstances, sometimes (2010: 72).74 Locke’s argument
here, however, regards the logical impossibility of knowing when one had ‘sufficiently’
considered since the only proof Proast’s argument could accept as evidence was the
individual’s total conversion. In this way, Locke’s view reveals a ‘weak’ requirement for
autonomy. Notwithstanding that people should hold their beliefs ‘sincerely’, and that it is
to be wished that they consider the grounds of their belief, it is impossible to know when
one’s search had been sufficient since the only evidence available was that they had
74

Presently, we know enough to realize that it is very possible to alter beliefs by putting people into those
situations whereby they are more likely to arrive at answer x than answer y, say, by restricting access to
information about y or by offering a comparatively abundant and positive assessment of x. And so coercion
as a means to bring about the ‘right circumstances’ is not at all irrational. However, Locke’s main point is
that it is, to use his word, “impertinent”, that is, it is not legitimate to do so in religious matters.
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changed their minds. Surely, as Locke points out, this logic is flawed. What might such a
test reveal if required of all those who presently conform to the true religion?
Galston’s use of Locke to ground an argument that traces liberalism back to the
Post-Reformation in order to determine that diversity is the fundamental liberal value is
unhelpful with regards to the overriding question under examination. That question is:
What and whose values ought children to be taught within a liberal society? In Locke’s
scattered writings on children and education, for instance, his main concern is that
children should be educated to the gradual exercise of their reason and mastery of their
appetites. It has been argued that this stems, not from a lack of awareness on Locke’s part
of the question of children’s developmental needs beyond the realm of the merely
intellectual (such as their emotional needs). It was rather that the “singular objective
[was] to produce ‘rational citizens …” (Arneil 2002: 73): the duty the father acquires to
“inform the mind” of his offspring during their “imperfect state of childhood”. What was
to supply the content of caring for children beyond this was simply of no concern to
(early) liberal theory because it was largely viewed as a natural phenomenon, undertaken
by women within the private sphere, and not a properly ‘political’ question (ibid).75
The important point in all this is that liberalism understood on the Lockean view
of protecting diversity as the outgrowth of protecting individuals’ ‘sincere belief’, takes
as its model those whose views are already fully formed in the first instance, and assumes
unquestioningly their generational reproduction in the second instance thereby leading us
away from rather than toward the issue under examination: The legitimate basis of belief-
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Perhaps most importantly, the question of what constituted ‘rational enquiry’ was not thought to have
more than one plausible answer. Diverse opinions should be allowed to flourish, but that was not because
each of them was potentially correct. By contrast, one commentator has noted that, by the late 20th century,
“even a minimal appeal to shared rationality [was] suspect” (Beiner 1987: 1).
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formation within a liberal polity (since what Locke is really talking about is beliefprotection). The very fact, though, that two of the central values within liberal theory
concern autonomy and diversity demonstrates the ill-fit of children within liberal theory.
‘Autonomy’ liberals seek to protect children’s future autonomy precisely because it is
acknowledged that children are ill-equipped to exercise that capacity at present while
‘diversity’ liberals often subsume the rights and interests of children within those of their
parents or, more amorphously, their religious or cultural communities. Both approaches
belie the reason for which protection of diversity is generally thought important to
liberals, including Locke: Because it protects ways of life and beliefs that people actually
possess in the here and now. In this regard, Harry Brighouse comments: “Liberals are so
impressed with the intimate connection between persons and their conceptions of the
good because persons are presumed properly to regard them as their own…” he continues
“….but we should not regard children’s conceptions as their own, because they are
unequipped to make them genuinely their own” (1998: 738).76
At this point, it might seem à propos to turn toward an examination of Mill. Mill
is often thought of as the seminal figure among political philosophers on the question of
the correlation between autonomy and human flourishing. It has become commonplace
among political philosophers to refer to ‘Millian liberalism’, by which is meant liberal
thought as a substantive political philosophy that appropriately privileges autonomy, that
is, critical and dispassionate enquiry of customs and social mores, as the particular
endowment of the human being. We shall see, however, that despite the use of Mill as a
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See also Brighouse (2002: 46-51) and Feinberg (1980: 125).
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staunch purveyor of ‘autonomy liberalism’ it is difficult to discern from Mill’s thought a
straightforward view of what it consists in.77

3.2.2 Millian Autonomy: Two Views

Mill writes that the end to which all humans must direct themselves is “the individuality
of power and development” (1998a: 64). For Mill, autonomy was an essential element of
human well-being: “if a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and
experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is best, not because it is the best in
itself, but because it is his own mode” (ibid: 75). With these famous words, Mill indicates
that the value of autonomy is to be found in the human good that is inherent in the
capacity to choose rather than in its consequences, for instance, because it can furnish
society with truth as he elsewhere proclaims. Nor is it good because humans are the best
judges of what is good for them, although this possibility does provide at least one
rejoinder to arguments for paternalistic intervention. Mostly though, it is best simply
because it was chosen by the agent herself, as a function of the simple human desire to
choose one’s own path. In the words of Dostoevsky “[w]hat man wants is simply
independent choice, whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may lead” (in
Dworkin 1988: 62).
Remarking on Mill, however, Richard Arneson notes that, at times, Mill’s views
on individuality seem only somewhat related to autonomy because Mill’s conception
reveals that autonomous agents can act in ways that reduce rather than increase their

77

Given the strong anti-paternalism in Mill’s thought, one observer has argued that the notion of ‘Millian
liberalism’ in the way it is normally meant, overestimates the extent to which Mill espoused paternalistic
intervention in the name of inculcating autonomy (Barry 2001: 119-20)
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individuality (1980: 479-481).78 The case in point is that of Mill’s discussion of the
institution of Mormon marriage. Despite Mill’s disapprobation of the way the institution
of marriage is practiced by the Mormons he claims that it is “as much voluntary on the
part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is the
case with any other form of the marriage institution” (1998a:102). What accounts for this
voluntary choice on the part of women is viewed with some disdain by Mill and is found
“in the common ideas and customs of the world” such that, marriage propagated as the
one thing needful for women, renders it quite understandable that women would rather
choose to be one of several wives than risk being no one’s at all (1998a:102).
Mill’s writing obscures as much as it reveals about how one is to understand what
constitutes individual choice that is appropriately ‘one’s own’. He writes, for example,
that the end to which all humans must direct themselves is “prescribed by the eternal and
immutable dictates of reason” (64). Reason, thus, stands in opposition to custom qua
custom, because it is by employing one’s reason that the merit of various customs is
evaluated: “it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever
had been known in the world before they came into it,” however “custom merely as
custom, does not educate or develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive
endowment of a human being” (65). Mill opines that even where custom contains
educative merit, it is only by the individual’s making a choice, rationally and deliberately,
that this merit can be ascertained and deemed appropriate for the person at hand, because,
first, what is good for one person is not necessarily good for another, and second,
experiences may be misinterpreted by others such that things that seem good to them, in
78

Mill never actually uses the word ‘autonomy’ in the whole of On Liberty. Instead, his views about
‘individuality’ in On Liberty are generally thought to be synonymous with or at least an adequate substitute
for the concept of autonomy.
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reality are not. So, while customs act as “presumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim
to [one’s] deference” (ibid), even then they must not be taken at merely face-value. A
choice to adopt these preferences must be made because it is only in choosing that a
person exercises her distinctively human capacities.
We might compare this view with that proffered by Harry Frankfurt in his seminal
contribution to the personal autonomy literature. Frankfurt argues that we share many
things with other species that are integral to us as persons including the ability to
deliberate and make decisions based on prior thought (1988). What distinguishes us, then,
as persons is not the simple capacity to choose, as Mill suggests, but to choose based on
the capacity to assess the basis of the choice itself. Consciousness does not begin with the
response to changing environments, which even plants exhibit. It does not even begin
with the capacity to decide on a course of action as between two or more possibilities,
which even non-human animals exhibit (Frankfurt 1988; Dworkin 1988: 15). Rather,
consciousness begins with the reflexivity of a secondary awareness of a primary
response. Only humans, then, form second-order volitions, that is, we are not only moved
to do certain things because we want to, we are moved to want to want certain things and
we want to have certain motives. However, not even all humans are persons in the
relevant sense. Frankfurt refers to humans who are incapable of formulating second-order
volitions as ‘wantons.’ For Frankfurt, children fall into this category. It is not, then, that
children cannot act freely, but that they cannot will freely.
‘Hierarchical’ approaches such as Frankfurt’s are said to suffer from several
major defects, the most important for present purposes is that of manipulation. On
Frankfurt’s account, and similarly to Locke, it does not seem to matter how the desires
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come to be as long as the agent identifies with them. On this account, a victim of
brainwashing or one who undergoes hypnosis could have implanted volitions not ‘their
own’, which they then come to identify with strongly, and yet it seems difficult to accept
that such desires would count as ‘one’s own’ in a sincere or genuine way.
Mill, too, seems to suffer from some uncertainty on this account since the human
capacity to exercise choice entails filtering the available information through the conduit
of the cognitive structure of the person in question, and this structure is largely informed
by the cultural milieu in which one finds oneself and in which one was raised. In The
Subjection of Women, Mill contemplates the fact that gender equality, for instance, has
not only to fight the indifference and hostility of men, but that of women also: “All
women are brought up from the very earliest years in the belief that their ideal of
character is the very opposite of men; not self-will, and government by self-control, but
submission, and yielding to the control of others” (1998b: 486).
Having noted that deliberate choice is the hallmark of one’s distinctive
humanness on one hand, but that the information upon which one acts is necessarily
understood differently depending upon one’s milieu on the other, Mill reveals the more
challenging view that human beings not only have different tastes, but also require
different conditions for their spiritual development (1998a: 75). He suggests that humans
have, not only a ‘human’ nature, something that distinguishes the human animal from
other, non-human animals, but that individuals have an ‘individual’ nature as well,
something that distinguishes human animals one from the other: “humans are not like
sheep and even sheep are not indistinguishably alike” (ibid).79
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Mill’s ‘autonomist’ views are tempered by the subjects to whom autonomy was meant to be extended,
prompting Appiah to remark that, contra those who fault Mill for his putative ethnocentric privileging of
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We are left then with two contending views of autonomy: On the first view, one is
expected to examine their own customs and those of others in order to ascertain which of
these best coincides with their inherent inclinations (our ‘individual nature’). This view
lends itself to the idea that dispassionate and rational calculation of myriad and
contending views is the most desirable state for a human being, and the only way to
reveal what is distinctively ‘human’ about the species as well as about the particular,
individual specimen of the species. On the other view, the ability to examine is not only
given by inherent inclinations, which includes the fact that some people are more
inherently capable of rational deliberation just as some people are more ‘independentlyminded’ than others, but more to my present point, by the very customs into which
children are born which, as Mill readily remarks in relation to women, are already
moulding their inherent inclinations in important – but likely imperceptible – ways.

3.2.3 Autonomy and Diversity: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

According to Appiah, Mill found no inherent value in diversity, but only in the act of
self-creation. For instance, Appiah says that if one were to find herself genuinely holding
exactly the same beliefs as her neighbours this would not necessarily be as a result of her
thoughtlessly ‘aping’ them. It would not, then, necessarily tell against the beliefs in
question being genuinely authentic to both herself and her neighbours (2005: 6). Mill
writes: “unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of
opposite opinions, is not desirable” (1998a: 63; emphasis added). On the one hand, then,
autonomy, Mill is ethnocentric precisely where he leaves off autonomy since he claims that “backward
states in which the race itself may be considered in its nonage” are ripe for despotic rule. In other words,
the ‘harm principle’ whereby an individual’s action can be prevented against that individual’s will only to
prevent harm to third parties, does not obtain in ‘backward’ states, where the people are analogized with
children. Children then are likewise excluded from the ‘harm principle’ in that their actions can be
prevented in order to prevent harm to themselves (in Appiah 2005: 144).
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unity of opinion is not bad per se (and conversely, diversity is not good per se.) That
said, without diversity it is hard to see how the comparison of opposite opinions might be
effected. Lecce and Appiah agree that, for Mill, “diversity emerges as both a by-product
and precondition for personal choice” (Lecce, 2008a: 53; Appiah 2005: 40-5, 141-54).
This suggests the need to protect diversity as a necessary precondition owing to, at least,
the instrumental value of personal choice (that is, choice maximizes overall welfare).80
One can imagine, for instance, that there might come a time at which a critical mass of
people, all authentically holding the same conception, unwittingly impedes the
reproduction of other conceptions against which one can test one’s own opinions and
beliefs thereby making the only condition under which Mill stipulates that unity of
opinion is acceptable, virtually impossible to achieve.81
Unlike Locke for whom diversity was a simple fact with attendant problems to be
surmounted, Mill thought diversity was instrumentally valuable because in the context of
dissension from any dominant value one of two things would likely occur: One, we
would discover the error of our initial thinking and correct it (1998a: 71). Two, having
tested our initial thinking and finding it to be true, we would never hold such truth merely
by habit such that it was held passively, as something now dead and believed only
through inertia. Truths that are held to be no more than custom take on the pallor of mere
custom, that is, something that is believed unquestioningly. The truths immanent in such
customs are endangered as a result:
80

There is a debate regarding whether Mill turns in his utilitarian credentials for the sake of privileging the
natural liberal rights of the person or not. Such liberal theorists as Feinberg and Arneson have been accused
of articulating this view, while Lecce argues that Mill’s utilitarianism is evident in the genesis of the liberal
rights he thought ought to be protected. On this view, Mill believed legal protections ought to be afforded
to basic liberal rights because their protection served overall utility at some second-level order of welfare
maximization.
81
See Lecce (2008a: 53-55) for a discussion of the four distinct grounds upon which Mill argues for the
utility of diversity.
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There is only too great a tendency in the best beliefs
and practices to degenerate into the mechanical; and
unless there were a succession of persons whose everrecurring originality prevents the grounds of those
beliefs and practices from becoming merely
traditional, such dead matter would not resist the
smallest shock from anything really alive, and there
would be no reason why civilization should not die
out… (1998a: 72).
Truth is, thus, a fragile thing which requires a constant re-assessment in order not only to
replace it with something better when something better comes along, but to constantly
assure ourselves – and thereby give us the reasons to provide to others – that it is, in fact,
the truth: “Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very
condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action” (24). Without
access to these justifications, passive truth could easily be replaced by energetic falsity,
with a dire consequence: The death of civilization!
The implicit interrelationship between diversity and autonomy in Mill is given an
explicit treatment by Joseph Raz, who believes that “to be autonomous a person must not
only be given a choice but that he must be given an adequate range of choices” (1988:
156). Raz posits that a commitment to autonomy entails a commitment to diversity, what
he calls ‘moral pluralism’, since it is through this that one can have access to an adequate
range of options which reflect the many capacities that are contained within the many
individuals who make up what we think of as society (164). Raz contends that there are
not only distinct ways of life that are morally acceptable but that they display distinct
virtues that are unattainable elsewhere (159). Diversity then is necessary for autonomy,
but as against the unifying logic of (singular) truth-seeking which sits in some
considerable tension with the (multiple truths of) diversity, Raz believes that
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incompatible virtues cannot be rank ordered: They do not derive from the same source or
speak to the same common principles (160). Truth-seeking stands in some tension with
the notion of diversity even while diversity is necessary for the autonomy of agents.
It is here that the special case of children is paramount. The provision of diverse
options to satisfy certain substantial inclinations presupposes that such inclinations not
only exist in embryo metaphorically speaking, but are sufficiently well-developed for
their satisfaction to be meaningful. If choice is meaningful because it protects substantial
inclinations beyond that of merely choice itself, such inclinations must, in some
important way, be considered authentic to us. It is this authenticity in children that is
questionable. The guarantee of sufficient options to satisfy substantial inclinations only
makes sense in the case of children on either or both of two conditions. One, that
individual characters are sufficiently different by nature that society will inherently tend
toward diversity and thus require an adequate array of options from which to choose,
and/or that diversity as it presently exists is sufficiently well-protected as to promote
diversity through the familial/communal reproduction of sufficiently different
motivations for action.
Locke, for instance, refers to children as “white paper” (1690: ss. 216), with
minds “as easily turned, this or that way, as water itself” (ss.2) suggesting that
environment is all important.82 Elsewhere, however, he refers to their inherent “natures
and aptitudes” (ss. 66). Taken together, this suggests that Locke did not view children as
blank slates purely created by their environmental conditioning, but rather that the focus
on environment assumed the fact that children’s inherent proclivities were beyond
anyone’s direct control. This is not to say that a particularly bold child cannot be made
82

Locke says that nine tenths of what we are, is as a result of our education (1690: ss. 1).
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timid and vice versa through social conditioning, either through a concerted effort to do
so or as an unintended consequence of other environmental factors (although Locke
himself claimed to believe that one’s “native stock” could be “a little mended” but not
transformed altogether (ibid). It is to say, however, that since social conditioning begins
at birth – and perhaps, even, in utero – the way a child’s inherent inclinations might be
shaped by their conditioning is largely unknowable. So too, then, are a child’s ‘inherent’
inclinations in the first place. As such, the difficulty with regard to the question of what
constitutes ‘authenticity’ in children remains.
Mill’s view of children reveals a tendency to assume away the problem of the
interaction between one’s inherent proclivities and the manner in which they are acted
upon by external circumstances. Mill identifies authenticity with what Waldron calls “a
sort of inner vocation” (2008: 166). Using the metaphor of a tree, Mill establishes that,
like a tree, an individual must grow and develop “according to the tendency of the inward
forces which make it a living thing” (1998a: 66). If we refer back to my earlier claim that
Mill views the human as both a species with a particular ‘human’ nature and also that
each specimen has a particular ‘individual’ nature, the point of this arboreal metaphor
becomes less rather than more obvious: Do the “inward forces” of the oak differ from
that of the spruce or do all trees have the same “inward forces”? When transferred to the
rearing of children the question regards whether we all have similar needs in view of our
humanness, in which case we are all owed what would promote and nurture their
fulfillment. What might those needs be if we all also have an ‘individual’ nature that is
acted upon by environmental factors in such a way as to alter it? There is a further
difficulty. Mill writes: “it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived
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at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for
him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own
circumstances and character” (in Waldron 2008: 166). The difficulty becomes apparent
when we turn our attention to the question of what we might term the ‘choice-paradigm’
through which information must be filtered. By the time one is in the ‘maturity of his
faculties’ his ‘choice-paradigm’ might already be largely given, precluding the rigorous
‘search’ upon which Mill, elsewhere, seems so intent.
For Mill, (as for Raz), it is apparent that autonomy and diversity are mutually reinforcing. On Mill’s view, living an authentic life of self-creation is the primary condition
of the human species, which authenticity is possible because there are myriad customs
some of which will require our deference and some which we ought to reject as
inapposite for ourselves, even though they are perfectly appropriate for another. This will
result in the diversity that is both the pre-condition to making choices and the result of
authentically made choices. At times, however, Mill seems to both acknowledge and
distance himself from the view that autonomy can be conceptualized independent from
the cultural prism(s) through which options are weighed and choice, whatever its other
bounds, is exercised;83 he seems to view the relationship between autonomy and
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Diversity of opinion can be achieved in myriad ways. Mainly, it is achieved by virtue of the different
‘contexts-of-choice’ that presently exist and are reproduced in the familial and communal context.
Diversity of opinion, however, can also be achieved by the methods that are promulgated by autonomist
liberals, namely, exposure to competing societal values. The imposition of the ‘revisability criterion’
which is part and parcel of the open future theory according to which children are owed exposure to diverse
societal values, is criticized as the imposition of conformity. Some observers have even analogized it to the
Communist education regime in the former Soviet Union (Redish and Finnerty 2002-2003: 76-81). But
this analogy, if not actually disingenuous, is hugely overstated. Even if we could agree that exposure to
diversity in the name of autonomy amounted to a paralyzing conformity (as if millions of children all
equally adamant in their right to think differently from each other were synonymous with them all thinking
that Father Mao is irreproachable) the other ingredients of a ‘closed society’ are lacking; such as formally
censored press, and a secret-police and a decided orientation against questioning received truths. That said,
we are not, here, advancing the view that children have a right to an open future, merely that it is a means
(if not the means) to advance diversity.
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diversity as unfolding organically. He acknowledges that individuals might require
different environments for their spiritual development, and that even poor choices such as
those women who choose the life of a Mormon wife are still freely-made choices that are
autonomous on some formulation of the term. Notwithstanding, when it comes to
children and belief-formation, in many ways the implications of his views do not differ
substantially from those of Locke. For instance, in On Liberty he opines that while the
formal education of children ought to be mandatory, for reasons that most liberals can
easily suppose, he does not prescribe the content of that education, fearing that too much
state intervention in education will act against the individualistic currents he is adamant
to defend (1998a 117-18). This puts us into something of a conundrum since present
arguments for an ‘education-for-autonomy’ through common schooling largely proceed
along the lines that liberalism, as elucidated by Mill, requires the privileging of autonomy
as, at least, instrumentally necessary in order for one to be self-fashioning, but it is not at
all clear how far Mill himself would have supported this view.84
All of this is to say that Millian autonomy as the basis for liberalism is less
obviously supportive of the kinds of state intervention that is defended in its name.
Moreover, the fact of his two views of autonomy restates one of our main problems,
which is how to conceptualize autonomous choice when circumstances work to alter our
perceptions of our options. This is unproblematic if, for instance, the fact that one existed
within a given choice-paradigm was proof, in and of itself, that one positively embraced
whatever choice-paradigm it was and was genuinely at peace or fulfilled by the life
which that paradigm presupposed, but our psychological disposition seems inherently
84

Mill does support exposure to any and all schools of thought on the basis that ‘so and so holds such and
such a view’ is a fact regardless of the merit of the view. It is concern over this very kind of exposure that
informs our present examination.
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more complex than that. For instance, in her autobiographic tales, Ayan Hirsi Ali
convincingly traces her mother’s unhappiness and violent outbursts to repressed
frustration and anger at her lot in life as a devout Muslim in a deeply religious and
illiberal country, even while her mother actively embraces the very values and customs
that make up her life circumstances (2007; 2010). Ali’s mother is a classic
personification of what many scholars (feminists in particular) following Jon Elster’s
work on rationality consider to be the problem of adaptive-preference formation.
Adaptive preference-formation represents a problem that is at the core of my
examination. Given that environmental factors such as the inculcation into particularistic
value systems act to alter the perception of these very systems, how do we begin to
untangle the implications for belief-formation in children? The two most common
answers are that (a) children are owed an ‘open future’ in the name of their future
autonomy and (b) that children will unproblematically come to embrace those views into
which they are inducted. Both answers are unsatisfying. The first for reasons that I will
elucidate in the following chapter, but in essence privileging autonomy in the way open
future theorists understand the concept posits an overly restrictive view of the child’s best
interest; and the second, because the measure of a child’s best interest cannot be taken
without a conception of those interests beyond the mere embracing of any particular
value system, leastways not without permitting some practices that are clearly
deleterious. Chandran Kukathas’ theory exemplifies this latter problem and it is to his
view that I will now turn.

3.3 Kukathas and Associative Rights
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In his well-known essay ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’ (1992), Chandran
Kukathas argues that if the concern to preserve cultural communities exists in order to
provide people with meaningful choice, then it makes little sense to speak of
‘liberalizing’ cultures that do not already value choice or the possibility of revising one’s
ends. Kukathas’ point seems simple enough: To interfere in the lives of individuals on
the basis that their way of life is morally inferior or in some way inconsistent with human
flourishing runs the risk of judging groups by standards that they themselves do not
recognize. It is this sort of imposition about which liberals should be leery (122).
Kukathas claims to be able to do justice to the cultural aspirations of individuals by
denying that there is any such thing as a right to one’s culture (107). Instead, any
putative right to culture would be subsumed within the liberal right to associate, which all
individuals retain. In this way, the freedom to live in accordance with values one
genuinely recognizes and embraces is protected. Kukathas’ solution to the problem of
being forced to live along lines that one does not embrace is a substantive ‘right-toexit’.85
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The assimilation of the ‘liberal association’ with the ‘cultural community’ as Kukathas would have it,
will not find favour with everyone. In his assessment of the communitarian critique of liberalism, Allen
Buchanan writes: “In the activities that are the life of a community, individuals think of themselves
primarily as members of the group, and of their values as the values of the group. At least in the course of
these activities, the distinction between "mine" and "ours" breaks down or at least recedes into the
background” (1989: 857). The same cannot be said for the value the liberal places upon the ‘association’
since the association is one that reflects common interests (rather than constitutive characteristics): my
interests are advanced at the same time as yours are and these happen to, for a time, coincide. The
difference between the two concepts is important. It is held that the liberal association is little more than a
way of ‘getting on,’ and has little to do with the fundamental question of one’s very identity and therefore
carries none of the gravitas that one’s cultural community does nor any of the deeply felt implications. But
it is not clear that this assessment is correct. Many liberals disagree that the ties of ‘association’ are
necessarily less pressing than ties of ‘community’. It is true that not all groups that are considered free
associations carry the kind of constitutive elements that the communitarian critique claims that one’s
cultural community does. For instance, a baseball club is considered a free association. On the other hand,
it is equally true that not all free associations, such as one’s membership in a baseball club, are considered
by liberals to be equally binding on the individual. Religious groups, for instance, while categorized as free
associations for the purposes of liberal theory, are not considered so because liberals believe religious
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3.3.1 The Right-to-Exit

Kukathas’ argument suggests that the de facto position we ought to take with
regard to groups is that their members accept their present way of life, however unjust
such ways might be from a liberal standpoint (132-33).86 For Kukathas, all that is
required to make this assumption tenable is the ongoing participation of those individuals
in the life of that group since those who do not acquiesce are free to demonstrate this by
having a (substantial) right to exit the group.87 All other rights are either derivative of that
or are bestowed by the group itself (1992: 117). If individual members no longer
recognize the legitimacy of the group, they may work to change the practices of the group
commitments are normally chosen, because they believe such commitments can be easily dismissed, or
because they believe they are not normally viewed as integral to one’s personal identity.
86
To clarify, Kukathas is only concerned with illiberal communities. This seems apposite, given what he
claims is his purpose, which is to elaborate a view of liberal theory that can take heed of people’s interest in
their cultures and he does this in response to those, namely Kymlicka, who he takes to argue that
interference in illiberal cultures is justified in the name of liberal norms.
87
Barry claims that any analysis of the right-to-exit is impoverished to the extent that it lacks a
categorization of exit costs. Some believe that the reason a right-to-exit might be non-credible, is that some
costs are simply ‘too high’ to pay and therefore would reasonably impede one’s exit and therefore render
the right ‘non-credible’, but this would be to misunderstand what Barry is saying. Kukathas, for instance,
claims that as long as one is not physically impeded from exiting, then the right is credible. Any further
examination would be to impose upon others what kinds of considerations they ought to take cognizance of
before assessing costs. For instance, for some the loss of family who would now disown one for exiting a
group would be insurmountable and would prevent consideration of leaving while, for another, no cost,
however high, could prevent exit: What for one is a high cost is not so for another. However, Barry’s
categorization of exit costs is not a question of degree, but of kind, and this is an importantly different
focus. For Barry, there are ‘intrinsic costs’, ‘associative costs’, and ‘external costs’ to exit. Intrinsic costs
are logically and irremediably intertwined with the act of exit itself. If you believe that ‘Extra Ecclesiam
nulla salus’, then exiting might be too high a cost for you. Given that one’s immortal soul is imperiled, it
might be empirically the highest cost possible, but this does not make the right-to-exit non-credible, since
there is no logical mediation possible here between the act of exit and its consequences, at least as viewed
by the putative ‘exiter’. External costs, by contrast, are those that are imposed that are neither integral to the
act of exit nor are of such a character that their imposition can be viewed as necessary to the distinct
character of the association itself. Such costs may be empirically ‘lower’ than intrinsic costs, but this is
irrelevant and anyway coincidental if it is the case. External costs ought to be remedied because they are
neither necessary to the character of the group, but they may be sufficiently high such as to render exit less
likely than is reasonable. The test, here, takes away some of the subjectivity with regard to a ‘high’ or ‘low’
cost and seeks to make a more objective evaluation. (2001: 150-151.)
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from within, but the ability to do so cannot be safeguarded. To do so would be to
interfere impermissibly in the internal arrangements of groups. Individuals may leave the
group, either individually or in concert with others, and this right must be safeguarded,
whether it is recognized by the rest of the group or not.
It is Kukathas’ belief that any group that consistently failed to take cognizance of
the desires of its members would soon find itself dying a ‘natural’ death; an end Kukathas
claims people would work to avoid. It is for this reason that he claims that the right-toexit is more than merely formal and has ‘substantial bite’ (133). In this way, too,
Kukathas’ cultural communities are akin to ‘democratic majorities’ and can be subjected
to the same influences and contending individual interests that make up democratic
politics on a wider scale as contending interests shape and re-shape the group from within
(108-118). As Kukathas rightly notes, neither interests nor group characteristics are static.
They are, (permissibly) altered internally; by contending forces, and externally; by comingling with members from the dominant culture. But there is a ‘free rider’ problem
that Kukathas ignores, which is that while the liberal state has no right to interfere in
illiberal cultures illiberal cultures are parasitic upon the wider liberal society. The Millet
system of diverse, but closed communities, for instance, cannot be a liberal one on
Kukathas’ view, not because of the internally illiberal arrangements of the groups, but
because within such an arrangement exiting dissenters have nowhere to go. Their rightto-exit can only be protected as long as the larger society is a liberal one (133-34).88 If
88

Despite this, on Kukathas’ view it is not the responsibility of the state “to pursue the task of creating a
harmonious and cohesive society-one that makes for a stable social unity that will endure over a substantial
period of time” since, he claims, this lies outside the capacities of state institutions (1998: 697). We must
admit that it is not clear what marks the difference between creating a ‘harmonious and cohesive society’
which is not, in his estimation, the business of the state, and the requirement that the liberal state “should
not be concerned about anything except order or peace” (694, emphasis added). Kukathas accepts that one
way of ensuring peace might be to engage in the kind of practices which recognize the specifically cultural
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the liberal state has no business ensuring that cultures comply with liberal norms beyond
ensuring the right-to-exit, and this can only be ensured if the larger society is liberal,
which itself is either impermissible or impossible to enforce, it is not clear that a right-toexit is itself enough to even ensure the continuation of a right-to-exit.89
Let us assume, though, as we likely safely can, that as a practical fact the liberal
majority culture is not going to disappear anytime soon. This tells us little about the fate
of children who cannot exercise the right-to-exit anyway. In his critique of Kukathas,
Barry points out that the act of ritual scarring of one’s children, an activity Kukathas
claims is permissible, can only be understood in the context of its ritualized, i.e., its
cultural, form (2001: 141-146). On this view, the only coherent reading of Kukathas is
that he must endorse a regime whereby any kind of scarring could be performed on
another, as long as the person being scarred was a member of a group that embraced this
practice. Likewise, Kukathas maintains that it is questionable why those cultures which
do not value schooling, leastways not formal schooling, such as Roma (‘gypsy’) culture
and the Old Order Amish, should be forced to send their children to school at all (1992:
126). Unless a dispensation is provided to these children owing to the particularly
cultural character of their views of formal education, there seems to be no reason why a

nature of some rights-claims. Kukathas says that “[p]eace may require, among other things, different ways
of devolving political power” (694). Such ways could include ‘group representation rights’ and ‘selfgoverning’ rights (694-95). However, for Kukathas, this would be a purely pragmatic rather than
normative stance.
89
This is particularly true when, as Kukathas rightly states, satisfying claims for cultural recognition can
run the danger of creating further claims: “Groups do not always demand recognition because they exist;
sometimes they exist (at least in their particular sizes and characters) because they have been granted
recognition” implying that devolution of power to sub-group polities likely leads to ongoing demands for a
further devolution of power and so on (1998: 693). Moreover, we might note that those who wish to exit
liberal society cannot have the same right to exit as do those who exit one of the many cultural
communities within the broader liberal society. At that point, we are more appropriately talking about a
right-to-enter. One might have the right to ‘exit’ liberal society, in a manner of speaking, to join the Old
Order Amish, say, but liberal society cannot guarantee the right-to-enter, since cultural communities are
free associations and as such are free to establish their own membership criteria.
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particularly irresponsible parent who saw no reason for her child to attend school should
be forced to do so either, since “the point of saying that there are ‘no cultural rights’ [is]
that the motive behind an action should be irrelevant to its legality” (Barry 2001: 14344). Before we conclude that Kukathas has been ‘hoisted on his own petard’, it should be
noted that this is not an inference that Kukathas rejects. As noted above, he maintains that
it is not “appropriate for the state to be in the business of education in the first place”
(Crites 2007: 181). In other words, he avoids the trap Barry sets for him at the risk of
proffering a theory that is even less provident for the welfare of children than Locke’s
own views were, in that the reproduction of norms is given an unproblematic treatment,
despite the potentially deleterious consequences of such norms. At the very least, Locke
recognized the centrality of the interests of children in terms of their upbringing, as I
canvassed briefly in chapter one, even if he was mostly silent about what informed those
interests. On a coherent reading of Kukathas, however, what would prevent, say, the
abuse of children as a function of a sadistic grouping of adults joined together for this
purpose?90
Like Narveson, Kukathas has no adequately liberal account of children. What
makes Kukathas’ theory a (putatively) liberal one is that individuals are free to leave
arrangements they no longer can abide, period. Indeed, this is the only right that is
guaranteed to an individual as a member of a ‘group’. Children, however, are not free to
leave. They have no choice, but to be forcibly inducted into whatever way of life they
were born into. This, too, is not a conclusion Kukathas rejects. By contrast, he claims that
“only to a very small extent” is the nature of the liberal association voluntary:
90

Deborah Hawkins points out that Kukathas’ response to queries about what protection might be afforded
to the most vulnerable members of groups, often women, children and dissenters, is both circular and
inadequate (2004).
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“Membership is usually determined by birth rather than by deliberate choice...” (1992:
116).
My point is not that children do not possess the capacities to give meaningful
assent to the world around them and therefore they ought to be protected from the
decisions of others (even though that is, at least partially, true) for the question will
remain why impose this view of the world and not that one. The insight that children
cannot meaningfully acquiesce to anything can only do some of the work here. I am not
arguing that children ought to be protected from coercive induction. Rather, in
recognizing that children cannot but be coercively inducted I argue that Kukathas’
framework, which explicitly offers no more than the protection against forcible induction,
cannot apply to children as a coherent theory. In Kukathas it is made manifest precisely
because his arguments against the legitimacy of ‘cultural rights’ lead to the conclusion
that there is virtually no obligation parents must undertake on behalf of their children and
very little that is impermissible with how they may treat them.
In his criticism of Kymlicka’s theory of ‘minority rights’, Kukathas inveighs
against Kymlicka’s use of “meaningful individual choice” as the barometer for assessing
the moral permissibility of cultural practices. Kukathas asks: “why make ‘meaningful
individual choice’ the basis for supporting cultural membership” (121)? One might as
easily ask why make ‘exit’ the basis for assessing acquiescence? This is not as flippant
as it may sound once we take into account the question Jon Elster asks, which is: ‘how
can individual preference be construed as the basis of social justice and the preferred
basis of assessing the value of individual choice, when preferences may be shaped by a
process that preempts the choice (1983: 109)?
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3.4 The Problem of Adaptive Preference-Formation

‘Sour grapes’ is a causal (rather than intentional) form of preference-formation (Elster
1983: 117), most associated with the (unwitting) downgrading of unavailable options.91
One does not ‘choose’ to ‘look on the bright side’ for instance, because the mechanism is
unintentional. Nor, however, does it play on the perception of the situation. In other
words, the particular mechanism we are presently concerned with does not imply
misreading the situation whereby one might console herself, say, after having been
rejected for a desired employment position by saying ‘the boss was clearly just threatened
by my ability.’ Instead, it plays on the evaluation of the situation, in which case we
unwittingly downgrade unavailable options in our own qualitative assessment as in ‘I
never wanted that stupid job anyway!’ This phenomenon carries important implications
for my question. The idea of living the kind of life one sees fit must tackle the question of
what measures are being used to determine fitness. Assuming that we are, here,
concerned with human liberty, understood widely as the ability to live the life one sees
fit, it would seem counterintuitive to regard as free someone who did little more than
resign herself to the inevitable.
With regard to the position of adults the problem of sour grapes is difficult
enough. Unless we treat adults as beings who have sprung, Athena-like, from their
fathers’ foreheads, with no childhood to speak of, then the question of the legitimacy of
moral choices is itself conditioned by the earlier options available to them that set the
stage for their later choices. (This was Narveson’s point when he proffered that parents
91

Following Aesop’s fable of the Fox and the Grapes, Elster called this process ‘sour grapes’ because in
that tale the fox, unable to reach the grapes, commented that in the end he didn’t really want them anyway
as they were ‘sour’.
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have a duty not to raise their children such that they will likely turn out to be rapists,
murderers or another kind of social deviant.) Versions of this idea are everywhere
present. It is why we have different standards for adults than for non-adults in legal
proceedings. It is also why we have such lines of defense as battered-wife syndrome for
certain crimes.
Kukathas’ right-to-exit solution, while appealing on a certain view of individual
autonomy, is inadequate in light of an examination of adaptive preference-formation. It is
not that subjective welfarism has no place whatsoever. After all, even if it cannot be the
only measure of well-being it seems hard to ignore altogether one’s assessment of their
own circumstances in an analysis of their individual freedoms and capabilities to
function. But in light of the vulnerability that distinguishes childhood, Kukathas’ theory
is unworkable, because circumstances might occur which irremediably alter one’s future
prospects even in ways that one is aware of and which the (future) exit option will not
successfully reverse. Among the most chilling examples is female circumcision.92
However, even the notion that parents can rightly keep their children from being
educated is problematic if, say, as an adult no amount of education will ever allow you to
catch-up to the level of skill demonstrated by those who could read and write from the
time they were seven or eight.
Feminist theory has largely adopted the language of adaptive preferenceformation, and has adapted it to an examination of women’s lives (Chambers 2008;
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Alice Walker’s Possessing the Secret of Joy (1993) is a wonderful tale about an African woman
attempting to come to terms the twin blights of colonial and gender imperialism as well as her own genital
mutilation as a teenager, which she willingly undergoes as a means of identifying with her African culture.
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Nussbaum 2000).93 This is particularly the case when we examine the tension that has
emerged between feminist theory and multicultural theory. At one time it might have
seemed that feminists and multiculturalists had found common cause: They similarly
attack the liberal concept of ‘free choice’ from the standpoint that it is far less easy to rid
oneself of the ‘entanglements’ into which one is born than liberals are said to imagine
and that such entanglements, moreover, reflect particular power relations that
subsequently reproduce themselves; power relations that are said to be universal, but
which actually privilege particular groups (whites, men etc…) They are strange
bedfellows, however, to the extent that multiculturalists argue on behalf of the kind of
‘group autonomy’ that put the rights of individual women within those groups at risk of
the very kind of sexist hierarchies that liberal feminists understandably reject. In the
words of one observer: “In its demand for equality for women, feminism sets itself in
opposition to virtually every culture on earth” (Pollitt 1999: 27).
The application of universal principles has been thought to be the best bulwark
against the exclusionary and arbitrary exercise of raw power. For much of the 19th and
20th centuries, for instance, the fight for enfranchisement of the poor and racial and
gender equality took the guise of arguing that motivating principles had not been
universally applied on the mistaken belief that the poor, non-whites and women were not
93

Writing about India, Amartya Sen noticed that in relatively poor regions, complaints about ill-health
tended to be lower than in relatively rich regions. Sen explains this by arguing that where the remedy to
poor health is unlikely, people deal with this deprivation by convincing themselves that there is no such gap
between regions. Sen argues that by way of the same unconscious process women in rural India came to
believe that their nutritional needs were vastly inferior to those of their husbands and children. These
observations lead Sen to reject ‘subjective welfarism’ as a definitive measurement of well-being. It is this
which leads to Sen’s ‘capabilities’ approach, which Nussbaum subsequently takes up. The capabilities
approach is about the ability to realize one’s ends, rather than their actual realization. Unlike the ‘liberal’
concept of equality of opportunity, the capabilities approach views equal opportunities as only one of
several criteria. The capabilities approach focuses on the multi-dimensional basis for assessing welfare,
unlike the formal freedom to choose which was hitherto dominant in economic and many political models
(1999: chaps. 3,4 and 8).)
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sufficiently possessed of the qualities that would allow them to make proper use of their
rights or were not properly ‘human’ at all. On this view, the problem has not been the
lack of unifying principles, but the lack of applying them in a unified way.94 This view is,
today, challenged on the basis that such ‘universalist’ approaches often amount to
displays of power by other means; that universal principles are themselves oppressive
because they misunderstand and misarticulate the complexities of being
‘racially/culturally’ and/or ‘sexually’ situated (Herr 2008).
In her well-known essay “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” (1999) Okin
tackles the challenge that multicultural theory presents. In its most compelling
formulation, it claims to be an extension of the liberal principle of equality. It embodies
“the radical idea that people in other cultures, foreign and domestic, are human beings,
too – moral equals, entitled to equal respect…” (Cohen, Howard, Nussbaum 1999: 4).
This invites us to take seriously the extent to which (some) liberal theory obfuscates the
contestation of power and jettisons certain viewpoints from the debate from the outset.
However, one can claim to deserve equal respect in order to engage in particular cultural
practices, without requiring that the culture, in turn, extend similar respect to individual
members who come to reject certain aspects of the culture. The problem is especially
acute with regards to the officially subordinate position of women within many cultures.
The liberal, in particular, is challenged by the problem of adaptive preference-formation
because, counter-intuitively, it requires us to resist rather than to fulfill the espoused
desires of the individuals in question. Indeed, it is offered that owing to the phenomenon
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The Bill of Rights which declares that ‘all men are created equal’ even as it is written by slaveholders
provides one of the most obvious cases in point.
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of adaptive preference-formation, only by resisting ‘subjective welfarism’ is a “radical
critique of unjust institutions” even possible (in Baber 2007: 105).
With that said, the situation is not quite as clear-cut as some make it out to be
since to protect individuals from the problem of adaptive preference-formation requires
that we posit for them what is in their best interest. As an example, Katha Pollitt claims
to have a friend who had disagreed with the French government’s ban on the hijab in
school95 until she heard a Muslim girl on TV who wanted the ban because without it she
would be forced to wear the hijab (1999: 29-30). The desire to support whichever
position best expressed the individual’s liberation against the threat of external
imposition, revealed a simplistic assessment of which position that was because for every
girl forced to wear the hijab is a girl forcibly prevented from wearing it.96 Moreover, it
isn’t entirely clear what the nature of the imposition that is being rejected is exactly.
Certainly, Pollit’s friend’s sensibilities would not likely have been engaged had the
discussion centred around whether or not parents could force their female children to
wear ‘western’, but otherwise modest attire when they, in fact, want to attend school
dressed like Lady Gaga. It isn’t clear that the hijab does not serve a similar purpose in the
context of non-western attire.
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The ban extends to any obviously religious adornment.
The debate over whether or not to allow women to wear the hijab while playing sports, particularly
football (soccer) is relevant here, as we would likely consider it to be a mark of female liberation to play
sports (notably, Saudi Arabia, where girls and women are forbidden from playing sports, will now be the
only country in the world not to send any female athletes to the 2012 Olympics), and yet many women will
not play without the hijab. In some cases, girls and women are permitted by their families to engage in
sports, as long as they dress appropriately (wear hijab). While we might not think much of this parentallyimposed condition, as a practical fact it is more important to safeguard these girls and women’s ability to
play than to forbid them on the basis of disapproval of this particular condition. (This, of course, speaks
nothing to the issue of ‘safety’ which is a separate issue, although FIFA rules forbid religious symbols so
safety is not the only issue.) More to our actual point is the fact that many girls and women do not want to
play without the hijab because they priorize their religiosity before playing sports.
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In order to avoid ethnocentric assessments about what constitutes such important
liberal ideals as emancipation, equality and autonomy, Bhikhu Parekh suggests that
multicultural theory allows for a more nuanced understanding of the variety of roles
women play and the myriad understanding of their own lives they can have than is
offered by liberal accounts (1999: 70, 75).97 Parekh proffers that in France and the
Netherlands, for example, some girls opted for the hijab precisely because it allowed
them a modicum of autonomy by signaling to both white and Muslim boys what kind of
activities they were available for (1999: 73).98 Anecdotally, I have heard of college girls
in Canada choosing to wear the hijab as a mode of youthful rebellion against their
parents, who want their children to live as ‘Canadians’ and to shed what their parents, but
not they, view as an outdated and repressive garment out of keeping with their acquired
Canadian-ness. In these accounts is the view that cultures are neither static nor
homogenous and the customs and traditions of various cultures possess meaning that is,
in many cases, particular to the agent herself. In some cases, these meanings are perfectly
commensurate with ideas of gender respect and dignity and, either way, cannot be
rectified from the outside (Herr 2008).
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This line of thinking has been suggested as the liberal rejoinder to communitarian critiques of liberalism,
and it has been, increasingly, the response that liberals have offered. For instance, Rawls has maintained
that justice as fairness “is the most reasonable doctrine for us. We can find no better charter for our social
world” (in Beiner 1992: 18) and Amy Gutmann remarks that “the unencumbered self is…the encumbrance
of our social world” (in Beiner 1992: 18).
98
For a detailed examination of the phenomenon of educated adult women returning to orthodox religion in
the Jewish and Muslim world, see Smolin (1995-1996). Indeed, even though she comes down very harshly
on Islam as being, at its root, a religion of violence and male dominance, Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s book Infidel
(2007) details the author’s initial response to choosing to wear the burka (being covered from head to toe
in black) as a bulwark against the wandering eyes of men on the street. In the context of liberal feminists’
rightful preoccupation with male sexual violence and the discomfort that can come as a result of being
ogled and knowing that one is being assessed in a sexual manner, Ali’s account offers a slightly different
narrative. On the other hand, the idea that the best response to the male view of women as sex objects is to
‘hide women away’ is deeply unsatisfying.
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For these and other reasons, Ranjoo Seodu Herr claims that the attribution of
‘false consciousness’99 to minority women who defend ways of life and cultural practices
which others might describe as non-liberal, is empirically false. Notwithstanding that
women in ‘dominant’ cultures suffer from ‘constrained agency’100 he maintains that
minority women who are constrained are not equally constrained one as the other, in the
first instance, owing to stratification along lines other than gender. Factors such as
income and education play a part. More to the point, these women view themselves as
“active participants in cultural discourses, capable of implementing change” (2008: 33).
What the above demonstrates is that liberal norms and the typical use of the
concept of autonomy is complicated by the diverse conceptions of the good that do not
adhere to these norms and which are notably increasing among liberal nations,
particularly with the increase in the numbers of Muslim immigrants to Western European
and North American countries.101 We need a theory that is capable of elucidating the
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False consciousness is similar to adaptive-preference. It is the Marxian thesis that the proletariat
unwittingly identify their interests with that of their oppressors such that ‘the ruling ideas in any society are
the ideas of the ruling class’.
100
A recent statistic that every six days, a woman is murdered in Canada by her domestic partner seems to
bear out the idea that women within dominant cultures are not free from systemic abuse. The further
statistic that only about 22% of domestic incidents are reported, (possibly explainable, in part, by the selfadmonishing “I asked for it”) further bears this out.
http://www.canadianwomen.org/facts-about-violence
101
For a view that ‘official multiculturalism’ is failing in Canada see Neil Bissoondath’s Selling Illusions.
The increase in the rise of Muslim immigration has prompted several recent legislative enactments
prohibiting the niqab and burka, for instance, in France and Belgium and the Netherlands (which takes
effect in 2013). Other countries have varying degrees of bans, for instance, for public servants such as in
Turkey and Québec. However, there is some uncertainty around the actual motivation for the bans. In
France, for instance, the ban is, like most other places, justified in the name of female autonomy. However,
if a woman in France is stopped by police in the street wearing a face veil, she is not forced to remove it.
Instead she is brought to the police station where her identity is confirmed. This procedure speaks to a
security-based justification, which has not been nearly as prominent as the ‘autonomy’ justification. If, in
fact, the issue was that of female autonomy, there does not seem to be any reason to go to the police station,
where they would either force her to leave without the face covering, which they could confiscate in the
street, or allow her to leave with it in which case the trip to the police station also seems completely
purposeless.
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interrelatedness of cultural diversity and autonomy that relies on a nuanced view of what
it is about cultural identities that is worthy of protecting.
Kymlicka is self-consciously influenced by Mill’s views about liberal democracy
and takes his project to be the development of “a distinctively liberal approach to
minority rights.” In order to develop such an approach, he claims to lay out the “basic
principles of liberalism” (1995: 75). He claims that there is now a consensus within
liberal theory, that of ‘liberal multiculturalism’ and what remains to be discussed is which
type of multiculturalism we will adopt.102 His examination requires him to ‘go beyond’
the liberal tradition in order to establish a robust defense of both cultural diversity and
individual autonomy (and since one acquires one’s cultural bearings in childhood, the
protection of cultural diversity has implications for children). Kymlicka does this by
defending a view of minority rights that requires not only the negative rights that are
familiar to liberals, but also positive protections in the form of group-differentiated rights
and in so doing comes very close to striking the proper balance between diversity and
autonomy. For the most part, he manages to avoid Kukathas’ accusation that he would,
inappropriately, seek to ‘liberalize’ groups, because Kymlicka’s prescription for
liberalizing groups is very much in keeping with the manner in which Kukathas claims
that groups are permissibly altered (Kymlicka 1995: 163-72).103 Where Kymlicka’s
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Since there are many liberals who would disagree with this assessment it is difficult to call it a
consensus. CF Barry (2001), Kukathas (1992). Kymlicka believes he is merely drawing out the logical
implications of the acceptance of diversity and to that extent seems to view liberal multiculturalism as the
consensus view.
103
Kymlicka observes a difference between identifying non-liberal practices and intervening in groups that
are non-liberal. Of the latter instance, he maintains that coercive intervention is generally only justified in
extreme cases of rights abuses, such as the existence of slavery or a maniacal leader that did not enjoy
popular support and yet maintained rulership through tyranny. Otherwise, inducements to liberalize by,
first, merely providing the example, is preferable and very akin to what Kukathas says about the cultural
character of a group being altered by interaction with the majority culture. In virtually all instances,
however, a very nuanced approach that took into account the nature of the group including its history and
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argument fails is in its prescription for the kind of education children require in order to
be autonomous. First, it elides the distinction between the kind of choices liberals,
historically, have sought to protect and what substantive conditions are necessary for
meaningful choice. Since Kymlicka largely bases his view about the interrelatedness of
toleration of diversity and autonomy on an examination of the historical record, the work
required to defend his more robust view of meaningful choice is overlooked. In sum,
therefore, he relies on an inadequately defended conception of autonomy, which I shall
examine in greater detail in chapter 4.

3.5 Kymlicka’s Liberal Consensus

Kymlicka’s discussion regarding the link between autonomy and liberalism relies
on familiar arguments about the necessity of being exposed to different conceptions of
the good and being able to “examine them intelligently” (1995: 81, 92). In the end, a
liberal state is distinctive, he maintains, in part because it does not just protect one’s
ability to revise their conception of the good, by for instance allowing individuals to exit
groups without legal penalty104 but it provides the conditions under which such revision
will take place in the form of a liberal education.105 This provides a strong point of

‘status’ (national minority, recent immigrant, long-term immigrant group etc…) and the nature of the nonliberal practice is required before intervention was warranted and even then it should be employed
sparingly.
104
See footnote 85 regarding ‘exit costs’.
105
Kymlicka is circumspect about whether there would be any exemptions to such an education. Some
groups (those who were accommodated through exemptions long before the term multiculturalism even
existed such as the Amish and Hutterites) have been allowed to withdraw their children from school prior
to the age required of others. It is likely, though, that only national minorities, such as the Quebecois and
Aboriginal peoples, both of which groups are said by him to require rights of self-government, would be
allowed to evade such an education. In the case of the Quebecois, this is particularly complicated since, for
all intents and purposes, Quebecois society is already a liberal one with an arguably fully intact societal
culture inclusive of liberal educational institutions and in this way is not easily assimilated to Aboriginal
societies. It is not clear then, on what basis this liberal society could be exempt from requiring a ‘liberal
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contention for those who accuse Kymlicka of being ‘drawn down the path of
interference.’ The problem here lies in Kymlicka’s conception of autonomy. Doing the
conceptual ‘heavy lifting’ is an elision between what internal restrictions the state ought
to resist in order to protect individuals from ‘bad’ minority rights and what the ability to
revise one’s conception of the good requires. His view is grounded in the child’s
autonomy-interest in being capable of revising her own conception of the good, without
an adequate conception of how the interest is upheld by the requirement. This is
something I shall discuss in detail in the following chapter, in terms of the child’s right to
an open future, which is predicated on learning about many and varied conceptions of the
good. However, Kymlicka’s treatment of the value of cultural membership and the
reasons group-differentiated rights are appropriate to a liberal theory bears some
discussion.
The origins, as I have noted, of a set of ideals that are recognizably liberal are in
the 17th century debate regarding religious toleration. Kymlicka notes, however, that
religious tolerance has historically been of two kinds: That in which a diversity of
different groups could flourish, such as obtained within the Millet system at the time of
the Ottoman Empire, whose constitutive groups did not allow individual freedom of
conscience. In other words, individuals could be punished for apostasy and heresy, but as
a group they were allowed to govern themselves according to the dictates of their own
faith. The other kind of religious tolerance is that developed by Locke and constitutes,
specifically, liberal tolerance. This kind of tolerance focuses upon the individual’s right

education’ to those polyethnic group members who reside within its borders, which the dominant liberal
society in English Canada is required, on his view, to do.
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to live according to the dictates of her own conscience.106 To the extent that group rights
are only coherent if they serve to protect, in some fashion, the individuals who make up
that group, religious tolerance only becomes liberal in character when it recognizes the
individual’s right to reject religious dictates and revise her own ends. Kymlicka claims
this shows that “liberals have historically seen autonomy and tolerance as two sides of the
same coin” (1995: 158).
With that said, Kymlicka seeks to ‘revise’ the liberal tradition in order to make
sense of our present insistence on the importance of cultural membership to people’s
actual, lived experience, claiming that, historically, liberal theory has not given this
adequate weight. This is not a new liberal claim about the importance of ‘membership’ to
people’s lives, rather it is a new way of recognizing what is at stake with regard to the
various ways ‘membership’ is treated.

3.5.1 The Importance of Culture

Kymlicka believes that cultures are important not only because they are important to
people generally, but because they provide the framework in which people can exercise
that which, he maintains, has always been important to liberals, namely, meaningful
choice. Autonomy, then, is at the root of liberalism, but access to aspects of one’s
culture107 enhances meaningful choice and in this way diversity and autonomy are part
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Rawls has expanded the paradigm of, specifically, religious toleration to include the toleration of
comprehensive conceptions of the good more broadly. For a view that Rawls fails in this attempt see
Kirstie McClure (1990).
107
Importantly, the term ‘societal culture’ is not coterminous with the term ‘culture’ more broadly, for
Kymlicka. Members of polyethnic groups who left behind societal cultures in their countries of origin, no
longer have access to a societal culture other than the dominant liberal one. Their members are expected to
integrate into the dominant societal culture, even while aspects of their cultures are afforded a level of
protection. That is because a societal culture “provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the
full range of human activities, including social, education, religious, recreational, and economic life,
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and parcel of each other (1995: 82-84).108 The strong bifurcation between choice and
circumstance that is given by the communitarian assessment, for instance, is stark in the
extreme and “run[s] the risk of obliterating autonomy entirely and of dissolving the self
into a concatenation of unreflective roles imposed by one’s social position” (Buchanan
1989: 871). Of course as we know from the discussion of early liberal theory in chapter
one, liberalism’s focus on the individual as ‘free’ and ‘equal’ opposes the notion that
social position ought to be the dominant factor that determines one’s ‘life-chances’.
Kymlicka rejects the communitarian critique on the further ground that, as a fact, people
can and do revise their own ends; he acknowledges however that such revision is
extremely challenging and, moreover, cannot be required within a liberal society, but that
liberal society makes it a genuine possibility (Kymlicka 1995: 91-92; Rawls 2005: 31).
Kymlicka believes the reason for which we attach such importance to cultural
membership lies deep in the human condition. He accepts the benefit of ‘effortless
belonging’, whether an evolutionary fact related to survival or a psychological fact of the
human animal, as the basic building block of liberal society (1995: 93). It is not, he

encompassing both public and private spheres” (Kymlicka 1995: 76). Ethnic groups within poare not
legitimated in setting up their own societal – that is institutionally intact – cultures. Societal cultures are
more than shared values and memories, for instance. Importantly, too, individual cultural values can shift
even while the societal culture remains constant. The strongest example for this in the Canadian context is
likely Québec, wherein values before and after the sweeping changes of the Quiet Revolution were
transformed, even while there remained a distinct societal culture on the definition above.
108
Notably, Kymlicka distinguishes between polyethnic groups and national minorities and affords a
different level of protection for the cultures of each. Canada, for instance, has two national minorities – the
Quebecois and Aboriginal peoples – and these are afforded protection for their societal cultures in the form
of rights of self-government. Polyethnic groups, by contrast, have some responsibility to integrate owing to
the putative choice that many of them made to emigrate to Canada. Polyethnic rights are different from
national rights and refer to “adapting the institutions and practices of the mainstream society so as to
accommodate ethnic differences” (Kymlicka 1995: 97). They do not include setting up institutions that
would enable the flourishing of their separate societal cultures in the way that national minorities’ rights to
self-government would do. Having said this, not all polyethnic groups are similarly placed one as the other.
Refugees and the descendents of African-Americans cannot be said to have chosen to emigrate in the way
that a, so called, economic immigrant to Canada or someone who came to Canada to go to university and
stayed can be said to have.
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emphasizes, that cultures are meaningful in and of themselves, but they are meaningful
because “it is only through having access to a societal culture that people have access to a
range of meaningful options” (83). This is not so because a range of cultural options will
allow the liberal a chance to ‘shop around’ and to find the culture that is ‘the perfect fit’
for her, although that may be, at least occasionally, true. Rather a societal culture
provides the context from within which particular actions and gestures are understood;
therefore, they inform the decisions that we, in turn, make about what kind of lives we
want to lead.109 And integration to the dominant societal culture, and therefore access to
the ‘context of choice’ it can provide, is made more likely by accommodating certain
claims of ethnic groups rather than rejecting them. This is because we are, presently,
deeply attached to those cultures into which we have already been inducted; the influence
of which deeply penetrates and informs our sensibilities, overall (1997: 87).
The fact that the dominant culture could do justice to people’s autonomy-interest
at some indeterminate time, must abstract from any autonomy-interest individuals
presently have.110 Kymlicka’s view that aspects of one’s culture deserve protection
109

Other thinkers, such as Charles Taylor, relate the importance of cultural coherence more directly to
identity. In The Politics of Recognition, Taylor draws a parallel between the view others have of one’s
culture and the individual members’ of that cultures feelings of self-worth (1994). Furthermore, among
Rawls’ list of ‘primary goods’ is ‘the basis of self-respect’, which some have translated in much the same
way as has Taylor and have used this as an argument that favours the proscription of certain kinds of ‘group
libel’. By contrast, it is said that how we are viewed by those outside of our own culture is largely
irrelevant to those inside it since what matters for our self-respect is how others whom we acknowledge as
capable of understanding us and to whom we extend our respect view us and these are likely to be others
from within our own cultures.
110
It is for this reason that Kymlicka’s argument self-consciously ‘goes beyond’ the liberal tradition, which
had always provided a ‘negative’ right to choose what cultural practices the individual wished to embrace
and/or reproduce and insists that a presently relevant theory of liberalism must include ‘positive’ rights to
culture. These would engage the liberal state in actively protecting cultural membership by recognizing
differentiated rights. One of the reasons for which a presently liberal argument might require a revision of
the liberal tradition in order to take better account of the importance of cultural membership, has to do with
the imbalanced way in which cultures are said to be able to reproduce themselves, owing to the decisions of
members of the majority culture. Locke’s example of Melibaeus and the calf provides the classic
exposition of the ‘negative’ right to participate in a given culture. As part of his treatise on religious
toleration, Locke maintains that whatsoever is permitted outside of the context of religion is permitted
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because our own cultures are presently important to us explains why it is that parents may
expose their children to their present cultures: Because in the first place, parents are
already attached to them and in the second have a right to live accordingly which will
necessarily expose their children to them. It provides a reason to find agreeable a species
of differentiated rights – external protections against the decisions of the majority culture
– which intend to limit the impact that such decisions will have on the group.

3.5.2 Revisability Criterion

Kymlicka states that our aim as liberals should be to seek to ‘liberalize’ nonliberal cultures.111 The reason this is so is because the liberal seeks to offer ‘external
protections’ in the first place because the protection of cultural identity enables
within it as well. He argues that if it is lawful to slaughter a calf for meat, it is lawful to slaughter a calf to
sacrifice it to one’s god, however much the magistrate may think it perverse to worship god in this way.
However, if the magistrate was to decree that for a time, owing to a shortage of bulls overall, that the
killing of all calves should be suspended, it would be suspended for all, regardless of the reason for which
one wished to kill the calf. For Locke, then, there was a ‘negative’ right to be left alone to worship as you
pleased, but no right to have your religious practices protected beyond this (Locke 198: 42). Essentially,
the state was under no moral obligation to take account of the consequences to your religious program of its
various dictates, as long as its motivations were legitimately secular.‘Positive’ rights are of a different sort,
and suggest that we must take active measures to ensure a culture’s viability. There are different arguments
for why this is so and different perspectives about the limits of state intervention in order to bring about this
state of affairs. Be that as it may, arguments for positive rights overall begin with the premise that even the
most facially neutral position imports particular considerations that hide ethnocentric tendencies. This is the
starting point behind virtually all feminist and multicultural theories. Catherine MacKinnon provides us
with the most perverse example. She claims that when, as a woman, one’s employment health benefits did
not cover the expenses related to pregnancy, this was not viewed as gender discrimination because the
employment health plan did not cover men for such expenses either: “concealed is the substantive way in
which man has become the measure of all things” (1987: 34). On this view, it would be argued that the ease
with which Locke’s magistrate can order a decree banning the killing of calves owing to legitimate, secular
reasons, might prove less so if he happened to belong to a religious sect for which the slaughter of calves
for worship was sacred. It is this line of thinking that brings us to the ‘rule-and-exemption’ approach
elucidated (but generally rejected) by Brian Barry. Here the motivation behind certain ‘rules’ must be
legitimate, that is, they do not serve simply to restrict an undesirable practice for its own sake, but,
importantly, they move beyond the ‘negative’ right proffered by Locke and may also take into account the
consequences these rules will have for certain groups. They may then offer ‘culturally based exemptions’ in
order to address these differential consequences (2001: 40-50). Kymlicka concludes that “since mainstream
institutions privilege the majority’s culture and identity in so many ways, and since people’s interests in
culture and identity are so important, the question we face is not whether to adopt multiculturalism, but
which kind of multiculturalism to adopt” (Kymlicka 2001: 35). For Kymlicka, the fact of adopting some
version of differentiated rights as a normative value is now the liberal consensus.
111
I am using non-liberal and illiberal interchangeably, although not all do.
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meaningful choice and that ‘internal restrictions’ works against this (1995: 94). It is, he
says, essential to take account of the way in which some cultures “undermine rather than
support individual autonomy” and therefore requires us to distinguish between ‘good’
and ‘bad’ minority rights (2001: 22).
For Kymlicka, then, since diversity can exist without any recognizably liberal
norms in place, i.e., the Millet system, it is impossible to divorce liberalism from the
requirement of autonomy, understood as the right to revise one’s ends. Kymlicka’s
argument takes the following steps. First, by comparing different versions of religious
tolerance historically, he determines that specifically liberal tolerance requires that people
be protected from both forced conversion and that they be protected in their voluntary
conversion. He contrasts this to those societies, both historical and contemporary, that
have claimed that freedom of conscience ought to be interpreted so as to exclude
proselytizing and apostasy (1995: 82). With freedom of conscience so interpreted,
different religious orders would tolerate each other, but these orders would not be
allowed to try to convert non-members, nor would individuals receive any legal
protection should they decide to leave their present religious arrangements. I take this to
mean that a ‘right-to-exit’ and the attendant determination of what conditions make such
a right credible, would be non-existent. Kymlicka determines that only those societies
which protect the individual from forced conversion and to voluntarily convert are
demonstrably liberal (82, 158).
Second, Kymlicka believes that liberal tolerance requires that people be formally
free to question, adapt, convince and convert, through the protection of such ‘negative
rights’ as the freedom to associate (whereby people acquire access to different kinds of
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information). This is the main element lacking in the Millet system of tolerance. He says
that there is no requirement to revise within a liberal society, but a liberal society makes
revision a genuine possibility by “requiring children to learn about other ways of life
(through mandatory education), and makes it possible for people to engage in radical
revision of their ends (including apostasy) without legal penalty” (82).112 There is an
elision evident between the first and second elements of the preceding proposition. The
determination that any recognizably liberal society ought to protect individuals’ right to
‘engage in radical revision of their ends’ is importantly different from the requirement
that ‘children learn about other ways of life’ than their own. Clearly, the latter is not
necessary in order to ensure the legal protection of one’s capacity to revise. Instead, it is a
statement about what the capacity to revise, itself, requires, namely an open future via an
education that canvasses competing values (81). But a strong capacity to revise is not the
same thing as the ‘autonomy’ that, historically, liberal toleration sought to protect by
insisting on legal protection against forced membership. Rather, it is a new account
about what revision entails.
The view of autonomy on offer is too value-laden to act as the counterbalance to
diversity that it is Kymlicka’s intention to elaborate, rather, it trumps it. What allows
Kymlicka an escape route is precisely the fact of children’s not yet having meaningfully
embraced particular ways of life, a consideration that can go some way toward justifying
exposure to ways of life which children do not already embrace: Because we are not
supplanting ways of life to which children are already firmly attached, they are not done a
112

It is unlikely that this requirement extends to national minorities, but only to polyethnic groups. Some of
these groups may have cultural practices which are illiberal (though certainly not all or even most), but they
are distinguished from national minorities in that they do not have a right to self-government. They are,
therefore, integrated into the dominant liberal culture – not assimilated – in ways that national minorities
simply are not, including via the educational institutions of the dominant liberal society.
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moral wrong by being exposed to alternate ones. And since Kymlicka prescribes children
should be provided with a ‘liberal education’ that would expose them to countervailing
values as a corollary to their own autonomy-interest, there is no necessary inconsistency
between a liberal education, which Kymlicka views as necessary for autonomy, and the
importance to children of their cultural membership, which deserves strong – but varying
– protection on Kymlicka’s view. But to say that there is no inconsistency between one
thing and the other is importantly different from saying that children are owed a particular
kind of education in the name of their own autonomy. The view of autonomy on offer is
an impoverished one. On one hand, it does not take adequate account of the way in which
exposure to countervailing values is a poor substitute for meaningful options. On the
other hand, it imposes a particularistic view that negates the fact that by its very
imposition it alters the cultural milieu in ways that likely preclude – and likely have the
intent of precluding – ways of life that are both meaningful and in keeping with the
autonomy-interest of those persons raised within those cultural milieus. It is to an
examination of these objections that I now turn.
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4. ‘Liberals-in-Waiting’ (2): A Right to an Open Future?
4.1 Introduction

In chapter two, I canvassed arguments in the philosophical literature on the parent-child
relationship regarding whether, specifically, parents’ interests (qua parents) ought to be
taken into account when making decisions about children. It was argued that the childcentred view, rather than the dual-interest view, is compatible with the ideal of viewing
children as equal moral agents. Furthermore, it was determined that owing to the large
discretion parents maintain to order integral aspects of their children’s lives, we need not
be concerned that, within necessary limits, the child-centred view hinders the parents’
ability to make decisions by requiring a constant and debilitating need to self-assess. Nor
should we be concerned that their ability to make self-directed (which I distinguished
from other-directed) decisions is hindered even though these might affect the family
and/or have the consequence of forming, in part, children’s value-sets.
Parents do, then, maintain the right to induct their children into their values.
Despite Galston’s erroneous critique, parents do not need fundamental rights in order to
do so. They may do so on the instrumental grounds that children’s interests are served by
being fully participating members in the cultural life of the family and owing to the
parents’ rights to live according to the values they adhere to, which, I have argued, will
necessarily have the effect of inculcating in children particular values and ways of life.
Generally, child-centred proponents espouse the view that children ought to have
what has been termed an ‘open future’. It isn’t that proponents of an ‘open future’ dispute
that parents may, even ought, to inculcate their particularistic values into their children,
but rather that there are particular requirements that others ought to meet (normally the
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state) with regard to children’s upbringing, even when these invite opposition from
parents.
An ‘open future’ is thought by its proponents to offer at least two necessary
things. The first is to instill the capacity to live up to the liberal ideal of non-imposition.
The idea that one can choose autonomously, that is, without the imposition of the will of
others, one’s own life plan and value-set, is arguably one of the bases of liberal thought,
even while its pretensions to being a value superior to others provides the basis for many
critiques (Galston 1995; Sandel 1982; 2006; Gilles 1996; Burtt 1993).
The second thing for which an ‘open future’ is thought necessary is the
preparation for equal participation in the democratic political order (Gutmann 1980;
Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Feinberg 1980). To this extent, citizens are required to
understand basic institutions and how they operate, as well as certain organizing
principles. It is argued that for these things to be substantive and meaningful, rather than
merely procedural and formal, children must develop certain basic capacities, such as the
capacity to think critically and assess competing ideas. How else in a democracy, it is
proposed, is one to make a reasonable decision about what best represents one’s own
interests? Moreover, how else is one to discharge this responsibility with a view to
understanding the impact one’s decisions might have upon others and to make
appropriate decisions in light of this?
Opponents of children’s right to an ‘open future’ argue that the preservation of
children’s future autonomy via an education-for-autonomy, guides the development of
their embryonic values and ideas of the good in ways that are far more particularistic than
proponents are willing to admit; that such an education “excludes quite as much as it
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includes” (Gilles1996: 948). According to these critics, autonomy is transformed from
mere instrument to being, itself, one of the contested conceptions of the good, which is
then, indefensibly, privileged. They argue that proponents of an ‘open future’ do not pay
enough heed to the fact that once a child has been educated for autonomy it is extremely
unlikely that she would ever choose a life whereby the ongoing practice of autonomy is
not a central feature. This being the case, critics argue that the claim to mere
instrumentality is chimerical. Moreover, they argue that the particularistic directions in
which an education-for-autonomy oftentimes leads, provides an inferior moral upbringing
than children would otherwise have.
In this chapter I argue that an open future is not properly a right of children, in
that it is not something that they are owed as a corollary of any autonomy-interest they
have. In the first place, it tends to conflate the quantity of options with the quality of
options. In the second place it neglects the dialectical nature of how children come to
choose, that is, from the interplay among their inherent natures, the choice-paradigm in
which they already exist and the influences to which they will be exposed, even if the
number of such influences is relatively small. This is not to say, however, that an open
future violates children’s rights. There might also be instrumental reasons for which
children ought to be exposed to countervailing influences in the form of appropriate civic
lessons in the name of good citizenship, a topic to which I shall turn in the following
chapter.

4.2 What is an ‘open future’?

The term ‘open future’ originates with Joel Feinberg in his well-known essay
“The Child’s Right to an Open Future” (1980). The right in question is one of the few
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rights, perhaps the only right that is peculiar to children. This right in general requires
protecting children’s future interests in having autonomous choice, by presently
guaranteeing the conditions that will enable them as adults to make informed decisions.
On this view, a child’s autonomy is held in trust just as one might hold in trust the legal
decision-making authority vis-à-vis another’s estate, with the proviso that this authority
may only be exercised in a way that would meet with the approval of the person in whose
interest such authority is held (Noggle 2002; Feinberg 1980).113 Contestation over the
specific content of this right in any given instance fills reams of scholarly books.
Virtually all commentators agree, however, that any convincingly liberal society must
provide a set of minimal conditions for child-rearing in which the future pursuit of chosen
activities is made possible. In other words, the possibility for future choice may not be
irremediably closed-off. What then distinguishes the ‘open future’ view from among
other views that generally agree to the need for minimal conditions to protect future
capacities to choose? The answer is both a difference in degree and in kind.
According to Arneson and Shapiro autonomy requires: “(1) the maximization of
options and (2) the development of critical reason” (Arneson and Shapiro 1996: 388). On
this analysis, an ‘open future’ distinguishes itself by positing a difference in degree by
choosing to espouse ‘maximal’ rather than ‘minimal’ choice-sets as being what children
require to protect future autonomous choice (Feinberg 1980: 136). Additionally, it
distinguishes itself by virtue of its difference in ‘kind’. The understanding of ‘critical
reason’ is based upon “generally accepted methods of enquiry” (in Fish 1999: 92). The
phrase ‘generally accepted methods of enquiry’ is a broad one into which much could fit,
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but here it includes basic canons of scientific evidence, that is, that evidence garnered
from the fields of physics and biology can be adduced to understand most natural
phenomena.114 Moreover, it includes the idea that every value and conception of the good
is a potential candidate for unbiased, critical assessment.
The ‘open future’ argument is proffered on putatively ‘Millian’ grounds, that is,
on the grounds that autonomous choice is a basic liberal precept. The argument is
twofold: First, individuals have a right to an autonomous choice about the kinds of lives
they want to lead and second, they require certain kinds of critical capacities in order to
make good democratic citizens. In the literature these two reasons are, almost invariably,
conflated (Gutmann 1980: 338, 350; Feinberg 1980).115 Theorists argue that children
require an ‘education-for-autonomy’ for reasons of independent self-governance, which
argument is thought to subsume both our first and second reasons. Self-governance is a
vague concept generally related to the ideal of non-imposition, that is, the right not to
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The notion of ‘scientific enquiry’ is all-important. This is because much (though not all) of the
controversy over what values children will be exposed to has its basis in religious belief. And where this is
the case, the question of values is inextricably linked with questions of fact (Carter 1987). This is also the
case when it comes to the link between fact and values that are not religiously based. For instance, the
‘culture wars’ and the controversy over what curriculum should be taught to children takes as its base a
difference over what facts ought to be emphasized. For instance, ought we to focus upon the good that the
founding fathers did or the fact that they were slave-owners? For detailed accounts of the ‘culture wars’
see Ravitch (2002). The link between facts and values here still incorporates canons of evidence that,
broadly speaking, are scientific even if they do not actually adduce evidence from the ‘scientific’ fields,
such as biology and physics. This is because the pursuit of historical knowledge, which incorporates
scientific canons based on observable data, that is, physical evidence, is relevant to the question of which
facts to emphasize. That presidential hopeful Michelle Bachmann claimed in an Iowa speech that
America’s love of diversity and tolerance extended to the founding fathers who fought “tirelessly until
slavery was no more in the USA” reveals the depth of the problem Ravitch explores (2010).
115
In Mozert v. Hawkins, the opinion of Justice Kennedy most reflects this. Mozert regards the case of a
reading series to which some parents objected owing to its depiction of themes and values which they
found incommensurate with their own. Objecting parents argued to be able to ‘opt-out’ of classes in which
the books were to be used, as a means of remedying what they argued was a First Amendment violation.
Justice Kennedy claims that preparing students for “citizenship and self-government” requires that they be
taught to think about “complex moral and social issues” in such a way that would invariably increase their
capacity to assess opposing values, which capacities would likely extend to questioning their own values
(in Burtt 1994: 57). For a thorough account of the legal and ethical issues involved in Mozert see
Stolzenberg (1993).
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have the views of others imposed upon oneself. It is thought by proponents of a child’s
right to an ‘open future’ that roughly the same capacities that are necessary from the
point of view of the child’s right to live the life to which she is most suited and which
most coheres with her espoused values and conception of the good are also necessary for
equal citizenship and that equal citizenship is required in order to give substance to the
ideal of non-imposition.
By contrast, I argue that the two parts of the argument actually lead to different
rather than the same conclusions and that they actually amount, therefore, to two separate
arguments. The reason this is so is because the subject of the right, while thought to be
the same, that is, the ubiquitous ‘child’, is actually different. In the first argument, the
subject of the right is the child herself (or more accurately, the ‘future adult’ she will
become). The concern here is to safeguard her right to choose for herself, in the future,
the particular kind of moral values and conceptions of the good she will want to adopt
and abide once she is of an appropriate age to make that determination. I argue that in the
second argument, the subject of the right is twofold: The subject of equal citizenship is
both herself and others. The concern here regards the ability to make appropriate
decisions that will contribute to the society in which she is a part whose decisions will,
necessarily, affect other people and not herself alone. In order to bring out the
implications of each more clearly, then, I shall distinguish between these two arguments,
which I call, respectively, the ‘liberal-in-waiting’ and the ‘democrat-in-waiting’
argument. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the former. I will take up the
‘democrat-in-waiting’ argument in the subsequent chapter.
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4.3 The ‘Liberal-in-Waiting’

On what I am calling the ‘liberal-in-waiting’ view, proponents of an ‘open future’ believe
that children need to be exposed to an ‘open future’ for their own sake, in order to
determine, without the imposition of given social roles, their own future conceptions of
the good. Children are thought incapable until a certain level of maturity is reached to
make decisions which cohere with their own world-views, such world-views themselves
being nascent, therefore encouraging their capacity to do so in the future is a central
objective. On the ‘liberal-in-waiting’ view, what are at stake are the moral allegiances,
values and conceptions of the good that the person will choose for herself when she is of
an age to do so. It is thought that this idea is consistent with the consent ideal within
liberal thought, in that children, if they had the wherewithal to consent, would want their
future options kept open and thus are presently owed the conditions that will enable that
in the future. In this way at least one observer has argued that ‘future autonomy’ can be
included in a list of Ralwsian ‘primary goods’ (Gutmann 1980).

4.3.1 Instrumental Autonomy

Autonomy is viewed by many ‘open future’ proponents as purely (or at least
predominantly) instrumental and characterized as a conduit through which the latent
possibility of every child, to live the life that is best suited to her, may be discovered
(Arneson and Shapiro 1993; Mill 1998a: 66, 68). In other words, during the course of the
child’s development the child need not (in many cases should not) be taught to embrace
the ideal of autonomy.116 Rather, the ideals she will come to embrace are to be arranged
by her via the choice-mechanism that autonomy enables. This mechanism includes
116

When we say ‘should not’ we mean that autonomy should not be taught as a supreme ideal in the
context of the plural education system.
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rational deliberation via canons of scientific enquiry of a maximal number of possible
goods. This instrumentality is said to work equally well for virtually every possible
conception of the good. For this reason, an education-for-autonomy is not thought to
hinder the requirement of the liberal state to remain neutral as among competing
conceptions.
In the course of receiving an ‘education-for-autonomy’, however, children are
raised, however unwittingly, to embrace autonomy as a value. Owing to this, it is argued
that they could never be expected, therefore, to lead a life that then embraced its lack
(Callan 2002). Once one has been trained to choose autonomously and to value critical
detachment and dispassionate evaluation, it seems unrealistic that one could be brought to
the point of deciding to continue down the path that the training had started you on, only
to muster all those decision-making propensities to turn around and go back. To say,
then, that persons trained to choose autonomously could reject a way of life that would
engage the ongoing exercise of autonomous choosing is to identify ‘autonomous
choosing’ with a skill – the ability to size up alternatives and make better than worse
decisions. If it were true that that was all that it entailed, then there would be no basis to
resist children’s training in autonomous choosing. In fact, to the extent that it enabled the
realization of better than worse options, there would be reason to embrace it. But its
rejection arises from the fear that autonomy on the open future view entails something
rather different; that it is more accurately viewed as an internal disposition or an
evaluative orientation – the fundamental propensity to attach moral value not, simply, to
choosing, but to choosing in a particular way and through particular cognitive processes,
ones that assemble the relevant lessons from the previous training that has led to the
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moment of choice. These processes consist in assessing, comparing and evaluating, and
not merely in choosing. Once viewed this way, it seems much more difficult to accept
that autonomy, as the open future theorists frame it, could attach to ways of life that reject
what the internal disposition fundamentally entails: The moral value in critical evaluation
of one’s pre-conceived views based on the idea that it is necessary to critique and assess
any and all views. This orientation cannot sit comfortably alongside ways of life that
reject the moral value of critique – or at least that reject the particular mode of critique
relevant here. How would one now close-off the very disposition through which one had
chosen what one takes to be the most meaningful plan of life whatever that plan turned
out to be?
Autonomous choosing as a skill may be engaged regardless of one’s conception
of the good: People make choices all the time from within the particular ways of life to
which they subscribe. But to define autonomy in terms of critical capacities and maximal
options is to transform it into something quite different from a mere skill. Instrumental
autonomy belies the necessarily active part an ‘education-for-autonomy’ plays in actually
shaping the evaluative character of those who are to do the future autonomous choosing.
The instrumental conception of autonomy is such that its character is transformed from a
mere instrument through which all other conceptions are evaluated to being one of the
contested conceptions of the good itself.
This view of personal autonomy is normally seen as unproblematic by those
whose substantive conceptions of the good cohere with the capacity to constantly and
critically appraise and re-appraise the truth-claims, life-ends and value-sets which form
the basis of one’s present outlook. For those, however, whose conceptions of the good
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are marked by, say, substantial deference to hierarchy, authority and tradition,
instrumental autonomy is particularly troubling as the only conceptions liable to be
rejected are those which cohere with the ideals of deference to authority, hierarchy and
tradition (Callan 2002: 122-24; Beiner 1992: 24-25).
We must begin with the understanding that the division we are principally
concerned with when we are claiming to require an ‘education-for-autonomy’ is not
simply a distinction among different values or conceptions of what is a ‘good’ life that
children will be expected to identify and acknowledge, but among incompatible values
and conceptions – notably between those that are thought to be autonomy-promoting and
those that are thought to be autonomy-inhibiting. The distinction between the two is made
by Arneson and Shapiro in the course of a thought experiment, meant to demonstrate that
state enforced autonomy-promotion does not violate liberal norms of neutrality. In this
experiment a guardian must choose which of the two ways-of-life increases the odds for
her charge of choosing a way-of-life that will complement her inherent ‘bend’ toward,
either, a ‘secular’ (autonomy-promoting) or ‘traditionalist’ (autonomy-inhibiting) way-oflife. Arguing against Arneson and Shapiro’s thesis that an ‘education-for-autonomy’ is
neutral because those provided with one can as readily choose to live either an autonomyinhibiting or autonomy-promoting life, Callan writes that “autonomy is internal to the
character of the agent, and therefore, young adults who have learnt to choose
autonomously will to that extent be inclined to reject autonomy-inhibiting lives, even
when they (autonomy-inhibiting lives-AB) might be more suited to their (first) nature”
(2002: 126).117 This is because the environment in which one is raised matters to the kind
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of life options not only that one will have available to them in the future, but also to
which options will be viewed as viable ones, as well as what options will be necessary in
order for the agent to be capable of satisfaction. It is only logical, then, that an autonomypromoting education can only promote autonomous choice if an autonomy-inhibiting
education does the opposite, for it is in relation to an autonomy-inhibiting education that
the promotion of autonomy is understood. In this way, we glimpse the error of viewing
autonomy as instrumental since if an ‘autonomy-inhibiting’ education did not have the
opposite effect of an ‘autonomy-promoting’ one, what would be the point in arguing on
behalf of either?
Callan accepts the premise that children do have an inherent (first) nature, which
certain types of influences will either complement or alter.118 Whether or not this is even
important will depend principally on whether or not we view complementarity with one’s
first nature as decisive in terms of an appropriate conception of autonomy, that is, some
life-plan or course of action genuinely being ‘one’s own’. In the previous chapter I
largely credited this view to Mill. Particularly stirring in this regard is Mill’s famous
analogy of the tree which must be allowed to “grow” and “develop” according to its
‘inner tendencies’. An even stronger statement of this view has been given recently by
Matthew Clayton (2006).
Clayton writes: “children are not blank slates, which must be filled with
convictions if they are to develop the powers necessary for autonomy...” Rather,
“children are born with particular proclivities and will in due course acquire particular
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Therefore, children’s psychological development cannot be explained purely in terms of upbringing (1990:
222).
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interests and beliefs as they experience alternatives that are offered to them” (120). He
argues, for instance, that children ought not to be inducted into any comprehensive views
before the approximate age of ten; the age at which he supposes children can begin to
make sense of the world around them in a way to enable them to begin making
reasonable decisions about their own value systems. Until that time, the protection of
natural proclivities and the exposure to maximal alternatives is how we allow children to
develop the powers necessary for autonomous choice. On Clayton’s view, the
development of autonomy is an organic process that emphasizes children’s innate
tendencies as the driving engine behind it. When we remember that the point of
privileging autonomy is not that children will then make thoughtful decisions that cohere
with some pre-programmed worldview, but that they will be enabled to develop
worldviews that cohere with their ‘first natures’ (as Callan puts it) or their ‘particular
proclivities’ (as Clayton says), then we do not seem to have a strong basis for resisting
the development in children of the ‘powers necessary for autonomy’, leastways on the
liberal-in-waiting view. This is because on Clayton’s view (like Arneson and Shapiro),
exposure to competing influences help the individual develop her innate propensities and
surely nothing can be more indicative of autonomy than such development. But Clayton’s
view encounters a number of problems.
Clayton’s statement of the ‘open future’ view, first, is a particularly demanding
one because, unlike so many others, he argues that both parents and the state have a
moral duty to provide children with an ‘open future’; requiring that parents refrain from
inducting children into their particular values,119 and second that this is justifiable by the
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He claims that parents may do so as long as it is not their intention to induct their children and as long as
they introduce their children to “other religious and irreligious traditions” (110). In other words, a certain
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analogous relationship between the family and the state. Historically, such analogies have
been utilized to justify the subordinate position of non-patriarchal familial members.120
Clayton’s revival of the analogy has the purpose of turning the analogy on its head.
Rather than contending that the divinely appointed monarch is called upon to do within
the realm of the commonwealth what was assumed to be the role of the patriarch – a
kindly Filmerian figure but one who was not accountable – within the family, Clayton
argues that authority within the family is accountable to all members by requiring
particular conditions for its use. In this way, the commonwealth is not modelled on the
family, with all that that assumed about parental authority, but the family is modelled on
the liberal state, with all that that assumes about political authority (Clayton 2006: chaps.
1 and 3). Since the liberal state is said to be neutral as among conceptions of the good,
by likening the family to the liberal state the family must then assume the same
requirements of neutrality with regard to the moral upbringing of children, (with the
caveat that the morals with which children are raised are commensurate with other values
the liberal state is said to require for its continuance) (Clayton 2006: chap. 4).
Neutrality within the liberal state is defended on the grounds of treating people
with equal concern and respect in the context of plural conceptions of the good. Since
children have no discernible conceptions of the good, by extending the analogy of the
act can be undertaken if motivated by certain kinds of considerations that is precluded if motivated by other
(impermissible) considerations even if the effect is the same.
120
Aristotle says that rule by a husband over his wife is “as a statesman; over children as by a king”
(Politics Bk. 1 sec. xii). However, he recognizes that this analogy is limited since rule by statesmen usually
involves people ruling and being ruled in turn, whereas rule of the husband over the wife is a permanent
feature of gender relations. Rule over children is considered “royal” because a monarchy is an example of a
constitutional arrangement wherein one rules affectionately and as a result of age. Otherwise, however,
there is no inherent difference between monarch and subject, just as children (boys) are no different at birth
than their fathers were. The fact of the non-permanence of childhood accounts for the different ‘type’ of
rule a father has over his children than that which he has over his wife. (Where female children fit is
another question.) For a deconstruction of the gender-bias inherent in Aristotle’s philosophy see Okin
(1979: chap.2).
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liberal state to the organization of ‘the family’, we have no choice but for children’s ‘first
natures’ to act as a suitable substitute for adult citizens’ developed conceptions of the
good that the liberal state is beholden to protect. Accordingly, we are morally required to
keep open virtually all options in order that the ‘first natures’ of children can be allowed
to develop with as little interference as possible, similarly to how the liberal state must
interfere as little as possible with its citizens’ developed conceptions of the good.
Although interesting and novel, Clayton’s thesis runs into both practical and
conceptual difficulties for which reasons it is not compelling. In the first place, there are
dissimilarities that strain Clayton’s analogy. For instance, the family is characterized by a
degree of love and empathy beyond that which is usual or even expected within a
political organization whereby most members have no direct or personal ties one with the
other. We cannot afford to be underwhelmed by this important fact. While it does not
provide us with enough reason to think that elements of a liberal society are always
inapposite in the familial context (a point canvassed in the first chapter), we can neither
afford to be complacent about the particular reasons for which the issue of children’s
moral upbringing invites such fevered discussion and that is precisely because we do not
view ourselves as equally indebted to all children; we view our indebtedness to our
particular children as requiring that we provide them with the benefit of what is in our
view (for ultimately we can have no other view), the best moral upbringing for them. In
relation to this, it should be noted that the ideal of Rawlsian public reason is no more than
the attempt to divine the normative basis of a political morality in the context of deep
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pluralism.121 To attempt to import it, as Clayton does, to the familial context, ignores the
very premise of the deep pluralism which prompted it. This fact substantiates our earlier
claim: Parents will necessarily impart to their children the values that they deem to be
meaningful. This is not merely an empirical fact to be set within our normative scheme,
but is a necessary part of the normative scheme itself, in that parents have a moral duty to
provide to their children an appropriate moral upbringing. Within a pluralistic society
governed by principled norms of conscientious freedom, the moral duty to provide such
an upbringing cannot be neatly disentangled from the fact of the plural moral upbringings
that are necessarily engendered.
Clayton examines and rejects several arguments in favour of the view that parents
have such a moral duty. One is the intimacy argument, which I canvassed thoroughly and
rejected in chapter 2 and so will not take it up here. The second is the ‘inevitability view’.
On this view, parents cannot help but guide their children according to their own
comprehensive ideals. Clayton finds this unsatisfying because “it is too strong to claim
that parents cannot detach their aspirations for their children from their own specific
conception of what is good or virtuous” (113). Certainly this is true of some of us, some
of the time. For instance, I might recognize that there is a plurality of good lives
possible, and so be perfectly accepting of the fact that other families will rear their
children differently from how I rear mine. This accepting attitude might extend to how I
view the public school curriculum, whereby although I espouse, say, atheism,
vegetarianism and a concerted critique of capitalist social organization, I would not
necessarily push to have such views replicated in the classroom…moreover, if I embrace
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For criticisms of Rawls’ exclusion of the family from the requirements of public reason see Okin (1989;
1994). For a critique of Rawls’ Justice as Fairness see Sen (2009: chap. 2), and for a critique of the
difference principle see Cohen (2000: chaps. 9; 2008).
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the Rawlsian ‘burdens of judgement’ I can accept that views incompatible with mine
might be just as reasonable as are my own. But from these truisms it is a longer stretch to
reach Clayton’s conclusion which is that parents “need not believe that the virtues they
practice must also be ones their children should pursue” (113). One reason he offers for
why this might be so, is the possibility that parents themselves acknowledge about the
fallibility of their own judgements and their hope that if some or other of their views
turns out to be mistaken, their children will come to reject such views later on. But
arguments from sceptical premises are unhelpful, mainly because comprehensive views
are not generally founded upon scepticism, but upon deep conviction and sincerity,
however mistaken. As Nagel says: “if I believe something I believe it to be true. I can
recognize the possibility that what I believe may be false, but I cannot with respect to any
particular present belief of mine think that possibility is realized” (1987: 217).122
In the final analysis, Clayton’s view is distinguishable from my own not because I
claim that it is impossible to avoid imparting one’s comprehensive views – although I
believe that Clayton pays less attention to the difficulty here than is merited – for Clayton
122

In a discussion arguing that epistemic absence does not necessarily conduce to an unstable political
order, Susan Mendus (2002) offers something akin to Clayton’s claim. She says that the ‘believer’ might
be able to differentiate between the fact of their belief and the fact of their belief being true. She argues that
statements such as ‘I believe P will occur’ and ‘P will occur’ are two different kinds of statements. Her
point is that in making either statement the speaker has access to the very same reasons and no more
because “[ ] believing is believing true [ ], but they are not thereby the reasons for p’s actually being true.”
Here Mendus distinguishes between what one takes to be true (whether correctly or not) and what is
actually true (whether or not one will ever know this and whether one will ever have access to the correct
reasons to know it). Mendus writes: “reasons for believing true may be distinct from reasons for truth itself,
and the believer may acknowledge that, while also acknowledging that he has no access to the different
reasons that might apply in the two cases.” This, however, is no longer to be a ‘believer,’ (since ‘believing
is believing true’), but to be a ‘conjecturer’ who acknowledges that he cannot proffer a (for him) truth
statement because he knows he might be wrong (after all he acknowledges that he does not have access to
the different reasons that might demonstrate this thereby acknowledging that such reasons either do or
might exist) (2002: 27-8). But, even though it is the case that the believer can distinguish, in the abstract
and at a distance from a present controversy, between his own belief and the fact of truth, he cannot do so
in the context of a present controversy or presently held belief without adducing the very scepticism that
seems to counteract any genuinely comprehensive view…unless that comprehensive view happens to be a
deep attachment to complete scepticism. But if that were the case, Clayton’s view of ideal rearing would
likely be widely adopted and there would be little call to argue for it.
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does not claim it is inappropriate to inculcate into children our own comprehensive
views, per se. Rather, he claims that it is inappropriate to do so without also providing
children with access to alternative and competing views, in which case inculcation is
legitimate only if it is an unintended consequence of a larger attempt to avoid inculcation
(110-111). Neither is the issue that people will not likely abide by his prescription
(although likely they won’t), for we can separate the fact of something’s legitimacy from
its practicality. Rather, for Clayton it is illegitimate for parents not to expose their
children to myriad and countervailing viewpoints because of the restraints that the ideal
of public reason imports into the familial setting. I, however, reject the appositeness of
the analogy, as previously noted. Furthermore, Clayton’s view of autonomy is vulnerable
to the same criticisms Callan offers of Arneson and Shapiro’s thought-experiment. But
even if we do not accept the criticism that Callan offers, or accept that it applies to
Clayton, we might yet have other reasons for rejecting an ‘open future’ as a right
grounded in children’s autonomy-interest – even if we do not also argue that it is a
violation of children’s moral rights to have such an education – for reasons that have to
do with the quality versus the quantity of options.

4.3.2-Choice and Meaningfulness

While open future theorists focus on the capacity of an ‘education-for-autonomy’
to provide ‘meaningful choice’ (Gutmann 1980: 341-343, 350) this view is criticized for
what it seems to purport about the nature of choice: How ‘open’ is ‘open’ and at what
point does ‘openness’ cease to lead to meaningful options?
Claudia Mills offers a trenchant critique, focusing on what it means to have a
future that can be called ‘open’ and what is lost (rather than gained) by it (2003). Like
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Callan, Mills contends that the ‘open future’ view tends to see autonomy as entailing
little more than the capacity to choose among a large array of options, many of which
conflate the capacity to choose one’s future occupation with autonomy tout court;
whereby the ability to choose being either “an engineer, a physician, a research scientist,
a lawyer, or a business executive” (Feinberg 1980: 132) is viewed as encompassing more
rather than less choice and that such choice is either a demonstration of autonomy or
coterminous with it. There is an implicit suggestion that all views are equally good, and
that ‘more is better’.123 But in the context of a qualitative difference among options, it
isn’t clear that the quality of the choice can be directly mapped onto the quantity of
options, or at least that ‘more choices’ means ‘better choice’. If we accept Callan’s point
that the main cleavage does not concern differences of the type alluded to with regard to
various career options, but instead concerns the difference between ‘autonomypromoting’ and ‘autonomy-inhibiting’ lives, then we have a very different perspective.
This perspective forces us to more thoroughly examine what is at stake in rejecting, so
called, autonomy-inhibiting lives. In other words, for the ‘more is better’ view to obtain,
we must first assume that the type of choices alluded to above are inherently worth
having for their pursuit to be worthy of protection. On the Razian view (adduced in the
previous chapter) this is (partially) so: An adequate array of choices must be protected in
order to allow those with different inherent inclinations to pursue lives that cohere with
these inclinations so that people may come to lead lives of self-fulfilment. In other ways
though, Raz remarks on the importance of qualitative difference among options: “A
choice between hundreds of identical and identically situated houses is no choice,
compared with a choice between a town flat and a suburban house” (in Mills 2003: 500).
123

For a valuable discussion on the relative merits of more or less choice see G. Dworkin (1988: chapter 5).
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Since it is not possible to include all possible options (and at the risk of straying
into utiliarian philosophy), the total expected fulfilment yielded from options that are
available must prove, on the whole, higher than those which are precluded. Choices must
be made as to which are the most meaningful to protect. In other words, we must accept
that the benefit offered from being able to choose among being an engineer, physician
and business executive, is inherently more conducive to meaningful choice than having
the more ‘narrow’ option of being raised, say, to be an Amish farmer or
housewife/mother. But this is a difficult thing to accept uncritically if we recognize the
much larger qualitative difference between the life of an Amish farmer understood as one
possible ‘type’ of life and the life of someone who could choose among the options
adduced above as another ‘type’. In other words, the choice is not as among several
‘types’ of life; that of an Amish farmer, or an engineer, or a physician or a business
executive, but that between two types: The life given by the kinds of concerns which
preoccupy the Amish farmer and the live given by the kinds of concerns which
preoccupy one who can choose among the various occupations adduced above: “…from
the point of view of the Amish parent, all the various career options…are all ways of
living in the world, pursuing money, prestige, and professional satisfaction, focusing on
worldly reward rather than on living in harmony with god” (Mills 2003: 500).
At this juncture, I must reiterate the point regarding the built-in bias of
instrumental autonomy: That the type of life to which one is exposed will largely dictate
what one will need in the future in order to have a sense of fulfilment. This point has its
‘dark side’ with regard to the problem of adaptive preference, and for that reason we
should tread carefully. But what that ‘dark side’ requires us to do is to critically assess the
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possibility for a particular way of life to be fulfilling on an objective basis of what
constitutes a reasonably ‘good life’. It is, in part, for this reason that Gutmann’s
assessment of an ‘education-for-autonomy’ as a ‘primary good’ is questionable: It isn’t
clear that there aren’t desirable values that are precluded by such an education. It isn’t
clear then that one would want an ‘open future’ whatever else one would want, in the
same way that one can be said to want other primary goods.124 This is, in part, because
meaningfulness is largely an a posteriori determination: It is as much dependent upon
past choice-sets as it is upon future ones.
This above point becomes more appealing once we bear in mind that options are
‘closed-off’ every day that do not normally give rise to concerns about restricting the
right of children to an ‘open future’. Any opportunity that a child has to pursue a future
as a world-class athlete or artist, or as an ‘elite’ professional of any significance (Nobel
prize-winning laureate or astronaut, say) will depend upon choices that are made now
that close-off alternative options. The qualitative difference among options reduces the
strength of the argument that ‘more is better’ (Callan 2002: 118).125
It seems impossible to say that a life devoid of any and all choice could be either
reasonable or meaningful. Moreover, it would be largely impossible because even on a
view that one never seriously questioned the dictates of their faith and never wavered in
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This criticism might be said to be similar (but is importantly different) from Rawls’ inclusion of material
wealth as a ‘primary good’, given that there are some ways of life which eschew material wealth (the
priesthood) and would not include it (some brand of socialists perhaps). The important difference being that
‘material wealth’ is merely shorthand for the capacity to afford an adequate amount of food, clothing and
shelter that one can reasonably be thought to want and which in advanced capitalist society is normally
required in order to acquire these things. It does not, then, require that one accept that capitalist society is
either (a) the best means of social reproduction nor (b) does it preclude people from using material wealth
to work against the evils they believe it brings by, for example, donating to charity or other ‘good’ causes
nor that a life of chose austerity is inherently bad nor that a life of spiritual contemplation is not a
reasonable conception.
125
The focus on qualitative differences among options is further explored by Mills (1998: 154-165).
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their belief about, say, what god wanted from them (obedience, devotion, self-sacrifice)
or about their final ends (to become a great stage actor) options abound: God wants my
devotion and obedience, but what does that entail in this particular instance when I must
choose between two paths that seem, both, to be required of me? What path will help
rather than hinder me in my pursuit of artistic genius?
Further to this, on one way of looking at things, the possibility of rejection is
required in order that any course of action be meaningful at all. It would seem difficult,
for instance, to take satisfaction from continued moral allegiance to a particular way of
life if there was, literally, no possibility to stray from it whatsoever. On this view, what is
appealing about living according to particular moral dictates is the continued allegiance
to such dictates even in the face of alternatives that tempt us to do otherwise. I offer this,
even on the understanding that straying would not ever be seriously contemplated by
some individuals owing to the strength of their allegiance to the way of life in the first
place: The requirements of ‘literal possibility,’ are, notably, minimal here. Callan points
out, for instance, that when people say they had ‘no choice’ but to respond a particular
way to a moral imperative, what they mean is that their choice was based upon a
‘categorical’ rather than ‘competitive’ evaluation of the different options. In such an
instance the point is not that they did not choose at all, but that alternate options simply
did not count as eligible options owing to the categorical nature which obtained, from
their view, of the available choice-set (Callan 1997: 56). A mother who steadfastly
refuses to turn her son in to the police for a crime she knows he committed might be said
to have made a choice based upon a categorical rather than competitive evaluation.
Certainly, she could not be said to literally have had no choice. On the other hand,
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literalness cannot be the salient measure of choice otherwise ‘your money or your life’
would seem to fall into the same category of option-sets as the choice between declaring
either comparative literature or sociology as your college major! By the same token,
reasonable choice cannot be viewed as a complete openness to all options. Choice
matters precisely because we do not normally view all options as interchangeable.
It is difficult to conceive of any way of life undertaken in an advanced liberal
democracy that was so ‘closed’ so as to preclude choice in the way I mean it. It would
have to preclude even minimal knowledge that there exist other ways of life even if such
ways are unexamined and little about them is known. On this view, even the Amish (or
the Hutterites to offer a more local example), our best comparator group in terms of a
‘closed’ and ‘traditionalist’ society, do not count as having a lack of meaningful choice.
That is because their engagement with the world is enough that all can be expected to
have minimal knowledge that there is a mainstream society from which they differ. It
may well be impossible to quantify what constitutes an adequate parameter of choice, but
to make autonomy and choice coterminous in the way that ‘open future’ theorists tend to,
would be to falsify the way in which even those who live what I have been calling
‘autonomy-inhibiting’ lives actually live.
Tevye from Fiddler on the Roof (1971) provides the perfect example to illustrate
this point. When his two eldest daughters wish to deviate from traditional marriage rites,
Tevye asks himself whether his faith and tradition can sustain the deviations. He
concludes that they can. He draws the line, however, at the request of his youngest
daughter, who wishes to marry outside the faith. This, he cannot countenance. He never
deviates from his faith which dictates all his actions, even while he struggles to determine
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what adherence to his faith, respectively, allows him and forbids him to abide, all the
while, therefore, being forced to examine, deliberate and make choices. (Interestingly,
his daughter goes against his wishes, risking her relationship with her father.
Nonetheless, by the end of the tale, there are signs that Tevye will, eventually, forgive
her. Four decades later we are still awaiting a sequel to see if that’s true...)
At issue is the fact that some critics recoil at the (often superficial and demeaning)
picture that is painted of those who reject conventionally ‘western’ ideas as to what
constitutes the critical assessment that is said to be constitutive of autonomy in the first
place.126 The kind of evidence that acts as proof in defence of any given truth-claim or
course of action is itself part of a wider frame of reference that requires the assumption of
its own privileged position in order to be accepted as the default frame of reference.
Many non-liberal ways of life, however; certain sects of Catholicism and Judaism among
possible others, have long traditions of critical reflection and scholasticism, and entail the
exchange of reasons with regard to interpretation of sacred texts and what implications
these carry for those who try to live in accordance with the dictates of these texts. These
engage in critical assessment, but refer to a different modality of rationality altogether.
As Stanley Fish argues, those who believe in biblical inerrancy “will regard the lack of fit
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Carter (1987) notes that the liberal response to those who attempt to bring religion into public discourse
is all-too-often to dismiss them as lunatics, such that “even the religious left is sometimes offended by the
mainstream liberal tendency to mock religious belief” (977). Carter examines the constitutional record of
laws passed in order to give ‘equal time’ to ‘scientific creationism’ as to ‘evolutionary theory’. He
concludes that liberalism has a blind spot when it comes to religious belief because the constitutional
record prohibiting ‘equal time’ laws as violations of the ‘Establishment Clause’ of the First Amendment,
turn on accounts that, however true (such as the fact that ‘creation science’ is just bad science) ought not to
inform the constitutionality of the laws themselves and that the only other proof the courts have of the
establishment of religious belief inherent in creation science is the fact that the views are informed by and
therefore consistent with religious belief. Surely, however, not everything consistent with or informed by
religious belief can be said to be unconstitutional on a First Amendment analysis. Carter opines that in the
final analysis, what threatens liberals about religiously-motivated fact-finding is the assumption that the
deeply religious are incapable of reason and that this incapacity threatens the liberal order. Shelley Burtt
(1994) and George W. Dent Jr. (1987-1988) also opine that the goals of religious parents are often
misunderstood and mischaracterized.
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between their own conclusions and the conclusions that might be reached by the
‘generally accepted methods of inquiry’ as the severest judgment possible on the
generally accepted methods of inquiry” (Fish 1999: 92). (On this view, the fact that
human beings cannot walk on water only serves to further prove that Jesus was the son of
god, rather than that he never walked on water!) What Fish’s statement does not entail,
however, is that people who reject ‘generally accepted methods of enquiry’ reject all
methods of enquiry, or exchange of reasons, or attempts to rectify cognitive dissonance,
or internal dissension, all of which are important hallmarks of critical assessment in
keeping with the ‘generally accepted methods of enquiry’ which Fish’s argument
implicates.
According to ‘open future’ theorists, liberal theory ought to work backward when
it comes to children, viewing them as repositories of liberal values waiting to be
unleashed. From this point of view, childhood is a training ground for people’s generally
much longer lives as adults. It is recognized that persons have the right to practise the
religious values that they are presumed to have freely chosen. The neutrality as among
ends to which liberalism is thought to aspire is based on the model of adults with fully
developed belief systems. Must, however, liberalism be neutral as regards belief
formation in children even if it must be as regards formulated ends of adults? On one
view, no harm is done by imposing beliefs onto children by virtue merely of their being
imposed, simply because what is anathema about imposition is that what is imposed
supplants what is already there. This does not, however, secure us the right to impose any
beliefs whatsoever and in any fashion that moves us.127 Why might this be so?
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In Manitoba, a young girl went to school with Swastikas temporarily tattooed on her. Eventually,
teachers called Children’s Aid who apprehended her. In interviews with social workers the 8-year old
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Previously, I identified several issues that are relevant here. The first is that
cultures are important because people have an interest in ‘effortless belonging’. Children
also, then, have such an interest. Moreover, parents import a moral duty to raise their
children with the particular values that they believe to be the correct ones.
Mills states it nicely. She says “All parents can really do to produce children who
share their faith is precisely that: to share their faith with them as long as the children are
willing to let them share it []” (2003: 504). After this time, (Mills puts it, unsurprisingly,
at around age 12), parents must demonstrate respect for the present autonomy of children
(what I in chapter one referred to as their ‘being’ in contradistinction to their ‘becoming’)
by dealing thoughtfully with their children’s withdrawal from or criticism of the ways of
life which their parents wish for them to pursue, and the reasons the children offer for
such withdrawal and criticism.128 Evidence gleaned from the field of child psychology
suggests that such ‘thoughtful dealing’ with the child’s individuality is necessary for
competent parenting (Schaffer 1990: 222-226).
Proponents of the child’s right to an ‘open future’ posit a much more stringent
requirement. Rather than the minimal requirement that children must not have the
capacity for future autonomy irrevocably hindered and that parents are subject to

explained that all non-white people should die. This provides an example as to the limits of what a parent
may reasonably be allowed to teach a child on the basis that society has a legitimate interest in what kind of
people children will turn out to be. The Act under which she, and subsequently her younger half-brother,
were apprehended, allows for the state to apprehend children to protect the child’s “life, health or emotional
well-being”. The judge hearing the case as to the permanency of the removal agreed that the parents’ values
and their associations threatened the children’s emotional well-being. However, he concluded that the
racist markings were not in and of themselves enough to justify a permanent removal of the children. The
judge concluded that an assessment of parenting skills and the kind of home environment offered needed to
be conducted and that such an assessment had to be done in isolation from the beliefs that the parents had
and had inculcated (2010 MBQB 32).
128
J. Morgan asserts that “the parent is at risk of violating the [the child’s right to an open future] only if
his treatment of the child does not respect her emerging identity” suggesting that emerging identity both
requires respect from the moral point of view and that it is distinct from (although influenced by) the
“experiences that others provide for her” (2005: 371).
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thoughtful dealing with the child’s possible rejection of parental values, ‘open future’
proponents posit the maximal requirement that they must be taught in the present about
the future exercise of this capacity. Indeed, it is possible that on one formulation of this
view, the latter is required by the former. In the most extreme examples of confusion on
this issue, it is proffered that children’s espoused wishes should be taken into
account…unless they espouse the wish not to have available to them an ‘open future’. In
other words, if children, of an agreeably appropriate age, defend their own right to an
‘open future’ as against their parents’ objections, then the espoused wishes of the children
should be taken into account. By contrast, “they ought not to be granted the right to
restrict their options against their parents’ wishes and the state’s requirements” because
their espoused wishes then act as proof that they are not yet able to discern their own
interests (Gutmann 1980: 354). So what ought parents to do with regard to sharing their
enthusiasms with their children?
In words sometimes credited to JFK: “There is something immoral about
abandoning your own judgement...” Parents are duty-bound to share their moral values
with their children. Moreover, doing so is as much a fact about parenting as is changing
diapers. Such morals may include of course, esteeming such thing as value-pluralism (the
belief that there are many, equally viable and incommensurate values) and scepticism
(the belief that there is no concrete way to discern any ultimate truths with certainty), as
much as it does that there is only one true god and that the bible contains the complete
truth of all there is to know. Regardless of the relative virtue of the values themselves (for
there are many values that are highly dubious and some that are positively loathsome) the
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fact of instilling in one’s child the measure of what one takes to be valuable is a basic
moral condition of good parenting.

4.4. Moral Limits

We recognize moral claims in a variety of ways. First, adults have moral rights to live
according to their best lights. Second, adults as parents, have a moral duty to inculcate
their moral ideals into their children. These duties stem from the child’s right to have the
benefit of some moral grounding. I recognize that what I am calling a ‘moral grounding’
could, potentially, be constituted by the substance of virtually any number of different
values. Either way, it is both a practical fact that parents will inculcate into their children
(or attempt to do so) the religious and cultural values that they deem superior as well as
their moral duty to do so. The only alternative is to accept the amoral upbringing of
children: The idea that children are to be given no basis to determine right from wrong or
the context from which to view anything as fundamentally valuable or meaningful. It
seems hard to imagine how one might esteem a rudderless life and to the extent that
parents may act to prevent this, they must. Further, children have a right to be
participating members of the culture to which the family belongs, owing to their own
need for effortless belonging: In both the cultural and the familial sense.
Moreover, we recognize moral rights and duties as distinct from, although
importantly related to, legal rights and duties, although the latter ought normally to be
premised on the former in some rational way. Without getting into a Kantian analysis of
perfect and imperfect rights and obligations, suffice it to revisit my example from chapter
2 with regard to the parents and their choice to spend money on a family vacation rather
than use that money to develop in their child her particular musical talents. I determined
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that parents may or may not have a moral right to a given choice even if we would be
unwilling to conclude that they did not retain a legal right to make it.129 With that
distinction in mind, I turn to what are the moral limits to the inculcation of values in
childrearing.
Above, I contended that the ‘open future’ view inappropriately conflated choice
with autonomy in the first instance, and privileged autonomy above all other values in the
second. Moreover, it portended to a maximal account of options, whereby virtually all
options are to be viewed as equally good, equally available and the moral agent ought to
be encouraged to choose among them. I argued that children did not have a right to an
open future. However, I have yet to elucidate the kinds of minimal criteria that must be
met for children to be provided with a legitimate upbringing from the moral point of
view.
Virtually all observers agree that children may not have their future capacity for
choice irremediably negated. Rather than argue that children must have options kept
maximally open, I claim that children must be reared for eventual independence. I pause
to reiterate that for the moment I am bracketing the kinds of considerations that will come
into play, when we consider the individual as a member of the wider society and, for
now, restrict my discussion to the minimal moral criteria for upbringing from the point of
view of the effect upon the child alone.

4.4.1 An Education-for-Independence

What might it mean to be reared for independence as opposed to autonomy? Some
might suggest that there is little difference in that both are concerned with a kind of ‘self129

Although we also claimed that it was not clear that this choice was morally impermissible anyway.
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government’, and freedom from the imposition of the will of another. I posit, however,
that the use of the term ‘autonomy’, particularly in the context of the ‘open future’ view,
posits an overly strong emphasis on the virtue of ‘choosing’ in order to accord with one’s
moral basis without due regard for the largely un-chosen moral basis itself. By contrast,
the term ‘independence’, leastways as I am using it, has much more to do with the ability
to make decisions without requiring guidance or input from others.
Adducing Thomas Hill’s example of the Deferential Wife, Callan suggests that
servility in the Deferential Child, can be understood as believing in an “overriding duty to
serve her parents” (1997: 153). He claims that it is impermissible to rear a child in such a
way that even as an adult she has no ability to question the dictates of her parents even
when logic and future evidence would militate against the wisdom of their views (Callan:
152-57). It is difficult to know from mere observation where respect for parental
authority normally viewed as desirable, fuses with mere subservience as the overriding
moral consideration just as it is difficult to determine the way in which servility as
defined above, distinguishes itself from many of the ‘autonomy-inhibiting’ life options I
claimed were permissible to impart. Deference to faith-based gender roles, say, might
seem to fall into the ‘autonomy-inhibiting’ category. They can, however, be distinguished
from the servility apparent with the Deferential Wife, for whom acquiescence to her
husband’s will is her single overriding objective. Conceptually, at least one difference is
the spirit in which one undertakes what one believes to be one’s role. To say, for
instance, that there exist gender roles and we ought to live accordingly is not ipso facto to
say that such gender roles include that women’s primary moral function is to be
subservient to the will of her husband. This is so even if that will is benign, in other

160

words, even if the husband encourages her to be more independent simply because he
believes that that will make her happy.130 If she proceeds to do things that would
normally be indicative of greater independence, i.e., she finds employment outside of the
home, she embarks on occasional overnight excursions with female friends, only because
she believes that she ought to do as her husband instructs, then she is not embarking upon
these activities in the ‘right spirit’ as it were, and thus is actually exhibiting not
independence, but subservience: Experiencing the imposition of another’s will as her
own. Again, from a practical point of view, it might be difficult to distinguish between
similar activities undertaken in a different spirit. One who seeks employment outside the
home, say, because she genuinely wants to might be practically indistinguishable from
one who seeks it because her husband genuinely wants her to. Furthermore, it might be
difficult to distinguish between doing something out of subservience, that is, because we
understand our primary moral obligation to be submitting to the will of another person,
and doing something about which we are uncertain, on the advice of a trusted and
respected loved one.
Finally, it might be difficult to distinguish from doing something for loved others
because we wish to make them happy, which as I stated in chapter one often takes the
form of waiving our rights vis-à-vis loved others, simply because our love for them
motivates us to put their own needs and wants ahead of our own, even when our own are
legitimately to be privileged from a neutral point of view. In other words, one can
commit identical acts from different motivational bases or in a different spirit, and that
matters to our overall point.
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Callan notes that while “[s]ervility and despotism are mutually reinforcing vice [] there is benign as well
as malevolent despotism (1997: 153).
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Children must be taught to do things in the proper spirit. Children must have
engendered within them the confidence to make their own decisions. Moreover, they
must be taught that their wants and needs matter as much as those of others. This of
course, leaves myriad options open with regard to the moral framework within which
they will make decisions including how they will evaluate and priorize their wants and
needs in relation to those of others. Some parents will impart a view that their children
should learn to always assert their needs and wants on the basis that others will do the
same and that getting one’s needs met is a contest that you sometimes win and sometimes
lose. More desirably, some parents will teach their children that there are times when it is
necessary to assert one’s needs and wants and other times when it is not and the fact of
the matter is that it is often difficult to know which is which. The important point in all
this is that the spirit in which actions are undertaken cannot be one of subservience, that
is, that one is morally beholden to the will of another. Unlike an ‘education-forautonomy’ an ‘education-for-independence’ has little to do with scrutinizing the moral
framework from within which one makes decisions (although such scrutiny is not thereby
precluded). This largely brings us back to Mills point, above, that the most a parent can
do is share their faith with their children, for as long as their children let them. Respecting
children’s present autonomy largely requires allowing them to ‘take the lead’.
There are, moreover, certain things that are morally impermissible for parents to
impart. Parents may not impart racist or homophobic ideologies to their children. This is
not just because of a need to impart ideals upon which good democratic citizenry can be
built, more about which in chapter 5. It is because it does a disservice to the child herself.
This is particularly true in the case of children born to homophobic parents. Since it is not
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possible, leastways at this point, to either predict or prevent the birth of a gay child,
children must not be subjected to an anti-gay ideology for reasons established in chapter
two.131 The same is true, although differently so, for children exposed to racist ideology.
In the context of a pluralistic society where people regularly encounter people of different
races: In the grocery store, in university, in the workplace, when dealing with public
service workers, it is a disservice to children to raise them in such a way as to encourage
stressful encounters with the myriad people she will encounter everyday that will be,
potentially, of a disparaged race. I am reminded of a scene from the movie Crash (2004).
In the movie, a racist man is on the phone with a woman trying to get medical
help for his father, through his HMO. Things are not going well and in an attempt to
bring the conversation to a more personal level, he asks the woman her name. When she
tells him it is Shaniqua and the man realizes she is African-American, the conversation
takes a turn for the worse as she becomes the focus of his frustration owing to her race.
Rather than improving the situation owing to a capacity to intimately explain the details
of his father’s situation, the situation is worsened owing to the man’s predisposition
toward the woman because of her race.132
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CF Sandel (2007) and Jecker, Jonsen and Pearlman (2012) for pertinent discussions on the issue of
genetic engineering. Even if we were able to predict and thereby prevent the birth of a gay child, this
practice would be exceedingly questionable from both an ethical and prudential point-of-view. As an
example, we know that there is an imbalance with regard to the ratio of men to women in China, owing to
that country’s ‘one child’ policy. This imbalance is partially owing to the sexist manner in which the
policy was implemented by individual families who, hoping for a boy, would sometimes kill their female
children. Nonetheless, it is not clear how such a policy would fare from the point-of-view of ratios were it
to be implemented without any sex-selection process. In other words, does such a policy, applying (as it
did in China) to such a large number of people, play havoc with nature’s method of sex selection and would
the selection of heterosexual children carry unpleasant practical and ethical consequences? The question of
sexual-orientation selection, which its potential implications for reproduction, the ability for others to find
mates of the same sex, and the ethical considerations of potentially removing from existence a ‘deviation’
that is found in nature, is equally frought with problems.
132
Similar, real-life examples can be found. In 2009 a young girl went to school with racist graffiti
stenciled on her body. The following day she and her half-brother were apprehended by social services.
During the court proceedings to determine whether the apprehension should be permanent, the judge heard
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Parents have a wide area of ‘interpretive capacity’ in which they may make
decisions that are in their view in the best interest of their children. They may expose
children to the values, religious and otherwise, which they believe are superior and hope
that their children come to respond to these values and embrace them as their own. They
may make a strong case for why it is that these values are the ones that ought to be
adopted. Moreover, they need not expose their children to a large variety of different
options and to weigh the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of the various ones. But they must deal
honestly with their children. They must respond with openness and thoughtfully to their
children’s legitimate queries when and if they arise. Moreover, while parents may shield
their children from many of the more unsavoury aspects of life on the basis that there are
appropriate ages at which to reveal these, they must develop a kind of plan about when
and how to introduce these difficult subjects to their children. In other words, they must
attempt to develop within their children eventual independence, which independence
includes the capacity to make decisions without the input of another. Nothing in this
precludes parents from inculcating in their children a particular value-structure from
within which conditions must be assessed and decisions reached, but it does preclude an
upbringing that attempts to shield children altogether from knowledge of any kind of life
other than the one they presently know, or an upbringing which does not attempt to
cultivate the eventual independence of the child as she emerges into adulthood.

evidence regarding the father’s parenting skills, which, somewhat unsurprisingly, were woefully
inadequate. Among other pieces of evidence adduced were two incidents involving what were initially
everyday encounters with non-whites that turned violent, clearly owing to the father’s racist worldview.
One of these incidences involved a gun. Both of these incidents were witnessed by the young girl, and
reportedly left her traumatized; clearly not conducive to her well-being now or in the future, nor to the
well-being of her (step) father whose views they are. Director of Child and Family Services v. D.M.P
(2010).
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Even if we accept that (a) an ‘education-for-autonomy’ is biased despite its
pretensions to neutrality, (b) it erroneously conflates quality with quantity, (c) it pretends
that choice and autonomy – understood as the capacity to critically assess and revise
based on ‘objective’ canons of enquiry – are coterminous, it isn’t clear that even on its
own terms an ‘open future’ does the job it expects of itself. I take this to be that it leads
to human flourishing because it enables children to develop given aptitudes and to make
choices that cohere with their value-set. One does not learn to become masterful at a
given sport or instrument by successive tries at consistently alternating ones, any more
than one can absorb what is meaningful about a particular way of life in what amounts to
a cursory and superficial exposure to it (Mills 2003).
Moreover, the question then of quantity and quality raises its head again: If choice
is meant to offer more than the option to choose for its own sake, then the quality of the
options to be provided are all-important. Other theorists have chimed in on the
superficiality of choice presented in a society with a deep consumer ethic, one whose
advertising seems bent on having you believe that your personhood is truly expressed by
something as irrelevant as the design of the ‘skin’ you choose for your cellphone.
(Actually, you are encouraged to purchase several so that you can alternate depending on
how you ‘feel’ on any given day.) Some have commented, rightly, that the attempt to
provide something more meaningful than choice that follows a consumer ethic is not only
required, but must be zealously safeguarded given how pernicious the consumer ethic
model is because such a model re-focuses our attention overly on our own immediate
wants and requires far too little in return. In this regard, Allan Bloom writes: “a young
person today begins de novo, without the givens or imperatives that he would have had
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only yesterday. His country demands little of him and provides well for him, his religion
is a matter of absolutely free choice and…so are his sexual involvements” (in Beiner
1992: 36).133
Choice for choice’s sake carries little meaning at worst, and at best carries no
more meaning, on the whole, than lives that reject choice as a fundamental virtue. It isn’t
clear that those raised in the way that the ‘open future’ view would have it are happier,
healthier, have better relationships with their families, etc... than are others. Evidence
suggests, for instance, that people who are religious fare far better in dealing with
emotional and life upheavals than do their non-religious counterparts (Clark and Lelkes).
Nothing here is meant to indicate that we can safely conflate ‘open future’ theory and
atheism, or religiosity with a rejection of the ‘open future’ view, (although much of the
opposition to the ‘open future’ view comes from religious corners). It is to say, simply,
that the correlation between the fact that the deeply religious better withstand life’s
upheavals than do the specifically non-religious, and report a level of satisfaction and
well-being equal to or in excess of those reported by the non-religious, ought to give us
pause.

4.5 Conclusion

So, what conclusions should we draw from the above examination? First, the
requirement of an ‘education-for-autonomy’ is problematic owing to the ‘authenticity’
problem: It isn’t clear that an ‘education for autonomy’ better enables people to lead the
lives in the direction that their inherent inclinations would dictate; it as likely as not
moulds us in a direction ‘away from’ rather than ‘toward’ our inherent inclinations. Two,
133

Galston makes a similar observation (2002: 105), so too does Callan (2002).
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it isn’t clear that an ‘autonomy-for-education’ leads us toward empirically better and
more meaningful lives.
If Callan and Mills’ objections are to be taken seriously, it might be that the
majority of approaches that could safely be called ‘child-centred’ tend to view autonomy
in terms that are too demanding to withstand the objections advanced by critics within the
context of a modern society marked by deep plurality. On the other hand, if, as has been
previously argued, parents do not possess an ineluctable right to impose their own valuesets and comprehensive ideas of the good upon their children, it might seem
unproblematic if parents should find an education-for-autonomy troubling, leastways
from a normative if not a pragmatic viewpoint: The fact that they might find it troubling
does not tell against it being in their children’s best interest.
Typically, opponents of the right to an ‘open future’ argue on behalf of a dualinterest view. This view unwittingly subsumes the rights of children within those of
parents which I have argued is inappropriate on a liberal view. On the other hand,
proponents of an ‘open future’ typically argue on behalf of a child-centred view. This
view is consistent with liberal theory’s focus on non-imposition and the equal moral
worth of persons, but their conclusion often stems from conceiving autonomy as
something that can be held in trust. This denies the actual process of personal moral
development, and, as well, it has the effect of negating the personhood of children by
focusing on their future selves, without paying due regard to their present selves.
The child’s best interests can only be understood with reference to the
particularity of the individual child’s present ‘situated-ness’; that autonomy is not
something that can be held in trust, because autonomy cannot be removed, wholesale,
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from the constant and ongoing development of the person, which development is often
given by many of the factors that an ‘open future’ would reject. I do not reach this
conclusion with reference to the claims of either parental interests that are other-directed,
or the interests of ethnic/religious communities as such, but reframe the issue from the
point of view of the child herself. This argumentation rests on a conception of the child
that is not readily given by most liberal theories; the child is, at once, in the process of not
only becoming, but of being. An adequate account of children must address their present
situated-ness as members of particular families and communities etc… in order to do
justice to their present selves, even if such selves are understood to be also in the process
of transition. It is this process of transition which allows us a good deal of latitude to
determine the substance of their interests. As a corollary to this, the determination of
which interests lead best to human flourishing cannot be accomplished without reference
to external factors which we might reasonably accept as the basis for determining what
constitutes an objectively ‘good life’ and which factors are met by any number of
conceptions of the good.
So, if an ‘education for autonomy’ doesn’t lead, necessarily, to a more meaningful
life-path (in fact it might lead to less meaningful ones) and if it doesn’t make us live the
life that is more authentically our own (because it shapes us into things that would simply
be different, but not necessarily better-or worse) then it is not a ‘right’ that children can
be said to have for it doesn’t do what rights are intended to, which is to serve the interests
of the people whose rights they are. In other words, assuming our intention is to provide
children with either a more meaningful or authentic life i.e., one that is neither empty nor
imposed, the right to an ‘education for autonomy’ does not fit the bill on the ‘liberal-in-
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waiting’ argument. This is not to say that an ‘education-for- autonomy’ is impermissible.
I have not determined that, ipso facto, an ‘education-for- autonomy’ leads to empirically
worse or inauthentic lives. We can have access to an ‘open future’ without suffering
some of the failings pointed to above just as I have argued that a so-called ‘autonomyinhibiting’ life need not lead to a life paralysed by the impossibility of meaningful choice.
It is to say that on the above argument an ‘open future’ is not morally required. If,
however, we can determine that an ‘education-for-autonomy’ is required on another
view, then the ‘liberal in waiting’ view offers little in the way of an objection to its
imposition in that instance. One candidate for the imposition of at least some
components of an open future is the requirement of inculcating in children civic values.
Arguably the components of an open future which facilitate good citizenship are
coincident with those that facilitate autonomous-choosing. I now turn, to an examination
of the legitimacy of imposing appropriate civic values.
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Chapter 5: The Democrat-in-Waiting: Children and Civic Education
5.1 Introduction

In chapter 3, I said that autonomy and diversity were core commitments of the liberal
polity. Properly conceptualized, they work in tandem to preserve the individual’s ability
to live according to their conceptions of the good. In the previous chapter, I said that the
conception of autonomy that is generally posited by ‘autonomy liberals’, which takes the
form of a putative right to an open future, is inappropriate as it regards children. This is
because in an attempt to ensure that children are not inducted into views that render
future autonomy impossible – or that they are inducted into views that make future
autonomy inevitable – the conception of autonomy offered tends to equate abundance of
choice with autonomy without taking account of the quality of the choices and with little
regard for the particular individual child whose proclivities these choices are meant to
satisfy.
I have argued that an open future is not properly a right of children on two counts:
First, the notion of autonomy that grounds this view negates the dialectical nature of what
choices can be convincingly seen to be ‘one’s own’, and second, it offers future
possibilities that, on the whole, are not objectively more appealing than those that might
be offered by any number of upbringings that do not adhere to the ‘open future’ ideal.
The argument, then, that an ‘open future’, with its focus upon the maximization of
autonomy, is owed to a child is mistaken. This, however, is importantly different from
saying that an open future is inherently bad for the child or that it constitutes a violation
of children’s rights (or of that of their parents). Given that, the fact that developing
certain capacities might promote an open future is not an argument against the
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inculcation of these capacities or the values that are thought necessary for their effective
deployment.
There are other interests that might be properly satisfied by the inculcation of
certain aspects that tend to be annexed to the type of upbringing contemplated by
proponents of an open future. Specifically, the interests that members of the wider society
have in the moral quality of children (and particularly the adults they will become) can be
satisfied by the inculcation of appropriate civic values; the inculcation of which might
tend to enhance – by way of what has come to be known as ‘the convergence thesis’ –
those aspects of autonomy that I contended were not a right properly speaking of
children. These include the ability to dispassionately and critically assess myriad
contending viewpoints, one’s own included.
Many different reasons exist for questioning or even rejecting what can be
termed the common-school curriculum. Among these are the democratic paradox, that is,
the idea that the universal inculcation of the values deemed necessary for good
democratic citizenship simultaneously undermines plurality and autonomy (Reddish and
Finerty 2002-2003); the negative effect that education developed by the majority (white,
middle class) is said to have on minority children (Arons and Laurence III 1980); the
objection to particular teaching methods (discursive, say, rather than authoritarian);
objections to the usefulness of particular subjects (too much math, not enough music), or
objections to specific material – chief among such candidates are sex education, the
theory of evolution, and civic values. Objections to the teaching of civic values normally
takes the form of objections to positive depictions of gender role-reversal, the
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normalization of homosexuality or the putative equality of myriad religious viewpoints
and/or contestable values, sometimes thought to be synonymous with ‘moral relativism’.
Numerous solutions have been developed to deal with these controversies. For
instance, ethnocentric schools,134 charter schools that focus on the Arts or separate
schools focused on teaching within the parameters of a particular faith or in which
children will be instructed in a language other than the national language.135 With regard
to some issues, in particular controversial civic lessons, one solution is thought to be
found by way of exemptions from those aspects of the curriculum to which parents
object. The relative merits of each of these putative solutions could themselves be the
basis of an entire thesis. In one way or the other, however, they all speak to a common
principle: Parental control of educative choice brought about by at least some displeasure
with at least some aspects of the common school curriculum.
In chapter two, I recognized the following: Parents had only instrumental (rather
than fundamental) rights to order their children’s value-sets. I argued that the ‘liberal
standard’ is to view children as creatures of both their parents and the state. Both,
however, would be required to order the lives of children in the best interests of the
children themselves, as instrumental rights are meant to do, rather than weighing heavily
the best interests of parents (qua parents) as fundamental rights presuppose. As noted,
there is much overlap in terms of what parents can actually effectuate through the use of
both kinds of rights. Instrumental rights, for instance, can be adduced easily to defend
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In 2011, the Toronto District School Board approved the creation of an Afrocentric high school, the
second of two Afrocentric schools in the Toronto area. The first was an elementary school.
135
See Callan (1997: chap.7) for an account of the ways in which separate and common schools do and do
not map onto charter schools. In other words, a Catholic school might constitute a charter school, but that
does not tell us whether it is common or separate for the purposes of the relevant distinction regarding the
inculcation of appropriately universal civic values.
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such things as allowing parents to introduce children to parental religious views, only
here it would be on the basis that to be a fully participating member of the cultural life of
the family is in the child’s interest.
Two issues previously left unexplored now present themselves: First, what are we
to do when parents’ notions of the child’s best interests clash with those of the state?
Given the wide leeway with which instrumental rights imbue the parents to order the
lives of their children, the difficulty here is obvious. Parents may genuinely believe, for
instance, that to ‘spare the rod is to spoil the child’ and that a particularly harsh and
punitive regimen for even minor infractions is in the best interest of the child, but the
state would be delinquent if it turned a blind eye to child abuse in the name of parental
rights, just because parents believed it, dementedly, to be child-centred.136 The
legitimacy of instrumental rights cannot be, in and of itself, the basis for which parents
may do what they would not otherwise be permitted to. Second, I have not considered
the legitimacy of the claim that society itself has on the development of its future
citizenry.
This chapter seeks to develop a child-based analysis that nonetheless recognizes
the claims of the society to inculcate appropriate civic values. The analysis will take the
following form: That children are either served by or are leastways not normally harmed
by the inculcation of appropriate civic values, that parents maintain limited rights to order
the value-sets of their children, and that only a reasonable apprehension of harm to the
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In 2001, several families who were members of the Church of God, which believes in corporal
punishment, fled to the US from Aylmer, Ontario to escape what they believe are persecutory child welfare
laws. See Claiborne (2001).
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child ought to be dispositive with regard to excepting that child from mandated civic
education.

5.2 Parental Educative Choice

Virtually all observers agree that there is a minimal requirement with regard to
what things a child must know. It would be impermissible, for instance, to prevent a child
from acquiring basic literacy and numeracy. Beyond this, however, there seems to be
little agreement as to what a child must be taught. Even arguments that a child must be
taught basic citizenship values, which find wide agreement, leave many cold. Proponents
of a strong deference to parental educative choice argue that even if this is so, there is no
reason to doubt that parents are as able as others (namely the state) to inculcate these
values in their children (Burtt 1994; Gilles 1996; Galston 2002; Dent Jr. 1987-1988) and
only where they fail to do so, ought the state to intervene.
It is largely agreed, then, that society at large is owed future citizens who can live
up to the demands of being law-abiding and can cleave to the ideals of their society to a
great enough extent that the society itself can be reproduced. This view takes as its basis
the notion that the state has a right to maintain an orderly and peaceful society and to
reproduce itself, and that citizens of the state have a right to the protection from and
cooperation of those people with whom they will have to share political (and other)
space.
Moreover, children are afforded the protection of the state no less than other
citizens. The form of the intervention might differ, but that children are not unilaterally
the creatures of either their parents or of the state is the rule. For instance, virtually all
observers agree that parents may not beat or starve their children precisely because they
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are not, unilaterally, the creatures of their parents. These observations are generally
uncontroversial.137 It is within these (albeit broad) parameters that I situate what might be
thought of as maximal and minimal parentalist accounts.
A maximal parentalist account would show strong deference to the educational
choices of parents and protect these choices as parental educative rights, limited only by
the parents’ failure to impart basic skills of literacy, numeracy, the ability to make
commonsensical judgements of basic logic and the minimal requirements of citizenship:
That the law must be obeyed and that the legal rights of others must be respected. A
minimal parentalist account, by contrast, would show strong deference to the state,
limited by the state’s requirement to be neutral with regard to the inculcation of values. In
all this, much depends upon what are conceived as requirements of citizenship, how are
we best to understand the rights of others and whether or not there is such a thing as
neutral values. In situations where agreement cannot be reached, the question of maximal
or minimal educative rights must find some other basis for justification. On the childcentred view that I advocate, the child’s best interests must motivate parental decisions
regarding education. The question to be answered, then, is who decides what values will
be imparted to children in situations where there are conflicts between opposing or
incompatible assessments about what those interests are?
A sophisticated, but ultimately flawed, answer to this question is offered by
Gilles. Gilles uncontroversially claims that, for myriad reasons, it is parents and not states
that have the most incentive to act in children’s best interests. And the state that is
committed to neutrality as among reasonable conceptions of the good has no reason to
137

Chapter 1 looked at Narveson’s strongly libertarian theory which claims that parents maintain a right to
kill their very young children, but this is a view that is very minimally shared and in any case parents may
not beat their children.

175

privilege one conception over another. Therefore, the only way for the state to be
consistent to the principle of neutrality is to give parents very wide leeway in terms of
educative rights, as long as the conceptions into which they seek to induct their children
are reasonable ones. Therefore, on his view the best interests of the child ought to be
pursued as parents define it as long as their definitions are reasonable.
Gilles claims that the issue is not whether or not parents can imagine that there
exist other (even valuable) ways to live beside those that they wish to impart, it is that
their way is the only one that they are competent to impart (1996: 967). No doubt this is a
valuable insight – the fact that I wish to impart a particular way of life need not mean,
ipso facto, that I believe it is the only view of life worth having. This observation,
nonetheless, need not detain us, principally because while true it does not speak squarely
to the question at hand. Parents are not concerned only that they be allowed to impart the
way of life that they are competent to impart while allowing others (namely the state) to
impart different values as if the issue was one of them being forced to teach children
ways of life about which they knew nothing and finding themselves, thereby, foundering.
The issue here is when others (the state) seek to impart values against the wishes of the
parents for reasons that have nothing to do with competence, either theirs or that of the
ones doing the imparting. The obvious solution to the problem of being forced to teach
values that one is not competent to teach, would be to teach one thing at home and allow
the school to teach something else. This putative ‘solution’ is the very problem to be
resolved.
Stephen Carter has said that “contemporary liberalism faces no greater dilemma
than deciding how to deal with the resurgence of religious belief” (1987: 977). The
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reasons have to do with the incompatibility between religious beliefs (leastways those
religions he canvasses) and what liberalism dictates. What matters, for him, is the
irreconcilability between the very (different) natures of our respective norms of
deliberation, that is, the centres of meaning from which we make judgements about the
world. However, a different challenge now arises and that is to meet objections that
emanate from within the logic of liberalism itself.
Liberals are said to pass too quickly over objections to their preferred account,
which account includes two ideas that are usually found at its heart. The first idea is that
as long as the state does not specifically endorse a particular view, then merely exposing
children to it does not violate liberal neutrality. The second idea is that liberal theory,
with its penchant for rational enquiry, can disassociate ‘facts from values’ such that laws
that require equal time to the teaching of, say, creationism as it devotes to teaching the
theory of evolution can be dismissed on the basis that one teaches facts about the world
and the other teaches particular religious values and it is this latter which impairs
neutrality.138 As critics of liberalism have pointed out, however, the distinction between
facts and values rests on the very epistemic premises that many people reject (Carter
1987; Fish 1987; 1999; Sandel 1982).
Galston offers us this simple test. He asks us to imagine how we would feel if our
children were being taught something to which we were deeply opposed. His point is that
the content of the learning is irrelevant since, from the point of view of liberal neutrality
and the equal concern and respect it putatively embodies, what matters is how we would
feel about this: To imagine that one’s child is being taught that evolution is just a theory
and that, really, we were made fully formed in the Garden of Eden, is no less egregious to
138
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the ‘scientific-minded’ than to teach the truth of evolution is to the fundamental
religionist. If, as the scientific-minded, we would not agree to the Adam and Eve thesis
being taught to our children, then the evolutionary thesis must also be excluded as an
option for the children of religious fundamentalists (2002: 117). While it is impossible to
remove all content that someone would find objectionable without reducing education to
something hardly worth attaining (Callan 1997: chap. 7; Ravitch 2002)139 exemption
from objectionable material is meant to be seen as the obvious resolution of Galston’s
challenge. However, this is not the only interpretation available. Rather than assume that
a liberal view would allow both the scientific-minded parent and the religious
fundamentalist to each restrict exposure of the opposite view from their children, we can
as easily say that the correct liberal view is that if I believe it is appropriate for the
children of the fundamental religionist to be exposed to the theory of evolution if this is
what is determined by appropriate democratic processes, than I am willing to have my
child exposed to the religious thesis under the same circumstances.
Galston’s ‘test’ brings one major issue to the fore and that is the nature of rights
and what it means to insulate people from majoritarian deliberation. Clearly, liberals are
interested in siphoning off a reservoir of private conscience and in protecting people in
their ability to lead lives in accord with what their consciences dictate. Some observers
argue that the moral education of children should not be subject to the will of the majority
since that would violate parental rights, which rights act as ‘trumps’ against
majoritarianism. Now, Galston’s concern is about the expressive liberty of parents and
their ongoing intimacy with their children, the legitimacy of which considerations I
disputed in chapter 2. A stronger basis for Galston’s thesis can be found, however, by
139
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arguing not from parental interests, but from within the demands of liberal neutrality
itself: Since whatever constitutes a reasonable conception of the good must be allowed,
the state acts illegitimately when it promotes some reasonable views over others. Is this
what the state does when it imposes a certain education on children whose parents oppose
it? Gilles believes so and he argues that there are compelling reasons to give parents not
only the right to transmit their values to their children, but also the right to reject
schooling that promotes values contrary to their own (1996: 938). For Gilles, the question
comes down to who has the legitimate authority to decide the educational direction of
children when there exists a conflict between the preferences of parents and the mandate
of the state, in light of the liberal requirement of state neutrality vis-à-vis conceptions of
the good.
Gilles does make certain concessions to the idea of the family and the intimacy it
requires in order that it be a well-functioning unit, for both the sake of children and
parents. In this way, he tips his hat to the dual-interest view (940-41). However, Gilles’
argument can be reformulated. To be compelling, his view needs to be more sophisticated
than merely stating that parents may impose whatever views they choose to as long as
these views are reasonable, for we would still need to understand the basis of the parents’
right to have children exempt from exposure to views to which they object. Why, for
instance, would both the state and parents not be allowed to introduce children to any
number of reasonable views? The issue then is not the nature of the views that is,
reasonable vs. unreasonable. That they are reasonable is a necessary but not sufficient
reason to allocate the strong deference to parental authority that Gilles does.140 The most
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promising prong of his argument acknowledges the need to be guided by considerations
of the child’s best interest.
Gilles claims that it is parents and not the state that are more likely to pursue and
defend the best interests of children. He claims that because notions of best interests are
inherently tied to conceptions of the good, understanding which better serves the interest
of the child requires that we determine whether the state or parents serve the interest of
the child best as parents and the state, respectively, conceive that interest (1996: 940).
The focus, though, is not the objection that since parents know their particular children
better than the state, then the one-size-fits-all model that might be said to characterize
state mandated programs caters to their needs – the satisfaction of which is in children’s
interest – less efficaciously than can parental discretion. Rather, the argument here is that
since liberal society has only reached broad consensus on such societal values as
tolerance and law-abidingness, and this broad consensus cannot translate into “concrete,
protect what he calls “parental educative speech”. On this view, not only do parents have a free speech
right to communicate their values to their children, but they have the right that agents of their choosing
“teachers and schools” also communicate parental values. As a corollary to these indirect free speech
rights, parents have the further right to oppose educational requirements that their children be exposed to
views to which they object, on free speech grounds. This position is flawed thoroughly. In the first place,
free speech does not (nor should it) guarantee one an audience. People have the right to free speech for
reasons that have to do with their own need to express themselves freely, and the right for society as a
whole to engage in healthy deliberation in order to arrive at the best policy options for a democratic society.
So even if parents had a free speech right to communicate their values to their children (which arguably
they do, but since they may communicate their values to their children for any number of reasons, they do
not need a free speech argument to protect their ability to do so) the further argument that they have a right
that the speech of others, to which they object, will not find its way into the ears of their children, simply
does not follow on free speech grounds. In fact, in some instances the opposite is happening. The
Tennessee state legislature passed a law in April 2012, permitting teachers, who were so inclined, to
discuss creationism alongside the theory of evolution. (A similar ‘teacher free speech’ law was passed in
Louisiana in 2008.) In Tennessee, teachers are permitted to ‘discuss’ the merits of climate change and
human cloning. Aside from the obvious ‘I know a law that is trying to provide constitutional cover for a
religionist agenda when I see it’ (since the law’s scope does not extend to other objectionable and
controversial subjects that conservatives might be less fond to have explored) , this seems to be moving the
direction of education away from that proposed by Gilles. This is not to say, however, that such a law
would pass constitutional muster. Nor is it to suggest that the putative merits of evolution, climate change
and human cloning should not be criticized. Rather, the fact that these are allowable in the context of the
science curriculum (rather than, say, religion or civics class), seems aimed at cloaking the dubious merits
of the ensuing discussion in the legitimacy of science without all that pesky stuff like the imprimatur of the
scientific community: Tastes great and its less filling!
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legally enforceable educational requirements without outrunning and undermining that
consensus” (941), the very fact of enforcing educational requirements is, inherently, to
take sides among various conceptions of the good. He claims that “[s]o long as both
parents and the state define the child’s best interest in terms of a reasonable conception of
the good, we have no reason to prefer one definition over the other” (940).
According to Gilles, even the thickest conception of the good upon which we can
hope to achieve consensus will be dramatically less complete than most people would
agree is necessary for an education that lived up to the requirement of being informed by
the child's best interest. The problem, then, is of the application of this non-neutral
principle, which cannot hope to yield consistent results.141 Even if we could all agree that
the child’s best interests ought to guide children’s moral education (the non-neutral
principle), we cannot hope to agree upon what informs those interests (952). What we
can do, Gilles proposes, is acknowledge that parents have more incentive to act in their
children’s best interests as they understand them, than the state has to act in the children’s
best interests as it understands them (953-955). Parents, therefore, have a strong
presumption to the state’s deference in terms of educational choice because the liberal
state has no reason to prefer one definition of the child’s best interest over another as long
as both fit into an understanding of what constitutes “reasonableness”, which
understanding is necessarily expansive owing to the very pluralistic society for which the
liberal state is necessary in the first place (940). This deference “should approach (though
not necessarily equal) the deference we give to the self-regarding choices of adult
individuals” (939).
141

A non-neutral principle is one wherein there is espoused agreement to the principle from all people, but
the problem arises with the dramatically different ways in which each person (or groups of people)
understands the substance of the principle. See Gerald Dworkin (1975).
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For the moment, it is not enough to say that since children do not yet have their
own beliefs and values the exercise of which requires protection, then there is no
illegitimacy in imposing value-set A over value-sets B through Z, since that raises the
obvious question: Why A and not any one of B through Z? The answer to this question
cannot simply be “because this is what the majority wants” without inviting further
examination as to the legitimacy of democratic processes and outcomes and the
appropriateness of such having any bearing on the question at hand. The majority, by
definition, does not represent the myriad conceptions of the good that are allowed to
flourish within the liberal state. Instead, the state, on one view, must act as protector of
the rights of parents to oppose the majority, by, for instance, allowing parents to reject
schooling of which they disapprove. This puts us in something of a quandary. We cannot
recognize the right of parents to be left alone to pursue their respective versions of the
good without recognizing some limits of which I have acknowledged at least two kinds:
Those which protect children from the actions of their parents and those which are
necessary to instill certain basic requirements of citizenship. For instance, parental values
that insisted that parents could sacrifice their children would not be considered
‘reasonable’ since clearly they do not conduce to children’s well-being. Likewise, it
would normally be considered ‘unreasonable’ to argue that children could be taught that
black people ought to return to Africa as this undermines the very toleration that allows
those to argue that in the name of said toleration they should be allowed to induct their
children into the conceptions of their choosing.142 No rights are absolute and there is no
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What constitutes a ‘reasonable conception’ of the good is subject to much disagreement. Some posit that
reasonableness on a Rawlsian view, being epistemologically based, disallows any number of generally
accepted views of the good (Steinberger 2000). Others argue that what is required is only moral
reasonableness (Lecce 2008: 214-221) which would leave be any conception that recognized the right of

182

way around the question of where the limits are. Operationalizing these limits is where
we find the greatest disagreement.
Gilles is not specific about what constitutes a reasonable versus unreasonable
conception of the good, in order to conceptualize when parents are imparting one or the
other. He insists, however, that most parents do an adequate job of teaching their children
“the essential prerequisites for adult life and liberal citizenship” (941) and only if they
fail to do so is the state then justified in “overriding parents’ educational authority” (940).
This argument fails since the conclusion is undermined by the premise: If we cannot
agree to what these basic values are how are we to know when they have not been
properly conveyed in order to require intervention? Moreover, even if we can agree, as
we largely can, that tolerance, say, is a basic citizenship value, we cannot agree upon
what it requires. The idea that we have no reason to prefer one reasonable conception
over the other fails because Gilles has missed the main issue, which is disagreement
regarding whether the private reasonableness of, for instance, believing in biblical
inerrancy translates into public reasonableness of, for instance, voting in favour of a
constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. In other words, those whose marriage
options are restricted owing to such a ban would likely find the views that support it
unreasonable. Clearly, however, many more would not find them so. More to the point is
the important possibility of distinguishing between our personal convictions (that the
Bible provides the whole truth) and the public expression of them (this means that I must

others to the same considerations of civic toleration and respect as they expect. This is akin to political
morality (Vernon 2001: chap.2), which basis is the understanding that in view of the fact that we
necessarily face shared consequences by virtue of our decisions as to how to allocate resources and direct
the enforcement mechanism of the state, every citizen is owed not only good reasons for shared decisionmaking, but the equal right to participate in forming those reasons and the ability to convince others of the
superiority of their own reasons.
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oppose gay marriage). While the former is acceptable as a personally-held belief about
the nature of the world, it is its public expression that we encounter problems. But it is
practically impossible for many to sever one from the other, for reasons well elucidated
by communitarian critics of liberalism (Sandel 1982; MacIntyre 1988)
Furthermore, while Gilles’ argument is sophisticated, it imports either one of two
things that the argument itself seems to rule out. The first is a kind of epistemological
scepticism, which concludes that we simply have no basis for discerning generally and in
concrete terms what is in children’s best interests. But, this cannot be what Gilles means.
If it was then the deference we pay to parental discretion would need not merely
approach the deference we give to the self-regarding decisions of adult individuals.
Rather, the deference we pay would necessarily equal that deference, because on a
sceptical account there would be no way of correctly establishing any criterion that would
account for the distinction between ‘approaching’ and ‘equalling’. In other words, the
reason we only ‘approach’ rather than ‘equal’ the deference paid to adults’ self-regarding
decisions is because there is discernible space between what adults can be allowed to do
to themselves and what they can be allowed to do to their children. If this is so, then there
must also be a way of determining what is in children’s interests, such that the wishes of
parents can be overridden in order to promote these interests. And if we can discern
general and concrete interests, why must we pay such a strong deference to parental
educative authority as against majoritarian wishes to impart particular values?
One possible answer is that we have achieved, as Gilles maintains, a consensus
that children must be allowed to acquire literacy, numeracy, basic citizenship skills, and
powers of logical deduction (945, 984-987). Therefore, it might seem reasonable to
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confine ourselves to teaching that upon which we, as a society, have achieved consensus.
The marginal difference at that point, between what deference we must show to the selfregarding decisions of adults (d1) and the deference we must show to the other-regarding
decisions of parents (d2), could be explained by the fact that those who deviate from their
responsibility to provide those things we had hitherto reached consensus upon, can
reasonably expect legitimate state interference. In other words, the distance between d1
and d2 is explainable in terms of society’s consensus position. But this answer is
unsatisfying in two ways: First, any situation that would call for state intervention would
exemplify that we do not, in fact, have unanimous consent since there would be no reason
for parents to deviate from it unless they did not agree, thereby outrunning even the
consensus that Gilles claims we do have. In this way, the marginal difference between d1
and d2 cannot be explained by reference to our consensual settled convictions on the
matter. We might think that we can safely discount the views of those who deviate from
the consensus position as being unreasonable since Gilles accepts that unreasonable
conceptions need not be respected in terms of parental educative authority. However, this
option is not available to us. This is because a consensus threshold simply does not
provide us with a basis to determine that some people’s conceptions are unreasonable: By
definition even the unreasonable count as part of the consensus threshold. We can only
make this distinction with reference to the majority, which Gilles has ruled-out. Second,
if consensually settled conviction is the only reason for which there is a difference
between d1 and d2, then a breakdown in consensus would lead Gilles to conclude that we
could no longer educate even according to the minimal criteria the consensus had
originally indicated, since this criteria no longer meets the minimal requirement for
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enforcement – namely consensus. And since we know that Gilles believes that the state
can intervene to educate according to this basic criterion where parents fail to do so, there
must be a means to determine when that is. Part of the problem is that Gilles sets the bar
impossibly high. He writes: “The overarching standard should be that parental
educational choices are to be free from coercive state interference, direct or indirect,
unless there is consensus that those choices are unreasonable in terms of basic human
needs or essential liberal competencies” (945). It isn’t clear what, precisely, this would
prohibit. Gilles must either allow the majority more sway to fashion the requirement of
mandated education than he is prepared to do, or else abandon his hopes for education to
the Kukathasian realm whereby virtually nothing is impermissible as regards parental
educative (and other parental) rights.
The second consideration that is imported might be said to rescue the above
formulation from the charges of skepticism previously adduced, but it fails because its
premise must also be ruled out. In a reformulation of the Galstonian test adduced above
(pp. 177-179) Gilles invokes the Rawlsian device of the ‘veil of ignorance’ to defend the
claim that it is compatible with liberalism that parents should have the right to a strong
presumption in their favour on the basis that behind a veil of ignorance people would
choose to be allowed to raise their children as they see fit (970). Gilles says that the veil
is a good device to solve this problem for we would not want to give up our right to
educate our own children as we see fit and therefore all others would have the same right
to educate their children as they see fit, hence demonstrating equal concern and respect in
a pluralistic society. Here, though, Gilles embraces what is often seen as one of the
fundamental criticisms of Rawls’ theory and the device of the ‘veil’; namely, that it is
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‘heads of households’ that are thought to be the original choosers behind the ‘veil’.
While the Rawlsian original position can save itself from this particular criticism by
extending membership in the original position to people other than the ‘heads of
households’, unless one extends membership to children – which only the child
liberationist view rejected in the first chapter would tend to do – then objections to
Gilles’ particular use of it remain. One could not exclude women or non-whites from the
original position and then argue on behalf of whatever decision the choosers – on this
example white men – arrived at on the basis that this is what they would have chosen
behind the veil of ignorance if behind the veil there could never be other than white men.
Behind the veil the choosers cannot choose circumstances for those positions in which
they could never possibly find themselves without undermining the entire purpose of the
device, namely, that one chooses circumstances that one would be willing to accept on
the basis that one does not know in advance in what circumstances they will find
themselves once the veil is lifted. In Gilles’ use of the veil, children who may not choose
are subject to whatever conditions parents choose for them. It is not clear, however, that
were children to choose behind the veil that they would agree that it is their parents and
not the state who should have decisive (or nearly so) authority (976).143

5.3 How public is the Private?

At this point we might ask: Why do liberals favour restraints on majoritarian processes if
they also seek deliberative processes and outcomes that are supported by the majority?
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This discussion assumes that it is appropriate to use the veil of ignorance for specific questions of rights
and their allocation. Being that the veil is a means of ‘thinking through’ the basis of constitutional
arrangements at their most general, it is unclear whether the device is equal to the task of resolving the
particular manifestations of those general constitutional principles.
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For instance, Galston (2002), Burtt (1993) and Gilles (1996) all claim that liberaldemocratic principles ought generally to allow parents to have their children exempted
from material to which they object. We might refer back to Locke’s stipulation that we
would only agree to state power, required here to enforce the ‘winning’ views, knowing
that some things would be pre-emptively (and protectively) taken off the agenda from the
get-go, precisely because the outcomes of majoritarian procedures could require
minorities to live in ways that were both anathema to them and without the possibility of
any adequate recompense (Vernon, 2001: chap. 4).144 Such ‘precommitment’ gives rise to
the ‘private/public’ divide that is, as I have said, central to virtually all versions of
liberalism. I also said, however, that the parameters of the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ were
not themselves given, but subject to the capacity for individuals to rationally discern the
normative barriers that the fundamental condition of equal liberty implied. Some
precommitment is necessary in order to “protect citizens’ ability to participate in the
political process” (Lusztig 2010: 694; Holmes 1995: chap. 5). We might think of such
‘process-enabling’ rights as being those that are most familiar to us, such as the right to
vote, to speak freely, and to assemble with others. Moreover, other ‘outcomesubstituting’ limitations are necessary in order to preserve the very values that liberals
and others depend upon in order to participate in the political process, such as the “the
rights to life, liberty and security and the right not to be deprived of these without due
process of law” (Lusztig 2010: 694).145 But it is less clear how far limitations may be
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Moreover, in Locke’s time this had led to cycle after cycle of violence as succeeding groups tried to
press their claims to the exclusion of the claims of others.
145
As the ‘war on terror’ has made abundantly clear, however, even this list admits of controversy. ‘No fly’
lists and security certificates have made it clear that what counts as due process can be mitigated by what
counts as security.
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used to substitute outcomes in the realm of – particularly religious – belief that so often
spill into the public domain.
Michael Lusztig calls those moral issues that are most appropriately resolved in
the private sphere, “live-and-let-live” issues. Live-and-let-live issues are, in the first
instance, intractable and, in the second, content-neutral, by which is meant that their
private resolution “has no direct and substantive impact on others” (ibid). This, of course,
is the major thing in its favour, for if such and such a thing has no substantive impact
upon others, and yet has enormous importance to us, we would not want the majority to
be able to decide such a thing for us. The paradigmatic case is, of course, that of religious
worship. The most obvious objection to be offered here is that the fact of religious
freedom being a paradigmatic case for ‘private resolution’ does not ipso facto secure all
religious issues from public deliberation. This is so for two essential reasons. In the first
instance, the more likely that one is to have whatever one does for a ‘religious reason’
removed from public scrutiny, the more likely one is to recast one’s preferences as
religious thereby attempting to evade legitimate democratic deliberation.146 The second
is that it is not immediately obvious where the dividing lines between a ‘private’ and
‘public’ issue are in any given instance.
Lusztsig, for example, inveighs against Canada’s Human Rights Act and the
decisions of various human rights tribunals to which the Act has given birth. In the two
cases he cites, the issue was that of religiously motivated speech against the legalization
146

A good example is the case of Corporation of Presiding Bishops of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos. In this case, the Mormon Church fired the building engineer who oversaw the
gymnasium which they owned and which was used for non-religious purposes, because he failed to receive
a ‘temple recommend’ as he did not conform to Mormon religious practices. The U.S Supreme Court
allowed the exemption for religious organizations found within title VII of the Civil Rights Act to apply to
the case, despite the lack of a rational connection between the religious activities of the church and the
activities the employee performed.
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of gay marriage. Under a ruling of one such provincial human rights tribunal, Pastor
Boisson and the Concerned Christian Coalition were ordered to pay damages to
complainants with regard to a letter the Pastor had written in the Red Deer Advocate in
which he called upon citizens to defend ‘traditional marriage’. They were further ordered
to “cease publishing in newspapers, by email, on the radio, in public speeches, or on the
internet, in future, disparaging remarks about gays and homosexuals” (Lund v. Boisson
2008). Lusztig claims that the decision “effectively precludes [the Pastor] from giving a
sermon pertaining to his religious views on homosexuality” (2010: 704). What is
noteworthy here is that Lusztig claims that in addition to having barred the Pastor from
expressing his political views, the judgment forbids him from expressing his religious
views (ibid). There is not, then, such a clear division between ‘political’ (and therefore
public) and religious (and therefore private) views.
Lusztig casts the Pastor’s views as being of the “live-and let-live’ variety; views
which, by definition, are seen as intractable and content-neutral (705). Since, however,
these views are both political and religious the clear-cut decision to relegate them to the
private sphere is undermined. That these views are content-neutral seems insupportable.
Insofar as preaching the merits of traditional marriage in opposition to the merits of
legalizing gay-marriage carries with it a foreseeable impact it can hardly be so. Indeed,
the whole point of writing letters (expressing political views) and delivering sermons
(expressing religious views) is geared at convincing others to share these views in order
to bring pressure to bear on those legislators who might otherwise be favourably disposed
to legalizing gay-marriage, or to bring pressure to bear on those who might otherwise
vote for them. The idea that such activities are content-neutral is blandly false, then, since
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their very purpose is to have an impact upon others whether directly (by convincing them
to share these views) or indirectly (because if successful, gays will be prevented from
marrying).
The relegation of issues to ‘public’ and ‘private’ realms is said to offer false
dichotomies: Whereas liberal restraints make popular will subject to individual rights
prior to and outside of the political process, purely majoritarian processes reflect the
majority’s will in ways that might cease to be acceptable to those who continually ‘lose’
in the deliberative process. In this way, the relegation of issues to one or the other realm
provides “a criterion” rather than a “standard-that is, it tells us what kind of thing should
count as a consideration, but it does not give us a way of measuring it that others can
reliably replicate” (Vernon, 2001: 90). Deliberation over education is clearly appropriate,
but more to the point, the removal of some from the outcome of this deliberation in the
form of rights-based exemptions fails both to take into account the legitimate demands of
others and to discern the reasonable limits to their own demands.

5.3 What is an Appropriate Civic Education in a Pluralistic Society?

The ‘democrat-in-waiting’ argument states that for reasons of self-governance,
children need to be taught certain values that lead to good democratic citizenship. Such is
usually characterized by the ability to participate in the democratic polity on equal,
liberal-democratic terms as others. Moreover, the ‘democrat-in-waiting’ argument views
as imperative that the democratic state should require, via one route or another, the
inculcation of certain values in order that democracy itself continues to flourish. With
this, there are very few observers who disagree. Gerald Dworkin, for instance, writes: “it
is a reasonable feature of a good society that it is self-sustaining in the sense that people
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who grow up in such a society will acquire a respect for and commitment to the
principles which justify and regulate its existence” (1988: 11).
According to Gutmann and Thompson children have a (future) right to make
intelligent use of their civil liberties, both for their own benefit and to protect the rights of
others (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 65). This provides the basis for thinking of a
‘civic education’ as a right properly of the child. Moreover, the strong interest that the
wider society has in the upbringing of its future citizens provides the basis for a strong
societal claim in how these citizens are geared toward citizenship. The ‘democrat-inwaiting’ argument is distinguished, then, from the ‘liberal-in-waiting’ view by the fact
that, here, both the individual and members of the larger society can be said to be the
beneficiaries and to carry the burdens of however well or poorly individual members of
its citizenry embrace the democratic values that are deemed necessary for the continued
flourishing of the larger society as a whole, as well as how well adults eventually
function within it.147 Since children will normally become members of the wider,
democratic society, securing allegiance to defensibly minimal civic values is appropriate.
Civic education can include the panoply of various values, facts and competencies
that might be said to be concerned with the proper functioning of a democratic regime.
These can include strongly republican ideals whereby civic engagement is thought of as a
moral duty and perhaps, in Aristotelian fashion, the exemplification of humanity’s
highest ideal. One objection is that to the extent that it is viewed as imposing a particular
value, it is contested as inappropriate for a pluralistic society, some of whose members
147

Since democratic decision-making is collective by definition, it is impossible to neatly disentangle each
individual’s input from the whole and examine it separately. We must proceed on the assumption that the
quality of collective decision-making reflects to a greater or lesser extent, the quality of decision-making of
individual citizens. For an examination of the relative superioroity of group decision-making see
Surowiecki (2004).
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might decidedly disavow the intrinsic worth of politics, some who might even think of
politics as profane. The more modest view is that civic participation is justified merely as
the necessary price of accepting the benefits of the liberal order (Kymlicka 2002: 294).
And while this view is not usually accompanied by prescriptions that require civic
participation – and judging by low voter-turnout within advanced liberal polities, citizens
are just as likely to think it is their right not to participate in democratic politics than they
believe it is their duty to do so – 148 it can be invoked to defend the inculcation of traits
thought required to live up to the modest ideal should people choose to do so.
We can divide a civic education into the following three components: knowledge,
skills and virtues. Civic knowledge can be understood as facts and concepts about civic
affairs “such as history, structure, and functions of government” (Murphy 2004: 224).
Notably, the separation of ‘facts’ from values does not render the realm of civic
knowledge uncontroversial. After all, the ‘culture wars’ has clarified the extent to which
the question of ‘facts’ in school, particularly with regard to history, is subject to as much
controversy as are questions of values.149 Rather, the point is to distinguish between
those things that can be called facts within the parameters of contestable academic
discourse, and those things that rest on value judgements that, while more or less
defensible given other generally accepted ideals about the culture of democracy (to which
I shall return), rest upon normative judgements that could never admit of scientific
investigation and/or replication and so forth. The second component, civic skill, can be
defined as the “trained capacities for deploying civic knowledge in the pursuit of civic
goals, such as voting, protesting, petitioning, canvassing and debating” (ibid). These
148

This should not be taken to mean that electoral politics is the only or even the best way to participate in
democracy.
149
See Ravitch (2002).
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skills are important for anyone’s ability to participate in the democratic polity in order to
contribute to fashioning policy to their liking regardless of their preferences, ideals and
values etc…The third component, and an important corollary to other two, is civic virtue.
This speaks to the motivation with which individuals employ their civic skills and what
purposes they attempt to serve when they enlist the use of their attained civic knowledge.
For instance, some things are ruled out such as fraud and deception. (However, since
even this is not necessarily self-evidently so the necessity of imparting civic virtue takes
on some shape.) More to our point is the question of the public-spiritedness with which
citizens within a liberal polity ought to engage one another. Whatever else upon which
liberals diverge, it is relatively uncontroversial among them that democratic politics must
proceed from a principle of reciprocity whereby we are prepared to grant others no less
than the same terms we are prepared to abide ourselves. This is the fact of life in
modernity. Once we reject the political privilege that was the hallmark of pre-liberal
society, our only alternative remains a “continuing ethic of reciprocity in politics, in
which claimants must content themselves with claims that they are also prepared to
‘allow’ to others” (Vernon 2001: 32).150

5.3.1 Reciprocity and Toleration

The so-called ‘deliberative turn’ of the 80s and 90s (Dryzek 2000) refocuses
democratic politics away from the ‘you win some and you lose some’ of competing
interests based upon “a set of preferences, fixed prior to and independent of the political
150

Although I claim that this is a liberal notion, the fact remains that even those who deride liberalism
employ its language and concepts. We need look no further than self-proclaimed conservatives in the US
who regularly rely on the constitution, an essentially liberal document, and the notion of the rights
contained therein to argue against the very liberalism that they are adducing. This confusion leads to the
incoherence of attempting to use the constitution to restrict the rights of, for instance, gays and lesbians in
the name of religious freedom while deriding the liberalism that would extend rights to gays and lesbians.
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process” (Kymlicka 2002: 290) and the ability to ‘capture’ policy-making at any one
time, and toward the ability to co-operatively arrive at reasonable outcomes even within a
context of disagreement with one’s fellow citizens. Kymlicka refers to this as the shift in
contemporary democratic theory “from ‘vote-centric’ to ‘talk-centric’ theories of
democracy” (ibid). He continues: “it is increasingly accepted that [the] ‘aggregative’ or
‘vote-centric’ conception of democracy cannot fulfill norms of democratic legitimacy”
(ibid). One reason why this might be so is based on the question of reciprocity. The
legitimacy of ‘talk-centric’ rather than ‘vote-centric’ theories of democracy rests on the
fact that people have the equal opportunity to convince others of the superiority of their
position and to meet various objections. ‘Vote-centric’ theories, by contrast, provide no
avenue for citizens “ to distinguish claims based on self-interest, prejudice, ignorance, or
fleeting whims from those grounded in principles of justice or fundamental needs” (ibid).
The difference, however, matters. For instance, I might share someone’s view simply
because I respect and admire that person whose view it is, and therefore assume their
view to be the correct one.151 However, if I were to discover that this view was informed
by naked self-interest rather than fairness or concern for the common good, I might take a
closer look and revise my holding of that opinion. In other words, ‘talk-centric’ theories
hold citizens to be rational creatures capable of discernment even while it does not (for it
cannot) require them to come to certain conclusions or to vote for particular outcomes for
reasons other than naked self-interest.
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Hobbes claimed that we believe things that are told to us in proportion to our pre-conceived views of the
person telling us, rather than based on the thing itself, which will oftentimes regard something we know
little or nothing about.
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The notion of persuasion inherent in ‘talk-centric’ theories finds currency with
democratic principles, for without it minorities152 would be subject not only to views and
ways of life they may find morally repugnant, but they would no longer even have any
reason to accept such views at all for what makes defeat acceptable, at least theoretically,
is that minorities too have the opportunity to convince others and meet objections. This is
one way, at least, in which all participants, eventual winners and eventual losers, can be
said to be equal (Vernon, 2001: chap. 4). It finds favour with the majority principle
associated with democracy because for a demand to be successful it must secure the
support of a majority and therefore ‘talk-centric’ views are based on the idea that one
needs to convince others in order for any particular demand to be successful: “The need
to convince others, as opposed to just reinforcing one’s own convictions, creates pressure
to root out special pleading from one’s case, to generalize one’s principles, and to learn
what others find important” (68).
Closely aligned with the idea of reciprocity is that of toleration, for without
toleration for the right of others to choose to live in ways that we would find
unacceptable for ourselves, the spirit of reciprocity would be most ungenerous. The
public-spiritedness that animates calls for reciprocity and openness to the claims of others
also animates toleration. A morally defensible civic education, then, “must affirm the
importance of respecting the many different ways of life that individuals permissibly
choose within the framework of free institutions, even when those differences divide
them at the deepest level of identity” (Callan 1997: 12).
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Minorities, here, refers to views or outcomes that do not, ultimately, find favour with the majority rather
than referring o any particular group of people e.g. ‘visible minorities’.

196

What this means in essence is that a common school curriculum must embrace the
minimally necessary elements of a common culture that allows for the scope of
reasonable conceptions that persist within the polity itself. These include the expectation
that people should be able to justify their claims on the same terms as they expect from
others and the extension of toleration for those claims with which we disagree, but which
are nonetheless reasonably permissible within a society marked by pluralism. Reasonable
conceptions do not, of course, exhaust the landscape of all conceptions that exist within a
liberal polity. Unreasonable conceptions also exist.
Some have stated that the difference between reasonable and unreasonable
conceptions is acceptance or rejection of Rawls’ “burdens of judgement” (Brighouse
2010). Rather than viewing conceptions of the good that differ from our own as
essentially wrong, the “burdens of judgement” refers to the notion that people’s
conceptions of the good result from a combination of the culture in which they were
raised, their individual life-experiences, and the limits of their individual rationality, and
that the fact of this combination makes such views as reasonable as our own (Rawls
2005: 54-71). Unreasonable conceptions, those that do not accept the “burdens”, need
not be either intolerable or intolerant. Some people might still accept, for instance, that
others have something like an individual right to lives along lines that are wrong and illthought, without giving up their right to be treated equally as a citizen with equal duties
and privileges. In this way, even if they do not accept the Rawlsian ‘burdens’ they do not
directly oppose the common culture and the public-spiritedness that it suggests. Some
unreasonable conceptions, however, do directly oppose the common culture by
suggesting that limits should be placed on the rights and duties of certain citizens. Neo-
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nazis who would restrict citizenship to whites display an unreasonable conception that is
counter to the common culture.

5.4.2 The Convergence Thesis

To talk about a common culture or a morally defensible common education is not
to talk about unanimity. Even if we could all agree that some civic education was
necessary, we cannot hope for unanimity about what this would entail. Many theorists
contend that there is little difference between a civic education geared toward good
citizenship and one geared, for instance, toward ‘autonomy’ precisely because skills such
as critical thinking which are thought necessary in order to be able to make decisions that
reflect one’s motivating values, whatever values these may be, are the same skills which
would enable one to critically reflect upon their own received values and the very factors
which motivate their decisions, thus autonomy and democratic decision-making become
one and the same (Brighouse 1998; Gutmann 1995; Feinberg 1980). Furthermore, as I
have previously noted, what some find objectionable about this is the focus upon the
examination of received truths that are thought unquestionable. This mingling of
democratic decision-making and autonomy-promotion is referred to as the ‘convergence
thesis’.
It seems reasonable that one must be well-schooled in the proper functioning of a
democratic polity in order to “employ the political freedoms of democratic citizenship”
(Gutmann 1980: 350). This is because “the value of a liberal democracy to its citizens is
in large part contingent upon the ability of its citizens to exercise their political rights
intelligently…” (ibid). The ability to operate effectively within a democratic order is
therefore twofold: On one hand it adds to the individual’s ability to choose among
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conceptions of the good by itself being one such conception, that is, one can choose to
embrace a life of civic engagement as an inherent good. On the other hand, democratic
politics acts as the instrument which, if used ‘intelligently’ may enable one to employ
one’s freedoms effectively, whatever these are understood to be. This latter view is
clearly less problematic on its face than the former, and yet it leads to the objection that
even a defensibly minimal civic education does by the back door what it cannot by the
front; namely, that by promoting autonomy as a necessary corollary to the inculcation of
civic values, it espouses ideals that are too contestable to achieve the sought after
agreement (Callan 2000). Others have argued that there is a “significant divergence
between the implications of only using education for civic aims and using education to
promote autonomy” (Fowler 2011: 89). The successful teaching of good democratic
values will not necessarily yield the convergence thesis, since it is not the case that the
requirements of good civic education would promote autonomy to the degree that would
satisfy those who believe autonomy-promotion to be a goal of education in and of itself
(93).
Notwithstanding the above, the question of ‘spillover’ effect is real (ibid). And it
does seem correct to say that the general tendency toward critical reflection, if undertaken
with any degree of rigour, would greatly enhance the possibility of critical self-reflection
and possibly even guarantee it (Cohen 2000: chap. 1). This is further substantiated by the
fact that liberal-democratic decision-making itself requires a certain ‘critical-distance’ by
which is meant the possibility of viewing the claims of others as arising from the same
fundamental right to advance claims as do our own, and with the expectation that they
will be dealt with on the same footing. This does not, of course, mean that one would

199

come to disparage one’s own way of life for one might find myriad reasons to
recommend it. The point is that one would not be taught that critical self-reflection is
inherently good. Simply, though, that the ability to reflect upon anything with a certain
‘critical-distance’ greatly enhances the chances that such reflection would come to land
on one’s own way of life.
I believe that what I have said so far is correct: That parents don’t have
fundamental rights vis-à-vis their children, that while children are not owed an ‘open
future’ it is neither morally prohibited to provide one nor the autonomy-promoting
propensities that are annexed to other things which it is generally though reasonable to
provide – namely some sort of civic education. The importance of liberal neutrality is that
it provides a basis for introducing myriad viewpoints without violating the liberal
principal of equal concern and respect. However, liberal neutrality is controversial. The
manifestation of equal concern and respect is viewed by those who reject views other
than their own as a distortion of truth and a preaching of moral relativism. Perhaps
though, rather than looking for a strong and direct compatibility, we must content
ourselves with a more permissive standard. For example, teaching that Christ is
resurrected directly affirms the existence of god – a Christian one at that – whereas to say
nothing at all about god is not to deny his existence. While this might be an obvious
point, it must be remembered that in a pluralistic society wherein we cannot each hope to
have our preferred worldviews exactly reproduced in our educational system, we must all
content ourselves with lessons that are not directly incompatible. This, it should be noted,
also applies to those who would embrace liberal neutrality. The truth of this point is
largely ignored in the interest of establishing that liberal neutrality is, indeed, more
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compatible with some ways of life than others. Critics often speak as if liberalism was
itself a conception of the good; however, it is important to point out the extent to which
liberals who believe in liberal neutrality also do not get the benefit of public institutions
which affirm their personal worldviews. It could only be otherwise if we were to,
erroneously, assume that the support for liberal neutrality stemmed from a belief in moral
relativism, which it does not. I can embrace the need to present myriad and opposing
viewpoints even while privately not accepting them all as equally good. Furthermore, I
may very well engage my child in a discussion as to why I find particular views
preferable. There can be little doubt, of course, that the critics are right to the extent that
neutrality as I conceive it will accommodate some views more readily than others, but it
need not be grounded on the rightness of those views.153

5.4 Exposure versus Indoctrination

Parental concern that children will come to reject by degree or in whole the
viewpoints they wish to impart to their children if they are exposed to countervailing
viewpoints or facts about life (alternate religious beliefs and sexualities, gender-equality)
is not new in the annals of political philosophy, nor indeed of jurisprudence, as I have
noted. Liberals have largely dealt with this concern by invoking a distinction between
exposure and indoctrination, that is, the view that simply exposing people, in this case
children, to the facts of pluralism and the liberal requirement that the state show equal
concern and respect to all its citizens is not the same thing as endorsing pluralism or the
‘moral relativism’ that all views are equally true or desirable. Mozert v. Hawkins (1982)
offers a case in point.
153

See Macedo (1995). See Raz (1990) for a rejection of the epistemic abstinence view.

201

At issue in Mozert, was the Holt reading series that was popularly used as a means
of teaching reading skills. Plaintiff parents objected to their children’s exposure to such
things as doctrines of evolution, gender role-reversal, and role-elimination that were
depicted in the series. After the school board forbade children from being excluded from
the classes in which the series was used, parents took the school board to court citing a
violation of their religious liberties and those of their children. During court proceedings
“witnesses testified under cross-examination that the plaintiff parents objected to
passages that expose their children to other forms of religion and to the feelings, attitudes
and values of other students that contradict the plaintiffs' religious views without a
statement that the other views are incorrect and that the plaintiffs' views are the correct
ones” (Mozert: B II).154
Clearly, the idea that schools may not even expose some children to views that
contradict those of their parents unless they are willing to explicitly confirm that those
views are incorrect, is a non-starter. In an attempt to elucidate what was at stake for the
objecting parents in Mozert, Stanley Fish states that what many failed to understand in
Mozert was that “the distinction between ‘teaching about’ and ‘teaching to believe in’ –
between exposure and indoctrination – rests on a psychology that is part of the
liberalism” (1999: 92) the plaintiffs reject and did not want imposed on their children.
He argues, therefore, that the distinction that liberals are fond of making between
indoctrination and exposure no more relieved the school board from a duty not to expose
than it would have from a duty not to indoctrinate. While Fish is correct about what the
plaintiff parents objected to in Mozert he is incorrect about what their objection implies.
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See Stolzenberg (1993) for a sophisticated analysis of the case and the varying claims, of varying merit,
that parents made.
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His argument is that the distinction between indoctrination and exposure was rejected by
the dissenting parents in Mozert and therefore their claims to have their children removed
from the course were justifiable on that basis. But, if we accept the argument that parents
do not have an indefeasible right to induct their children into their own particularistic
views then what is relevant or not to the dissenting parents is not dispositive; some other
basis for proceeding must be found.
I have argued that at least one such basis must be the interests of the child herself,
which the parents are not uniquely capable of protecting. I have identified one particular
interest and that is the child’s interest in being a fully participating member of the family
unit. On this basis, the decision in the Mozert case, which found against the parents,
seems to reveal a bias toward identifying the child’s interest with prototypically liberal
values, which could debar a child raised in a non-liberal family from fully participating in
the cultural life of that family. This is a trenchant point, which can be met by offering
some context. First, it is likely that most families can withstand some level of deviation.
Past a certain early age, people are not automatons that do little more than regurgitate
what is told to them. Not replicating parental views exactly can hardly, in and of itself,
equate to not being a fully participating member in the cultural life of the family. Second,
it would be difficult to measure the point at which a child having been exposed to ideas
that distance her from the viewpoints of her parents, is necessarily having her interests
harmed. Indeed, any such child might be said at this point to have competing interests:
On one hand to be a fully participating member in the cultural life of the family and on
the other to be true to the beliefs and views she has come to develop, which put her at
odds with the culture in which she was raised. It might be argued that had she not been
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exposed to ideas that provided the impetus for her burgeoning and controversial ideas,
there would be no competing interests, only her interest to be a fully participating
member of the cultural life of the family. Two things might be said about this point. First,
it is very difficult to neatly categorize and compartmentalize people’s interests as if
people were little more than vessels waiting to be filled with information, and even if true
it cannot respond to the fact that there are some children who will feel naturally at odds
with parental viewpoints. Second, it is appropriate to recall that the ‘democrat-inwaiting’ view requires that appropriate civic values are imparted for the benefit not just
of the adult that the child will become, but for the sake of the wider society. In other
words, while the child in question might now have competing interests that the exposure
to countervailing values has precipitated, society also has competing interests: On one
hand to secure a space whereby religious and other moral values can be expressed and
practiced, while at the same time securing allegiance to values that make it possible for
everyone to enjoy the equal benefit and burdens of the liberal order.
A few recent examples best exemplify the point. The first is the Ontario Liberal
Government’s recently-passed ‘anti-bullying’ legislation. Some religious groups oppose
the legislation for two main reasons: First, it explicitly mandates queer-positive groups in
schools where students have expressed a desire to form them. Second, it expressly
outlaws bullying based on sexual orientation. This is noteworthy because a similar piece
of legislation put forward by Conservative MPP Witmer did not. While opponents of the
Liberal Party’s legislation do not claim that they would allow bullying based on sexual
orientation, the fact that they oppose its explicit proscription seems to be a means
simultaneously to de-emphasize the extent of homophobic bullying and to enlarge the

204

‘wiggle room’ given to claims of religious freedom when gay-negative expressions are
vented in the name of creedal adherence.155 In this debate, religious parents have cast
themselves as the victims of attacks on their religious liberty. This point resonates, in
particular, among the province’s Catholic School Board.156
Beyond just anti-bullying legislation lay the concern that in order to make the
legislation meaningful children must be taught that bullying is bad and in order to do that,
examples of what it is and who is most susceptible to it are necessary. The position of
faith groups that oppose gay-positive depictions in the curriculum is that while bullying
for any reason is unacceptable, this can be taught without ‘affirming’ lifestyles which
oppose their beliefs. We might think of this as something of a compromise position
between the clearly unacceptable notion that homophobic bullying could be allowed in
the name of religious freedom and the Liberal Party’s curriculum agenda which is guided
by their policy document on equity and inclusive schools, which provides that teachers
ought to use materials that reflect the diversity of their students. In combination with the
government’s controversial anti-bullying bill, this would seem to suggest the inclusion of
gay-positive materials (Ontario Ministry of Education 2009). The faith groups’
‘compromise’ position, however, might simply not be efficacious. A 2011 report on
homophobia, biphobia and transphobia in Canadian schools found that owing to the
extent of harassment and the fact that administrators regularly “look the other way” when
LBGQT individuals are targeted, Ministers of Education and school divisions should
155

In 2011, a controversy erupted over a proposed anti-bullying bill that included language which, on one
hand, was viewed as merely protecting a zone of legitimate free speech from wrongful claims of bullying,
and on the other hand, was viewed as a ‘blueprint’ for bullies to evade penalty. (An anti-bullying bill was
eventually passed without the controversial passage.). See Fincke (2011).
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Though there has been some speculation, and despite much ado from parents and the clergy (although
very few Catholic educators, who are by and large supportive) over the government’s anti-bullying bill, the
Chair of the Ontario Catholic School Trustees’ Association said they would not be taking the government
to court “at this time”(Swan 2012).
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develop “respectful representations” of LBGQT people in their curriculum (Taylor and
Peter et. al. 2011).
Inclusion of all common bullying incidences, which necessarily includes
homophobic ones, is more likely to result in a lessening of bullying than simply abstract
lessons that teach that bullying is wrong. Even workplace anti-harassment training for
adults generally utilizes examples to clarify issues. Examples are very important to many
learning-styles and are particularly so for children. Would such lessons not use any realworld examples? Likely they would. And if they do, the exclusion of examples of
homophobic bullying might blunt the anti-bullying lesson when it comes to those who
either identify as LGBQT or are perceived to. Here, then, we can identify a second
interest of (some) children and that is for those children who do identify as LGBQT and
who do come from homes where such identification is not acceptable, gay-positive
images in the school can be said to serve their interests. Importantly, making exposure to
such material voluntary, that is, allowing exemptions for those children whose parents
find the material objectionable would be counterproductive in this instance. However, as
in the famous words of Justice McReynolds: “a desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means” (Meyer 1923). The question that remains to be answered is whether or
not in the context of claims of a violation of parental and children’s religious liberty the
exposure mentioned above amounts to a prohibited means.
A second case in point is the province of Québec, which in 2009 implemented a
course entitled Ethics and Religious Culture that was to be mandatory in elementary and
high school (except grade 9). The Ministère de l’Éducation claims that the course, which
exposes children to various world religions, is necessary in order to inculcate the values
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necessary for life in a pluralistic society (Ministère de l’Éducation, Loisir et Sport 2008).
Dissenting parents claim not to object to the value of toleration or to their children’s
exposure to views other than their own per se, but that exposure to contending views
risks indoctrinating children into the view that all truths are equally valid, in opposition to
whatever particularistic truth-claims are being taught at home. And it is owing to the
mandatory nature of the course that their religious liberties and those of their children are
violated.
The controversy over what civic values children should be taught is used as a
springboard to the conclusion that the education of children is a matter of parental
conscience and thus subject to the limitations of government interference found within
the notion of liberal restraints on majoritarianism, which majoritarianism is expressed in
governmental decisions. One of the problems with educational policy, then, is the liberal
notion of consent or more precisely the question of whose consent ought to be sufficient.
Since liberal-democratic societies are based on the consent of the governed and since
agreement about what common schools should teach is not forthcoming, it is argued that
parents are correct in claiming that they should be allowed to have their child exempt
from certain aspects of the common curriculum to which they do not give their consent.
Indeed, claims for exemptions might be viewed as a compromise motivated by
deeply democratic impulses in that claims are for exemptions from particular aspects of
schooling rather than claims that certain curriculum should simply not be taught to
anyone’s children.157 What might be said about this? Well, the fact of non-consent to
particular outcomes, in this case the (perceived) outcome that children will adhere less to
157

It is possible, of course that this position stems from the fact that claims for exemptions come from a
minority of parents who are, by definition, otherwise incapable of commanding that such and such a
curricular item be nixed.

207

the values of their parents, is not necessarily an argument in favour of being exempt from
those outcomes. Consent must be understood as being of two kinds: Consent to the most
basic aspects of a democratic polity, and consent to the particular outcomes that that
polity recommends through its democratic processes. Universal consent to either let alone
both is quite simply impossible. If it were, democratic politics would be largely
irrelevant.
Parents’ free exercise rights are seen to be violated because they are constituted
by the right not only to practise the religious beliefs of their choosing, but to pass along
their beliefs to their offspring. As I have previously argued, however, such a right does
not inhere within parental religious freedom, but only within the parents’ instrumental
rights to order the lives of their children along lines that meet the children’s interests. The
parental claim to a violation of their children’s religious rights takes the following form:
Children’s religious rights are violated by exposure to ideas that contradict the beliefs
they have not yet formed and that it is precisely for this reason that their exposure to such
ideas is not to be permitted. There is a fundamental flaw with this particular formulation
which is that a child whose beliefs are endangered precisely because they have not yet
been formed cannot claim such protection of them.
Parents have a presumptive status in terms of educational authority. It is
presumptive owing to the fact that they begin educating their children many years before
children even reach school age. Moreover, their influence over their children extends far
beyond that initial period. Naturally it will, at times, vie with other influences for
children’s allegiance. As earlier stated, the presumption is weak; it does not include an
ineluctable right to an all-out veto of the state-mandated curriculum. If we can agree that
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parents have, at least, a weak presumption in terms of educational authority then such a
presumption requires that parents be given substantial discretion to order their child’s
moral education, which they are able to do in any number of ways throughout the child’s
upbringing. It follows from this that the state may not issue truth claims which directly
oppose the values that parents impart under the gambit of such discretion. To do so
would undermine the substantial discretion in the first place. This, however, should not
be equated with the argument that any directive which has the consequence of
challenging the desirability of these values should likewise be disallowed since parents
do not possess the right to hold, in abeyance, the conclusions that children would
otherwise reach until such time as they can direct them, as if children were mere puppets
to be manoeuvred. It is for this reason that there remains an important difference
between exposure and indoctrination and for this reason we cannot say that exposure and
indoctrination are equally forbidden despite the possibility of their having similar
consequences.
Dissenting parents, of course, will view positive depictions of things they view
negatively as directly opposing their views. And perhaps this is inevitable. And it might
not be possible to present to children opposing arguments about the un-desirability, say,
of racism and ask them to reflect intelligently upon such arguments and then to choose a
side. Rather we teach children that certain things, like racism and bullying, are wrong and
once they have absorbed those lessons they can, as they mature, come to appreciate the
force of the arguments that favour this view. Perhaps it is for this reason, however, that
the relative age of the children to be taught matters very much to the debate. For instance,
it is unremarkable to say that a basic liberal tenet is that the state may not issue truth-
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claims about the relative rightness or wrongness of at least reasonable conceptions of the
good. One objection, then, is that it will be difficult for very young children to grasp a
distinction between (a) exposure to the fact of pluralism and (b) indoctrination into
espousing the equal value of plural viewpoints to which they are exposed, forcing
teachers, in fact, to do (b) in the name of (a). How does one explain to an eight year-old,
for instance, that her best friend, Hassim, adheres to different religious tenets than she
does, but that she need not believe they are as good or worthy as hers, that she can
believe that Hassim’s whole family is dead wrong, as long as she respects their right to be
so? If the course merely exposes children to the incontrovertible fact of different people’s
viewpoints, without a correlative endorsement of the equality of these viewpoints, then
there is no necessary violation of the tenet, but it is difficult to envision how it is possible
with regards to, at least, prepubescent children to inculcate the civic toleration that is
meant to lead to harmonious social relations without espousing the equal value and the
equal truth-claim of all views. The distinction between older and younger children is
especially important if we are concerned about a child-centred view, and harming
children’s interests.

5.5 Younger versus Older Children

I am attempting to elucidate a child-based theory that nonetheless takes into account
society’s equally important need to impart basic civic values. Thus far I have determined
the following: (1) children have an interest in being fully participating members of the
cultural life of the family, but this interest is not harmed by a certain measure of deviation
from parental viewpoints. (2) Society has an interest in imparting the kind of civic values
upon which co-operation with one’s fellow citizens in the ongoing reproduction of the
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society is made possible. (3) Exposure to viewpoints incompatible with what one is
taught at home might precipitate a deviation from parental viewpoints that is great
enough that the interest identified in (1) is harmed, in which case it is likely replaced by
the child’s countervailing interest to live according to burgeoning viewpoints. (4) Some
children have an interest in having positive depictions of alternate sexual-identities and
gender-roles to which they will not normally have access. I have now considerably
narrowed the scope of children whose interest could be harmed by exposure to
viewpoints which are incompatible with what is taught at home. There is, however, a
further argument to consider.
This argument claims that exposure to values and viewpoints other than what one
learns at home, is harmful to children. One parent speaking about Québec’s Ethics and
Religious Culture course concurred, saying, “We can’t do this to children. It will only
confuse them” (The Star.com 2008). This ‘harm principle’ argument has been suggested
previously. George W. Dent Jr. tells of children going home in tears because they are
deeply frustrated and confused by the inconsistency between what they are learning at
home and what they are learning at school (1987: 888). In fact, dissenting parents in the
Québec case argued for an exemption from the course not only on grounds of a violation
of religious rights, but also an article of the Education Act which allows for such for
“humanitarian reasons and avoiding serious harms” (D.L. c. Commission scolaire des
Chênes, 2009).158 This claim holds some promise on a view that places the interests of
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Parents lost at the school board stage. This decision was appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, but
since the ‘harm avoidance’ is governed by the Education Act, the only recourse to win on this argument
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Education Minister. This was held to be unfounded and the boards’ decisions (as all of them had,
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appendice.
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children first; however it is not based on the putative violation of either parents or
children’s religious rights. And importantly, it is not at all clear that it could be applied
equally well to, say, a sixteen year-old as to a six year-old. This is because it is
unreasonable to suppose that a six year-old and a sixteen year-old are in the same
position regarding their moral and emotional development, generally speaking.
Absent a conception of harm at this point, it seems at least reasonable to say that a
six year-old who is in tears every day after school likely is being exposed to things which
she is not yet ready to handle. On the other hand we expect that sixteen year-olds need to
grapple with issues of values and morality, tolerance and conflict in a way rather different
from that of a six year-old. Echoing a similar sentiment, Sylvain Lamontagne, one of the
parents who opposed Québec’s Ethics and Religious Culture course, claimed that the
course is “a course for adults, not a course for kids” (The Star.com). Does such harm
attach to a sixteen year-old as easily as it might to a six year-old? It seems far-fetched to
suppose that an average adolescent is harmed simply because she is uncertain as to how
to proceed once she is exposed to diverse moral judgments or of what to make of the fact
of diversity. To a large extent quite the converse is the case: We are doing youth a
disservice if we do not aid them through this process now. Indeed, even the spokesman
for the Coalition pour la Liberté en Éducation, a group aiding in opposing the
compulsory nature of Québec’s ERC course, made this distinction between younger and
older children (Fidelman 2009).
Owing to the distinction being made here between younger and older children, to
proceed we must look at the case of elementary school children separately from that of
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secondary school children.159 Looking at elementary school children, I have already
identified the following problem: That exposure to ideas different from those they learn
at home may result in a kind of harm which we ought to avoid. This leaves us with two
options. Our first option is to exempt from particular course content those children who
would experience such harm. While this is largely unproblematic, and perhaps even
required from a theoretical point of view, its practical implementation is considerably
more difficult. For instance, would the standard for harm be how much distance there was
between the views of parents and the views which might be introduced within the gambit
of the course? If so, would such a standard then present a normative problem for dealing
with those parents who oppose the course, but whose views are said to be ‘not that far
apart’ from the ones to which children might be introduced? Would harm be ascertained
before or after the fact? If before, on what basis would (potential) harm be ascertained
since parents cannot be the sole arbiters of whether or not their children would be harmed
by such exposure without putting us back to square one? If after, what harm might be
done to children while we ascertain whether or not they ought to have an exemption? Our
second option is to provide exemptions for all parents who request them regardless of the
reason why. While this would deal with the previously identified difficulties, it would not
address the issue for which the state brought about the course in the first place: Its
important interest in developing certain civic qualities in its citizenry.
Allowing exemptions from objectionable course content represents a less drastic
transition than the all-or-nothing approach that would exist otherwise. It is not that such
an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach violates the religious rights of either parents or children, but
that the optional approach has several advantages. First, it offers a practicable way of
159
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avoiding the harm that I have identified as a normative barrier to instruction within the
elementary school curriculum. Two, a more cautious approach might cool rather than
stoke the hostility of parents, which is desirable from the point of view that, as this thesis
has claimed, both parents and schools (as quasi-instruments of the state) have a
responsibility to see that children’s interests are protected. Presumably, this is better
enabled by reducing conflict between parents and school boards whenever possible. The
actual cost/benefit balance between avoiding harm to individual children at the (possible)
risk of increasing (or at least not decreasing) intolerance would require a longer and more
sustained discussion than is offered here but could take into account such factors as the
number of children whose parents would seek an exemption and whether there were less
conflictual ways of getting the idea of toleration across – including requiring the course at
a later stage of development – the persistence and severity of certain intolerant attitudes
and so forth. Whatever else, course curriculum regarding civic toleration cannot be
developed in a vacuum and as material contexts change the curriculum should reflect
that. It is owing to acknowledgement of this fact that we see the development of the gaypositive curriculum that has acted as such a flashpoint, that is, the incidents of gaybullying that has had dire consequences has instigated concerted examination of the
issue.160 Moreover, it is possible that the mere fact of particular curriculum being
presented to some children will have a desirable effect even on those not exposed to it.
(In elementary school in Québec prior to the rearrangement of the school boards, I recall
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wanting to attend the ‘morality’ courses that my non-Catholic friends attended and talked
favourably about instead of the catechism classes I was required to attend as a Catholic
student.) The overriding point is that on a child-centred approach the argument as to a
violation of religious rights does not follow.
Turning to the somewhat different issue of secondary school, the standards shift.
Owing to the age of the children at hand, there is a greater sense that they are capable of
tackling these difficult issues and are not normally harmed by debilitating confusion
which I identified as more likely among younger children. The fact of older children’s
greater experience and cognitive development allows them to understand that not
everyone thinks as they do even if this does not lead them to think others’ views are
equally correct. What, then, do we make of a sixteen year-old who claims on his own
behalf that mandatory attendance violates his religious rights? If we can claim that he is
not normally harmed by exposure to diverse moral viewpoints precisely because of his
age, must we not admit that he has standing to claim that he has a religion of his own?
And if so, do we believe that exposing him to material he claims violates his religious
faith actually does so? One answer to the question is not given by the age of the child but
by the nature of rights themselves, for rights are always limited by consideration of the
like rights of others. In a pluralistic society this consideration necessitates an adherence
to the basic civic value of tolerance for the permissible choices of others, which value
must, seemingly, start with explicitly acknowledging the fact of diversity from a slightly
stronger base than merely begrudgingly. To the extent that it is adherence to this
necessary value (and not to any particular faith or viewpoint) that a civic education is
trying to inculcate, the situation is remarkably different from, say, the paradigmatic case
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of forcing people to attend particular religious institutions against their will. But perhaps
this answer merely claims that he ought to be exposed to certain countervailing
viewpoints. The question of his right not to be is a separate one. However, this can be
answered if we re-focus on the putative violation, bringing us back to the idea that
indoctrination and exposure are not coterminous. In fact, the difference between one and
the other becomes greater with the child’s age and maturity. We also must look more
explicitly at the particular claim in its proper context. What specific principles might one
be elucidating if they argued that they should not be exposed to the fact of diverse
viewpoints on religious grounds?
There are two possible positions such a plaintiff might take. P1 will be the view
that I am confident in my religious allegiance and wish not to be troubled by exposure to
other views. P2 is that I am either comfortable or uncomfortable with my present views,
but either way, I fear the uncertainty I may experience if exposed to alternate views.
Harry Frankfurt elaborates the point when he says that we not only care about certain
things, but we care about caring about them and this sometimes guides us away from
things which might divert or dissuade us from either following a particular path or from
caring about following that particular path (1988: 87). Following from Frankfurt, on the
P1 view, exposure would seem to carry virtually no risk at all since the person is said to
be confident in his or her religious profession so there is no fear, on this view, that
exposure will lessen their religious ardour, or otherwise impede their ability to publicly
affirm and practise the faith of their choice. If it happens to challenge their religious
ardour, so be it, but this is something that could only be known after the fact and cannot,
logically, be the basis for the challenge.
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The P2 view offers a slightly different challenge. On this view, the person is said
to be fearful that exposure to diverse points of view might challenge their commitment to
their beliefs. This view seems to require us to choose between the equally important
considerations of religious freedom and civic tolerance. Although Frankfurt’s
observations are astute regarding what it is that people wish to protect, it might be that
fear of having one’s mind changed bears more in common with the issue brought forward
in regards to younger children: That they don’t yet have a religious viewpoint for which
they need the protection of religious rights. It isn’t clear that religious rights to free
expression and to be free from indoctrination include the safeguarding of religious
uncertainty. It might be the case though, that there should be an exemption for one who,
on this view, is perhaps emotionally or psychologically vulnerable on the same harm
principle adduced for younger children. Such exceptional circumstances, owing to their
exceptionality, are not always foreseeable. While it is not a reasonable expectation that
the average adolescent will be harmed by exposure to diverse viewpoints, where that
might be the case, individual exemptions are likely more easily facilitated than with
younger children, because older children are better able to articulate their views,
including their concerns and fears and so forth, allowing us to better ascertain the specific
nature of the issue at hand.

5.7 Conclusion

Society has an interest in insuring that its citizens are able to invoke the toleration
necessary for a functioning pluralistic society. On balance, then, we can conclude that in
general, exposure to viewpoints that oppose those learned at home are either beneficial to
or leastways do not harm children’s interest. They are legitimate to the extent that they do
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not directly oppose either the truth-claims that are made at home and that they are
commensurate with the common culture of a democratic society. However, since it is
more likely that harm will accrue to younger than older children for the reasons
postulated above, a child-centred theory would hesitate to endorse mandatory attendance
at courses that will knowingly expose children to material parents find objectionable as it
will likely differ from what is taught at home, and might end in harmful confusion for
younger children. In any case, the religious rights of neither parents nor children are
violated and any argument as to an exemption from permissible civic education ought to
proceed from the different bases offered here.
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Conclusion
Liberal theory begins with the seemingly innocuous proposition that people are born free
and equal, notwithstanding the many ways in which this proposition has failed to be
made manifest in the lives of millions since Locke’s treatises established it as
foundational. But this proposition, relying as it does upon our individual capacity to be
self-governing and to consent, in some way or fashion, to the constitutional arrangements
in which we find ourselves, has left children unattended in some back room of liberal
thought.
As society’s social relations changed, more attention was paid to the status of
children as separate entities with individual needs and wants. The mid-19th century’s
growing concern with the ‘welfare’ of children and their moral status as separate from
their instrumental benefit to the family, which was seen to be legitimately realized by
making children work to ‘pay back’ what provision had been made for them, was
partially responsible for spawning the common school movement (Woodhouse 1992:
1036-41). This movement was not uncontroversial, and many contemporary issues
regarding whose values should be imparted to children were played out, albeit with
certain distinguishing features. The general history goes as follows (and while this is a retelling of the US record, the broad strokes are not far different in Canada): Catholics felt
that only a Catholic education was suitable for Catholic children, Protestants – who held
sway over the common school curriculum – claimed to offer a non-denominational
curriculum, which was, however, god-laden – for the general position was that you may
worship god in the wrong way, but only a religious upbringing was compatible with
living a moral existence – and others claimed that the Protestants’ ‘common’ curriculum
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was less common than they believed. With some variation, this should be sounding very
familiar. One distinguishing feature, however, is the particular values with which we are
today concerned. Previously, the fight over whose moral values would be imparted was a
fight over exactly that: Whose? Now, the fight is in large part over what values will be
imparted, as Amy Gutmann tells us (1980). This might seem like a cheeky subtlety that
signifies nothing, but it actually signifies quite a bit.
Taking children out of the back room of liberal thought and sitting them down in
the front parlour requires a stronger acknowledgement of their distinctness from their
progenitors than was commonly admitted, prior to the last few decades. In this time, our
concern with how children are raised in such a way as to be self-governing, if not now
then in the future, in the way that liberal theory has always presumed adults to be, has
taken centre-stage. Thus, our present concern assumes large swaths of previous battles
over whose values should be imparted, and adds a little something extra – the attempt to
enable children to be self-governing individuals, in the various ways that that term can be
taken. It means, at one and the same time, the ability to make decisions about one’s own
future good, and one’s ability to make good decisions in the context of a democratic
polity. Previous debates over the common school movement did demonstrate a large
concern for the democratic potential of children – from the point-of-view of
‘progressives’, assimilation through a common curriculum would aid immigrants and the
poor to reach their potential, and from the point-of-view of ‘regressives’, the sooner
immigrants would leave behind their peculiarities the better. But the focus on children’s
autonomy as a good for the benefit of the adults they will become, per se, was largely
absent.
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Yet while children may now have a seat in the front parlour, where they can be
both seen and heard, they cannot be left there by themselves. They cannot be selfgoverning presently, and attempts to ensure that they will be in the future have largely
failed to take into account their present specificity. Moreover, the common conception of
autonomy offered by those hoping to ensure a future self-governing potential, suffers
from largely the same defect as did the Protestant common curriculum of a century ago:
Its prescription is far less common than it believes. However, we cannot avoid our new
realization that children are separate moral creatures with an equal moral worth. True, we
cannot allow their own decisions to be dispositive as to how they ought to be treated and
what they ought to be allowed to do as the child-liberation theory says, since the unique
situation of children is that they require others to oversee that adequate attention is paid
to their needs. The child-liberationists have been unable to get their concerns onto the
child-rearing agenda because, despite offering a few words of wisdom, their overriding
concerns are so patently without merit. With that said, the equal moral worth of children
requires that the child’s best interests should guide decisions made about them.
The child’s best interest as the guiding factor when it comes to decision-making
about children is surprisingly not the common view. The common view, whether it is
expressly stated or merely implied, even unwittingly, is that the child’s best interest is
merely one guiding factor in decision-making about children. Commonly, it is held that
the family unit and in particular parents have interests that are served by their
relationships with children and by how children are reared and these interests give rise to
what is sometimes known as the dual-interest view, that is, that these parental-interests
ought rightfully to factor into our deliberation.
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Clearly, parents have interests that are served by their relationship with their
children, but such interests cannot be defined as subsuming children’s interests while
being consistent to liberal theory’s proposition of free and equal persons – others cannot
be used as means to our own ends. The instrumental status that children had prior to the
20th century, at the time that they were put to work to ‘pay back’ the material provisions
given to them, cannot simply be refashioned into something more benign. Their
instrumental status must be jettisoned. Once we jettison their instrumental status we are
left with no option but to espouse a child-centred theory that places children’s interests at
the centre of any consideration about how to best fulfill their needs.
Thinking about children in this way clarifies some things even while it
complicates others. It clarifies what stance we ought to take when we are confronted by
certain kinds of claims about parental rights. Parents, as I have demonstrated, do have
rights to order many aspects of their children’s lives. Some claims, however, are nonstarters because they adduce the interests of parents. One such claim is that children’s
exposure to material within the school curriculum to which parents object, violates
parents’ rights to free expression. The assumption underlying this claim is
inappropriately outcome-based; the idea being that there is something like a right to
guarantee, inasmuch as this is actually possible, that children come to embrace those
values that the parents embrace. This claim annexes the right to introduce children to
parental values to the right to prevent others from introducing opposing values in the
name of parental free expression. A child-centred theory, however, unpacks this claim
and shows it to be parent-centred and thus not an appropriate candidate to ground a
parental objection. This claim, however, is generally accompanied by the similar claim
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that an objection to views to which parents object can be grounded in children’s religious
rights. For different reasons, this claim is also a non-starter. Children don’t (yet) have
religious views to protect, leastways not ones that we consider appropriately theirs. It is
for this reason that parents are so fretful about influences that they believe might steer
them toward adopting views of which they disapprove. Hence, this claim is circular and
the attempt to ground it in the child’s interest fails not because it is not conceptually a
child-centred claim, but because it is not a conceptually coherent claim.
Other things, however, can be complicated by the need to ground decisionmaking about children in the best interests of the child, namely the mistaken idea that
children’s interests come first in any decision that implicates them. A child-centred
theory can be much more restrictive, as is the one conceived here, than most observers
(critics and proponents of child-centred theories, alike) have noticed. Since liberal theory
ought to view the interests of children as equally compelling as (but not more compelling
than) those of adults, we need to distinguish between decision-making directly about
children (those other-regarding decisions that parents make aimed specifically at ordering
aspects of children’s lives) and decision-making that indirectly affects children (those
self-regarding decisions that parents make aimed at ordering their own lives, but which
necessarily impact – often hugely – children). A prime example would be the difference
between a decision about which other children one’s own child ought to be allowed to
play with, and a decision to take up a new job in a different city. Both order and affect the
lives of children, but the first is an other-regarding decision aimed at directly ordering the
life of the child – hopefully for her own good – while the second is a self-regarding
decision aimed at ordering one’s own life, which nonetheless indirectly orders the life of
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the child. Now, clearly this is not a simple black and white issue. The relegation of a
decision to the category of self-directed does not mean that any decision the parent
undertakes is then legitimate. I cannot leave my young child unattended while I go to the
bar simply because it is a decision not aimed at directly ordering the child’s life.
Moreover, parents’ self-regarding decisions can often have more far-reaching
consequences for children than other-regarding ones do. And surely, there are no
instances wherein parents may undertake decisions that affect children whereby they may
legitimately discount the interests of their children. Rather, the point here is that a childcentred theory is more restrictive than most have hitherto argued, because we can
conceptually distinguish between (at least some) times when the child’s best interest
must, morally speaking, be front and centre and times when it need not be without
actually undermining the theory altogether.
So far, we know that children are equal moral beings with equal moral worth and
that their interests matter equally. Some such interests include being an equally
participatory member of the cultural life of the family and all which that entails,
including their right to have some moral grounding provided to them. All of this tells us
that a child-centred theory is required by liberal thought – even while children are
wedged uncomfortably within liberal categories. We also know that a child-centred
theory can be more restrictive than most observers have imagined, that this is not
inappropriate, and that it is capable of responding adequately to concerns that a childcentred theory does the reverse of what I earlier criticized; that it transforms parents into
a means to children’s ends. Clearly, good parents will largely accept this and often put
their children’s needs ahead of their own even when this is not morally required. This is
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because loving, nurturing and giving are normally part of the parent-child relationship
and parents accept this sacrifice as part of what loving parents do. But a child-centred
theory is capable of viewing both parents and children as moral equals and can
conceptualize a space wherein it is morally required that children’s interests come first
and a space wherein this is not required.
But this summation leaves at least one major piece of the puzzle yet unaccounted
for. While a child-centred theory can tell us when at least some claims are inadmissible –
thereby telling us that some things can be left out – it does not thereby always direct us
toward what things ought properly to be left in. This uncertainty comes to the fore during
debates about the common school curriculum. These debates often seem to pit two
foundational values against each other: Diversity and autonomy. But these values need
be not at odds. In order for this to be so, however, we need to acknowledge that there are
many kinds of life that can be meaningful and deeply satisfying even if they adhere to
ways of being that many of us would reject. Children will be brought up in households
that live in some of these ways and if the value of autonomy is that it enables people to
make decisions that are genuinely their own, we must conceive of autonomous decisionmaking in such a way that it could be compatible with choosing to live along the lines
that are given by some of these ways. Once we do that, we see that children are not owed
an ‘open future’ in the way that I have explicated that concept. But this is not as
straightforward as it seems for the very fact of children’s malleability – the fact that gives
rise to the fevered debate about whose and what values will be imparted to them in the
first place – also gives rise to the realization that even if an open future is not morally
required, it is not impermissible. Essentially, it is morally neutral. But the fact that it is
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morally neutral is a help to us and not a hindrance. This is because its moral neutrality
gives the democratic polity large scope to legitimately prescribe a common school
curriculum that does not violate the liberal rights of parents or children and can still
respect the diversity and autonomy of citizens.
Once we have closed-off particular claims about what parents and children are
and are not owed within the liberal polity, we necessarily place those things that do not
properly belong to the private realm, into the realm of democratic deliberation. It
becomes properly the place of the elected representatives and engaged citizens, through
the usual thrust and parry of democratic politics, to ascertain what is and is not a proper
common education in the liberal polity. I have confined myself to the discussion of the
imparting of civic values, paying heed to the fact that they cannot be imparted in any old
way. And as noted in chapter 5, there are many different reasons for which parents reject
particular curriculum. Not all of it is values-based and where that is the case it might
require a different treatment.
The last thing I wish to say is that a focus on children’s interests requires us not
simply to examine things in light of constitutional rights, but also in terms of good policy.
A curriculum that did not violate children’s rights, but harmed their interests would not
be morally legitimate from this point of view; hence the necessity to examine things in
light of age-appropriateness. Of course, once we do all these things, we can still choose
badly: We can think that certain things are age-appropriate when they are not, for
instance. But since parents can also choose badly, this fact does not undermine our
argument. Rather, it places it squarely in the context of a liberal-democratic polity,
whereby citizens deliberate (well or poorly) then choose (responsibly or irresponsibly)
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and, hopefully, revisit and revise when necessary. And that is about the best that we can
do.
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Appendix
How might a child-centred analysis play-out in some actual scenarios? There is no
shortage of recent examples to muse over, but perhaps the most relevant one was decided
by the Supreme Court of Canada earlier this year.
As mentioned in chapter 5, in 2009 the Government of Québec implemented a
course that was made mandatory in all grades (save grade 9). And no exemptions were
permitted to individual students. The course itself is divided into two parts: Ethical
instruction and religious instruction. The first part is aimed at “developing an
understanding of ethical questions that allows students to make judicious choices based
on knowledge of the values and references present in society.” The second part is aimed
at “fostering an understanding of several religious traditions whose influence has been
felt and is still felt in our society today.” In both cases the preamble from which the
preceding has been taken makes it clear that the intention of the course is not to undertake
an exhaustive examination of contrary philosophical ideas, not to undermine anyone’s
present beliefs, nor to “accompany students on a spiritual quest” (in Commission Scolaire
des Chenes 2012: para. 34). The Minister of Education’s goal is to foster toleration.
The course was challenged at several levels by several parents with no success.161
Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, Deschamps J. concluded two things that
were integral and which echo issues already discussed in the pages of this thesis. The first
is that the course was neutral. And while the Charter does not have the equivalent of the
‘Establishment Clause’ found in the US constitution, Canadian case law has developed in
161

A separate challenge was launched by Loyola HS-a Catholic boys’ high school-claiming that a regulation
of the Private School Act allows them to be exempt from the course as long as they provide an ‘equivalent’
course. Their action was upheld at trial. The judge’s ruling-and his inflammatory comparison of the
government program to the Inquisition-are being appealed
http://www.mcgill.ca/files/prpp/Loyola_Judgment_English_Summary.pdf
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such a way as to realize the spirit of that clause (ibid at paras. 17-21). Deschamps J.
recognized that strict neutrality is simply impossible. Any attempt to remove all mention
of religion finds the opprobrium of certain groups and anything more content-laden then
meets opprobrium elsewhere. With this fact in mind, neutrality itself cannot be the
negation of everything and compatibility with everything. It must content itself with a
lesser standard. Without adducing Mill, the Court interpreted neutrality along Millian
lines. Although Mill maintained that state schools could exist alongside what we, today,
would call confessional, private and/or charter schools, it was precisely to prevent the
state from having undue influence over opinion and thought that Mill advocated that
examinations on disputed subjects should turn on the “matter of fact that such and such
opinion is held, on such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or churches” and that all
such testing be “confined to facts and positive science exclusively” (1998a: 119). It is
this very sort of state neutrality that is being challenged on the basis that it imposes
‘moral relativism’. The Court, however, rightly rejected the ‘moral relativism’ argument.
The second thing the Court concluded was that the objective proof of
infringement was lacking. This is a two-step test. The first step is a sincere belief in the
particular article of faith one claims is being breached (the sincerity test).162 In this case,
the parents believed that passing on their religious belief is required by the tenets of their
faith. The second step is that an infringement can only be said to exist on some objective
analysis that a given thing actually interferes with the tenet. The Court’s decision turned
on the fact that no objective proof had been offered to substantiate that the course
162

In Director of Child and Family Services v. D.M.P. et al., the defendant, whose children had been
apprehended by family services owing to his racist beliefs, tried unsuccessfully to argue that the swastika
and other symbols of ‘white pride’ that were found at his house and had been written in ink on his daughter,
were part of his Norse mythological beliefs. This was determined to be false when he failed to demonstrate
a basic knowledge of Norse mythology or to make any connection between it and the symbols.
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prevented parents from passing on their religious beliefs. This was, in part, because the
course was (a) too new to assess various delivery methods and (b) that the legislation
itself did not prescribe anything by way of particular content, texts, methodology – the
definition of the course is exceedingly open-ended. In a concurring judgement, Lebel J.,
claimed that in the future it might be possible to demonstrate that the course does
interfere with this right and at that time the constitutional sands on this issue could shift.
This is an important consideration when unpacked. The Court did not deny that there is a
right to pass on one’s religious belief that attaches to the parents’ belief. In this way, the
Court failed to reject a view offered by a justice of the Québec Court of Appeal from
decades earlier: “That the right to give one’s children the religious education of one’s
choice…find[s] [its] existence in the very nature of man” (Chabot v. Comm. de
Lamorandiere, 1957: 716, 722). On a child-centred theory, such as I have developed
here, parents have no such rights because such rights are necessarily fundamental rather
than instrumental. I have claimed that they have a right to introduce their children to their
beliefs, share them with their children and hope that they come to embrace them, but I
have rejected that this right is attached to the basic liberal rights of parents to live
according to certain religious beliefs. And it is not clear how any course could interfere
with that, regardless of delivery. Perhaps, of course, the delivery method could be such
that it impairs neutrality and thus violates equal concern and respect for those people
whose religious views are not favoured. No doubt this is also a consideration, but this is
not how the Court positioned it. Instead the Court said that to prove their case, parents
would have to show that the “ERC Program [interferes] with their ability to pass their
faith on to their children” (Commission scolaire des Chenes at para. 27). While the Court
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decided correctly, it is not yet clear that it did so for the correct reasons. It really depends
on what is meant by “ability to pass their faith on”, but importantly at no time did the
Court dispute that parents had such a right, suggesting that the case here turns not on the
non-existence of the right, as I would argue, but on its non-violation in the instant case.
Of course, if the “ability to pass on belief” means no more than “introduce and share
belief” then this would be unproblematic.
But the two-step test is somewhat troubling, nonetheless. In the first place,
anything anyone claims is a sincerely held religious belief – once it passes the ‘sincerity
test’ – is subject to two, and possibly three further considerations. The first is whether or
not that belief is violated on an objective analysis, and the second is the like rights of
others. The third possible consideration is a section 1 analysis in which the government
may argue that a law which violates the Charter is justified in a free and democratic
society. Of note is that the claimant does not need to establish that a given belief forms
part of any recognized religious order. There are obviously good reasons for this. And I
don’t mean to suggest that this will allow people to start desecrating cemeteries or
playing their ukulele music at all hours of the day and night. Rights are balanced in
highly sophisticated ways.
In the case of children, however, we know that their rights are fashioned largely
as a reflection of what rights others are said to either have or not to have. In this way
their rights can never really be equal and opposite. Moreover, US case law provides an
example of what can happen when the Court, even if for good reasons, refuses to engage
in objective analyses of the religious tenets themselves and the rational connection
between the particular beliefs and the impugned legislation (chap. 5 fn143). But clear
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thinking about rights is relevant precisely because the waters are getting muddier. This is
evident from the following story: In 2012, the president of a group called The Culture
Guard threatened an action in front of the BC Human Rights Board owing to the “hateful
slurs” that were being used in a program called “Out in the Schools”. The claim is that
this program promotes hatred against identifiable groups based on their religion and that
the schools and the school board must ban the use of the “hateful slurs”. The slurs in
question are the words “homophobe, homophobia, heterosexism and other similar terms”.
There is no doubt, of course, that (a) these things exist and (b) that not everyone who
belongs to a particular church or group evidences them and therefore care must be taken
not to paint all people with the same brush. The irony here, though, is that such a charge
could only come from an actual homophobe. Who other than a homophobe would claim
that the words are “invented propaganda labels, used solely to incite hatred and disrespect
for individuals and/or groups who oppose the false propagandist information being used
by sex activists to indoctrinate students within the public education system” (Catholic
Insight 2012)? It will be interesting to see how such claims fare.
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